

# THE CHRISTIAN REVIEW.

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## ARTICLE I.

### THE GENEVAN SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY.\*

#### THE ORIGIN OF THE GENEVAN ACADEMY.

THE Academy was founded, according to some German writers, in the latter part of the fourteenth century. But this is an erroneous statement. It is true that the emperor Charles the fourth did issue (1366) a certain ordinance for the establishment of a University in Geneva. But the bishop of the city, supported by the popular sentiment, made a vigorous opposition to the proposed institution. The citizens feared that its protector, the count of Savoy, might use it to crush their liberties. Hence

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\* In preparing this article, we have consulted the following works. His. lit. de Genève, G. Senebier. Gen. 1786. The author was a minister of the gospel in Geneva, and the "Librarian of the Republic." He was familiar with the natural sciences and general literature. He was laborious, erudite, but deficient in the depth and discrimination which such a work demanded. Hence his literary history has every excellence, except the one we most desire,—a critical estimate of what the Genevan scholars and theologians have written.

Spon, Picot, Thourel have each written in French a history of Geneva. The first published his work in 1680. We have seen only an English translation, "printed in London, 1687." It has the usual excellencies and defects of the histories of that period. Picot's work is the best of the three. A great part of our notice of the Academy is taken from it. Thourel brings his history down to 1832. His manifest indifference to religion, and his shameful partiality to the libertines of Geneva, has made his history any thing but a profound and philosophical one.

There is also "a church history of Geneva in five books, by the Rev. Andrew Le Mercier, Pastor of the French church in Boston, 1732." The author was

the ordinance was never executed. Catholic Geneva\* has not the honor of founding the Academy.

The most noted school prior to the time of the Reformation, was that established by Francis de Verronay, (1429), to teach the common branches, as well as Latin and logic. He was, without doubt, a good Catholic. An altar was erected, after his death, in the school-house, before which every pupil must recite a *Pater noster* and an *Ave Maria* for the repose of the soul of the founder.

In 1541, Calvin returned from exile, and recommenced his theological labors in Geneva. The great number of

educated in the Academy. It contains some interesting facts and incidents, which came to his knowledge while residing in the city.

Besides Beza's life of Calvin, we have in German a biography of the Reformer by Henry, an evangelical minister in Berlin, in three octavo volumes. We have here the whole man. He stands before us with his dark eye, his thin and pale face, as the legislator and theologian of his time. It throws much light on the great epoch in modern history—the Reformation. Audin, a French Catholic, the celebrated biographer of Luther, has written also a life of Calvin. Here we have an instance of what the enthusiasm of hate can do. He is patient in the collection of his materials, but is as artful and dishonest in the use of them as a Jesuit of the old school. It has been translated into English, and is now circulating in the western cities.

We have referred to the "*Insti. theo. elen.*," by F. Turretin, 3 vols., 1734, and to Pictet's theology in French, published in 1721. The edition of the Institutes which we have used, is that translated from the French of 1559, by John Allen.

\* Christianity was introduced in the fourth century. The Romans were then in possession of the place, and had reared their temples to Jupiter and Apollo. In the fifth century, it became the capital of Burgundy. For several centuries the city experienced various fortunes. It was first under the dominion of the Franks, then united to Lorraine, and afterwards to Arles, and then to Transjuran Burgundy, till at last it became a part of the German empire. But the wars of the Guelphs and Ghibelines soon broke out. The pope absolves the emperor's subjects from their allegiance. The moment was propitious. And under the sanction of religion, Geneva achieves her independence. During all these convulsions, the papal religion had become firmly seated in the affections of the people.

From this period till the fourteenth century, there were three parties in the city—the bishops, the counts and the citizens. The prelate carried the sword and the mitre; he was their feudal lord, as well as their spiritual guide. Hence he became the natural protector of Geneva. The count of Geneva held the lands about the city. With his strong castles, and men clad in steel, he often waged a successful war with the bishops. In the midst of such feuds, the common people were not idle. They had their rights. At the sound of the bell of St. Peter's, all the heads of the families assembled to impose taxes, elect their magistrates, or choose their bishops.

From the fourteenth century to the Reformation, we see the count of Geneva yielding to the count (afterwards duke) of Savoy. The bishops who, at first, resolutely oppose him, at last become his slaves. The patriot band is formed with the secret purpose of throwing off the authority of both parties. For the corrupt lives of some of their chief pastors had disgusted them, and the usurpation of pope Martin the fifth, in appointing a bishop without their approval, and the sanction of this by Sixtus the fourth, outraged their love of freedom. Thus papacy and the feudal system were tottering and ready to fall, in Geneva.



refugees\* which came to the city, and his success in gathering a goodly company of students, led him to propose to the Council, the establishment of an Academy. But his struggles with the libertines, and the poverty of the state defeated, for a time, his plans. But in 1558, the government determined to found such an institution as the Reformer had suggested. But its means were not equal to the expense, and it was forced to depend on the generous contributions of private citizens, many of whom gave a large portion of their property.

On the fifth of June, 1559, the church of St. Peter was filled with six hundred scholars, and with all the learned men and the most noble of the city. Calvin first rose and made an address in French, in which he stated the object of the institution, and exhorted the people to pray for its success. When he had taken his seat, the secretary of state read the laws of the Academy, and the confession of faith, and the names of the officers and professors of the University. After he had finished, Beza delivered a Latin oration on the usefulness of learning. And then Calvin concluded with prayer.

#### THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ACADEMY.

The school thus established in Geneva, remained without any material alteration for more than two centuries. During this period, several new professorships were created, and some classes added to the lower department; but the organization was essentially the same. The following account relates to the Academy, as it existed dur-

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At the commencement of the sixteenth century, we find that Berne had already embraced Protestantism. Under her protection, Farel, Viret and Froment preach the doctrines of the Reformation. Very many were truly converted, and became in heart and soul Protestants. But the great majority, embracing almost all the patriots, were so only for political considerations. Thus when Geneva gave up her old faith, it can hardly be said she had any substitute. The fierce declamation of Farel could raise a storm, but could not still it. The old rotten edifice had been nearly torn down; who should build a new and more beautiful one on its ruins? To make religious reformation as well as a political one—to make an inward change as well as an outward one, to do all this in the midst of divines and heretics, belongs to John Calvin.

\* There were at Geneva, soon after the Reformation, an English, a Spanish, an Italian and a French church, made up of exiles from these countries—almost all the highest posts of honor in church or state, were filled with these refugees or their descendants.

ing the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,\*—the impress and monument of Calvin's genius.

Besides the Academy proper, there was a gymnasium or preparatory department, called "the college." In this there were nine classes. Each of these was taught and governed by a "regent," and all were under the immediate superintendence of an officer, generally a clergyman, with the title of "principal," who was also a member ex officio, of the faculty of the Academy. The three lower classes were for reading, writing and spelling.† In the six upper ones, nothing was taught but Greek and Latin. The preference was given to the latter language, while the Greek was much neglected. This was in accordance with the taste and custom of the age. It may have been the case that the influence of the Reformer was felt here also; for he wrote Latin with purity and elegance. As the "regents," or teachers, were thorough scholars, this course of instruction, though limited, must have given an admirable discipline to the young mind, and fitted the student for a higher and wider range of studies. As an incentive to honorable ambition, medals and presents were annually conferred on the most worthy of the pupils. Boys left the "college" or preparatory department, at the age of fourteen or fifteen.

The Academy, properly so called, consisted of two departments. The upper, corresponding to our schools of theology and law, and the lower, which resembles our college. It was the latter, that the student entered on leaving the gymnasium. It consisted of two "auditories"—the lower for Belles-lettres, the higher for Philosophy. Two years were to be spent in each "auditoire;"—in which were two classes, who recited together. That is, the class which had just entered was taught with

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\* When the Academy was founded, there were five prof., two in Theology, one in Greek, one in Hebrew, one in Philosophy; in 1565, two prof. of Law were appointed; in 1582, a prof. of Belles-lettres. In 1612, another prof. of Philosophy added. In 1632, a prof. of Mathematics appointed. In 1697, a professorship of Ecc. His. created. In 1724, another prof. of Mathematics was added. In 1773, an observatory was erected. Besides these, two professorships of Theology were added.

† This was not sufficient for the wants of the people, and there were several "*succursales*," or branches, in various parts of the city. With the exception of these, there were no other public schools in the city during the period of which we are speaking.

the class before it; and after it had been there a year, with the class which succeeded it. Faulty as this method certainly was, it must have secured a thorough knowledge of the languages. The "auditoire" of Belles-lettres had but one regular professor, who gave to his classes two hours a day, except on Thursday; to him was added a professor of history, who read occasional lectures; with this exception, Latin and Greek were the only studies. The "auditoire" of Philosophy had three professors,—one of Mathematics, one of Natural Sciences, and one in intellectual and moral Philosophy. Here the study of the languages was excluded. But this neglect was more than atoned for, by having all the lectures and examinations in Latin. In this way the habit of speaking this language fluently, though without elegance, was preserved.

After having spent four years in this collegiate preparation, the students entered, if they desired, the higher department, the school of theology or law. The former was under a faculty of four professors,—two of theology, one of ecclesiastical history, and one of oriental languages, or Hebrew. The faculty of the latter consisted of two professors, one of civil law, the other of natural law and the law of nature. The term of studies for the student, in law or theology, was four years. They were then ordained,\* or admitted as advocates. There was no medical school till the beginning of the present century. Before this period, those students who wished to study medicine went to Edinburg or Paris.

The professors in theology gave a system of Divinity of their own composing. They also lectured on the Old and New Testament. In addition to these labors, most of them preached† as often as once a fortnight. The

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\* Before ordination the candidate was examined one day; a text was given him, from which he must make for the next day a sermon in French; and another text from which he must make, in two days, a sermon in Latin, which he must commit to memory and preach. Besides his examination as a theologian and preacher, he must be approved by the ministers, professors and council.

† Calvin preached much oftener than this. Between the twenty-first of September, 1549, and the fifteenth of February, 1560, he delivered 2,023 sermons, making nearly four a week. A scribe sat under the pulpit, and gained his livelihood by transcribing them. Calvin's style of preaching was clear, his manner calm and dignified, except when his eye fell upon the scoffing libertines; then he took fire, and the words came like a burning torrent upon the head of the offender.

students attended, from Monday to Saturday, the lectures of their teachers. On Saturday morning, each student in his turn maintained a *thesis* in Latin, on one of the articles of the Genevan confession of faith. Another was appointed critic.\* In the afternoon of the same day, one of the students read a discourse, either in French or Latin, from a text given to him by one of the professors. When he had finished, the student made their criticisms, and the professor added his suggestions. These two last regulations remind us of something very similar in the Institution at which we pursued our theological studies.

The instruction in the Academy was gratuitous, the professors and teachers being paid by the state.† In a few instances, men of great reputation were elected as professors without an examination. But in most cases, competition was open to all. No one could be elected a professor who had not sustained a severe and thorough examination in relation both to his general knowledge and capacity, and to his skill in teaching. The choice was made by "the venerable company of pastors," and confirmed by the council.

#### JOHN CALVIN.

##### HIS BOYHOOD—HIS LAW STUDIES—HIS CONVERSION.

An excellent abstract of the life of the Reformer has been given in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* of 1845. We shall only, therefore, notice those events, and traits of character, which marked the man, and fitted him for the work he was sent to do.

Calvin, when a boy, showed a strong religious nature. He was accustomed to walk away from the house, and pray in the open air. The sense of God's presence, which he then had, seems never to have left him. It was this feeling which led him, twenty years after this period, to

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\* Some of these *theses* were printed in Latin. We give the title of a collection of them, translated into English and published in Edinburg, 1591. "Propositions and principles of Divinitie, propounded and disputed in the Universitie of Geneva, by certain students of Divinitie there under T. Beza and Ant. de Faye."

† Their salary was small, but they were at the head of the social scale. The confidence which they enjoyed made the place of a professor an object of ambition to the learned. Calvin received a dwelling-house, about thirty-eight dollars, near twenty bushels of grain, and two tuns of wine. Besides these, the state made several appropriations. But he was always poor.



close all his sermons to the persecuted Christians of France, with a quotation from Paul,—“if God be for us, who can be against us?” Beza assures us that he was a stern censor of the morals of his school-fellows. His father, seeing these traits in his son, devoted him to the service of the church; and he procured for him, when twelve years old, a benefice in the chapel of his native city. He now goes with the boys of the Mommor family to Paris to prepare himself for his University studies. The slender body and pale face of the young student of Noyon afford a strange contrast to the ruddy Saxon boy, singing for his bread on the road to Magdeburg. But the large forehead, the prominent eye, the Grecian nose, the thin and slightly curled lip, made ample amends for other bodily defects. A dull observer must have seen that there were in the young man powers of the highest order—powers that were needed in his time to stay the storm, and to create from the scattered ruins a new and harmonious whole.\* He already exhibited, says Remond, “a sharp and vigorous intellect, prompt at repartee, bold in attack. He spoke but little, his language was serious and always to the point. He seldom entered into society.”

We must also follow Calvin to Orleans, and afterwards to Burges. His father, seeing the troubles of the times, and the honors which awaited the student in the study and practice of law, sent his son to the first jurist of France, Peter de Estoile. He was the delight of his master, docile and full of zeal for study. It is said that when his teacher was absent, he took the chair and performed the duties of the station in a manner quite acceptable to his hearers. In the midst of thoughtlessness and vice, Calvin still led the same quiet, diligent

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\* Audin, who certainly is not very partial to Calvin, gives the following incident which illustrates this element in the Reformer's character. “The council of the two hundred had assembled. Never had any session been more tumultuous; the parties, weary of speaking, began to appeal to arms. Calvin appears unattended; he is received in the lower part of the hall with cries of death. He folds his arms, looks the agitators fixedly in the face. Not one of them dares strike him. Then, advancing through the midst of the groups, with his head uncovered, ‘If you want blood,’ says he, ‘there are still a few drops here, strike then.’ Not an arm is raised. Calvin ascends the stairs, a few words calm the agitators. He descends, and cries out to the people that he wishes to address them. He does speak, and with such an energy and feeling that tears flow from their eyes; they embrace each other, and the crowd retires in silence.

and austere life. One of his bitterest enemies tells us, that his fellow-students were wont to say of him, John knows how to decline even to the accusative, indicating his knowledge of the Latin and his censorial spirit.

He left Orleans for Burges. Here he met the famous Italian Alciati, the man of all sciences. Under him, he seems to have stored his mind with various learning. Beza informs us that "he wrote and studied till night; and to be able to do this, he ate very sparingly at supper; then, on awaking in the morning, he was wont to remain awhile in his bed, recalling to mind and ruminating upon all he had learned the evening before." But there was another professor there, who also exerted a great influence on Calvin. It was Melchior Wolmar, professor of Greek. He loved his pupil and was loved by him in return. Calvin thus speaks of him in his *Pref. Epis. Cor.* "During my whole life, I shall cherish the memory of your zeal for my advancement, of your love for your disciple, of your delight in ornamenting my mind with all the gifts of science, and for opening your purse." Wolmar said to him one day, as they were walking together, "Do you know your father has mistaken your calling? You have not been called, like Alciati, to preach law, nor like myself, to talk Greek; give yourself up to theology, for she is the mistress of all the sciences."

While engaged in the study of law, the student did not abandon the idea of preaching the gospel. He himself tells us that in spite of all his efforts to lead a quiet life, his room became a public school, where resorted all the earnest inquirers after the true faith. He even went so far as to give public discourses in the cloisters about Burges.

It is impossible to determine when the conversion of Calvin took place. It may have been when he was but a child, under the care of a Catholic, but pious mother; or while at the University, where he first opened the word of God, and first met with those who were inclined to the doctrines of the reformers. It is certain that he did not leave the Catholic church, till he had found something which better satisfied the religious wants of his nature. While in the service of the papacy, he was not always at ease. He thus speaks of himself in a letter to Sadolet, who had written an epistle to Geneva, exhorting the people to return to their allegiance to Rome. "I was

very far from an assured tranquillity of conscience. For as often as I descended into my heart, or lifted my mind to thee, extreme horror seized me, which no purification, no satisfaction could cure. Ah! the more closely I looked into myself, the sharper stings pierced my conscience, in such sort that no solace or comfort remained for me, except to forget and thus to deceive myself." In his preface to the Psalms, he declares "that when he had been somewhat hardened in those things (papal customs), God by a sudden conversion subdued his heart and made it docile." How manifest it is, that this great moral change, whenever it did take place, was the work of the Spirit of God.

#### HIS THEOLOGICAL VIEWS.

Calvin's character and training were well fitted to make him the theologian of the Reformation. His intellect, naturally acute and comprehensive, had been sharpened and strengthened under the favorite masters of the age. He loved to think, not because the exercise of mental power afforded gratification, but from the fact, that there were truths worth knowing and pondering. He was an earnest Christian man. We see in him nothing of that sickly sentimentalism which is so much in vogue at the present day. He had a profound personal sense of the great realities of religion. His logical power, and the clearness with which he reasoned would not allow him to be a mystic; yet he possessed a depth of religious feeling, which it would be difficult to find in union with the reasoning faculty in any other man, if we except the apostle Paul, and our own Edwards. Calvin had, too, all the learning of his times. This was of great service to him in his controversies with the papists and the heretics, who seemed to swarm round Geneva to destroy it. And where there is no necessity of one's being a polemic, knowledge of every kind will be of value. Especially is this true of historical information. We may safely affirm that the profound historian, other things being equal, will make the ablest theologian. In noticing the theological views of Calvin and his successors, Turretin and Pictet, we shall confine our attention to those doctrines which characterized them, and the school they represented.

Calvin's great theological work was the Christian Insti-

tutes. The first edition was issued in 1535, of which no copy has been found. In the next year, it was printed in Latin at Basil. This contains the celebrated dedication to Francis I.\* It was then a small work of 514 pages octavo. It was called forth by the sufferings of his fellow-countrymen. He tells us that he had written it "for the French, of whom I apprehended multitudes to be hungering and thirsting after Christ."† It contained six chapters on the following subjects.

1. Explanation of the Decalogue.
2. "Of faith, where the symbol (called the apostolic) is explained."
3. "Of prayer, where the Lord's prayer is expounded."
4. "Of the sacraments, where baptism and the Lord's supper are treated."
5. "In which it is shown that the five others, commonly esteemed sacraments, are no sacraments."
6. Concerning Christian liberty, ecclesiastical power, polity, government.

This work underwent great alterations in the several editions, which were published during the life time of its author. In that of 1559, we have the most complete view of Calvin's theological system. It was printed in one folio volume of 564 pages. In his preface to the work, as thus finally corrected by himself, he says, "In the first edition of this work, I handled the subject, for the most part, in a superficial manner, as is usual in small treatises." "Now my design in this work has been to prepare, and qualify students of theology, for the reading of the divine word. I think I have given a comprehensive summary and orderly arrangement of all the

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\* How Francis regarded the Reformation may be gathered from a paragraph in Viller's influence of the Reformation of Luther. "Brantom relates that one day, when the king was explaining his views on this subject, he let drop the remark, that this novelty tended to the utter overthrow of sovereignty, whether it was vested in God or man. On another occasion, when he had intimated to the nuncio, that he might follow the example of Henry VIII, the prelate who saw through the artifice, replied, 'Let me be frank, Sire! You would be the first to regret it. If a new religion be once established among a people, they next demand a new prince.'"

† Audin thus remarks on the style in which the dedication is written. One is at times in admiration while reading the dedication to Francis I, and some of the chapters to this treatise, to behold with what docility the material sign obeys the caprices of the writer. Never does the proper word fail him; he calls it and it comes.



branches of religion." The Institutes, as enlarged and improved, contained four books.

The first relates to God, our knowledge of him, his character and mode of existence.

The second relates to Christ, in which the atonement is explained and proved.

The third relates to the Holy Spirit. There must be a new spiritual life in the soul of man.

The fourth relates to the church, sacraments and civil government.

The fall and depravity of man are treated of in the second and third books, where he shows that justification takes place through Christ, and sanctification through the Spirit. We think it would have been better to have treated of these subjects in a separate book. It is common also to discuss the work of the Son and of the Spirit together, relating as they both do, to our redemption. Faulty however as was the Institutes in method, it was much superior to Melancthon's great work, "*Loci communes*." The translation into nearly all the modern languages shows that it exerted an influence, wherever the doctrines of the reformed had gained a foothold. It would be an interesting labor to trace this influence, especially as it is seen in France and England. It is worthy of note, that Calvin's views were the same in the first edition as in the last. This shows that they were not formed by controversy, though they might have been strengthened by it. We might make the same remark with reference to his favorite author, Augustine. It is equally true of both, that their views were the result of patient and protracted thought. Controversy did not give them birth, but only a vigorous growth, and a form a little out of proportion with the other truths of Christian theology.

The chief glory of the Calvinistic system has exposed it to the bitterest attacks of its enemies. The reformer, turning aside from all discussions on the attributes of Deity, grasps the one, but grand idea of the holy God, whose decrees are eternal and unsearchable. On this account Calvin has been called a fatalist. Nothing could be more false or shallow than such a charge. The very reverse of this is true; no view of religion could be more opposed to the doctrine of fate. The only way of escaping from pantheism or fatalism is by holding fast to

the idea of a personal and sovereign God. Chance and necessity are but different names, given to the same lifeless principle, which is supposed to govern the world. Calvin started with the overwhelming conviction that there was one living Being, who was the governor, not of a multitude of isolated worlds; nor the director of what might seem the most important matters in the universe; but the absolute ruler of the entire creation. It formed one government under his sway. Hence he inferred, there must be one purpose, worthy of the supreme Lord, to secure which, every event in the universe shall be turned to account. While all his intelligent creatures are free, none of them can defeat his plans. Thus the scheme of providence and of grace are full of mystery. We can love God, we can confide in him, but we cannot fathom the eternal counsels of his will. Hence, too, God alone is responsible, and responsible alone to himself. So without despairing on account of seeming want of success, we have the highest incentive to labor,—that we shall participate, through Christ, in the glorious triumphs of our God. In some such way Calvin reasoned. The starting point of the fatalist is altogether different. He assumes the dogma that mind and matter are under the law of physical necessity. In such a system there can be no virtue, no providence, no infinite and wise God. It is easy to see then, that the school of Geneva has presented a bolder and more effective antagonism against these views, than that exhibited by the Arminian system. And as to the semi Socinian scheme which prevails to such an extent in New England, it has always shown a tendency to naturalism. Priestly, as a theologian, had a much stronger resemblance to Spinoza than Calvin had. A few sentences from the chapter on decrees, taken from the Institutes, will show the truth of what we have asserted. “Notwithstanding the ordination of all things by the certain purpose and direction of God, yet to us they are fortuitous, because the order, reason and necessity of events are chiefly concealed in the purposes of God. For they present no other appearance, whether they are considered in their own nature, or are estimated according to our knowledge and judgment.”

There are many who seem to think that Calvin's God was a mere deification of power, and that election was

the exercise of a purely arbitrary will. We are satisfied that this arises from a superficial knowledge of the man and his writings. His early Christian experience, the practical character of his theological works, show that this was very far from being true. The holiness of God was as essential an element in his system as the sovereignty of God. We quote again from the same chapter. "It is true, indeed, if we are ready to learn with quiet and sober minds, that the final issue sufficiently proves the counsels of God to be directed by the best of reasons. For the will of God is the highest rule of justice; so that what he wills must be considered just, for this very reason, because he wills it. When it is inquired, therefore, why the Lord did so, the answer must be, because he would. But if you go farther and ask why he so determined, you are in search of something greater and higher than the will of God, which can never be found. Yet we espouse not the notion of the Romish theologians concerning the absolute and arbitrary power of God, which, on account of its profaneness, deserves our detestation. We represent *not God as lawless*, who is a law to himself, because the will of God is the highest standard of perfection—even *the law of all laws*." The opponents of Calvinism spend a great deal of idle declamation on this subject. What we want is a refutation of the Genevan heresies, if they bear that character. The religious world has yet to see this. It must be patient, however; for the task will not be very easy.

But why did Calvin insist so strongly on the doctrine of election? This is the question which many good men have asked. They seem to suppose that it was the result of a mere process of reasoning—a cold and lifeless abstraction; that, though it was true, it had as little to do with Christianity as one of the theories of Euclid. Now had this been the case, the reformer would never have given it a place in his theology, for he was not fond of idle speculations. In one of his letters to Melancthon, he objects to this feature in some of his writings. This doctrine has a vital connection with the great truths of our religion. Let us suppose that it is rejected; we will not say that the beauty of God's moral government would be greatly marred, though we have no doubt such would be the fact; but what we insist on is that the

scheme of redemption would have no foundation. For if you deny God's gracious purpose to save, then you reject the actual execution of that design—regeneration. Give up regeneration, and you cannot hold to the actual depravity of man. Then the last scenes in the life of the Redeemer become a solemn farce. He is a teacher, a little more exalted than Moses. This system differs only in degree, but not in kind, from that taught by Confucius or Socrates.\* We do not mean to charge these consequences upon all who reject the doctrine of election; men sometimes hold views which are inconsistent with each other. But what we wish to show is, that a mind like Calvin's, possessing great logical power, must either hold to this doctrine, or abandon at once the essentials of Christianity.

That God acts as a sovereign in electing from the human family some to eternal life, Calvin not only taught, but preached. He had none of those doubts about the propriety of introducing it into his discourses, which seem to trouble some worthy ministers of the present day. We believe that these doubts spring from the mistake that such preaching can serve no practical purpose. We hold, on the contrary, that, when presented in the proper manner, it will tend to deepen the religious convictions of the Christian, while it shows to the sinner the rebellion of his own heart. We are satisfied that the history of individuals and communities who have listened to preaching on this subject, and have become practical believers in the doctrine, will confirm this statement. Care however should be taken not to present it in a scholastic dress, nor to tear it from its natural connection in a system of theology.

Calvin believed not only that God had a purpose in predestinating some to eternal life, but that in leaving others to work out their own ruin, he also was governed by his own infinite wisdom. He used strong language. We quote from the chapter on election. "In conformity,

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\* We had the pleasure of hearing, one evening, the Rev. Mr. Shuck, Baptist missionary to China. He gave an account of the conversion of a Chinaman who was present, in which we were struck with two remarks. He asked the convert why the system of Confucius had not exerted a greater religious influence. The reply was, "*because there was no Holy Spirit in it.*" When he was asked by the same missionary what feature in Christianity had most interested him, he answered, "*the atoning feature.*"



therefore, to the clear doctrine of the Scriptures, we assert that by an eternal and immutable counsel, God hath once for all determined both whom he would admit to salvation, and whom he would condemn to destruction. We affirm that this counsel, as far as concerns the elect, is founded on his gratuitous mercy, totally irrespective of human merit; but that to those whom he devotes to condemnation, the gate of life is closed by a just and irreprehensible, but incomprehensible, judgment." "Let them not, therefore, accuse God of injustice, if his eternal decree has destined them to death, to which they feel themselves, whatever be their desire or aversion, spontaneously led forward by their own nature. Their perdition depends on the divine predestination in such a manner that the cause and matter of it are found in themselves." "Predestination to life is grounded on the election of grace. Predestination to death is prepared for those 'fitted for destruction.'" This view does not differ from what is held by the Calvinists of the present day. There are some expressions which are exceptionable. Some passages, taken from their connection, do certainly convey a false notion. But from those we have selected, one, we think, must see that there was in Calvin's view of "reprobation" nothing so monstrous or absurd as has been charged upon him. Condemnation of the sinner for his sins takes place under the government of God. It was in harmony with his eternal purpose, that the sinner should meet his merited doom, and be thereby the occasion of making manifest the glory of the divine character.

Here it may be proper to allude to the reformer's view with regard to the future condition of unbaptized infants. He rejected the Catholic opinion, that baptism was necessary to salvation. Nor did he affirm that infants, who died unbaptized, would fail of salvation. In this respect, too, he differed from the Catholic writers. He believed that the offspring of Christian parents were included in the covenant of grace. And he also held that the children of unbelievers were in a state of sin, and hence exposed to its effects and deserts; and that they must be renewed; for "in Adam we can only die;" if they are left there, "they are left in death." As to their actual future condition, he is, as he thought the Scriptures were, silent.

Calvin is a strong Pædobaptist. It was a misfortune that some of the opponents of infant baptism were either fanatics or heretics. Their doctrinal errors were much more effective in the support of that ancient papal rite, than were the arguments of its supporters. This is quite manifest from Calvin's contest with Servetus. The scoffs of that Spaniard at the holiest truths of the gospel naturally prevented Calvin from seeing what correct principles he might have had in his system. The following short quotation from the chapter on infant baptism, in the Institutes, will give the reformer's view. "The whole of the subject, if I mistake not, may be clearly and summarily stated in the following proposition: that persons of adult age, who embrace the Christian religion, having been aliens from the covenant, are not to receive the sign of baptism without the intervention of faith and repentance, which alone can give them an admission to the fellowship of the covenant; but that the infant children of Christian parents, being admitted by God to the inheritance of the covenant, as soon as they are born, are also to be admitted to baptism."

If we were to reason *a priori*, we should suppose that the scriptural account of a religious rite would be so plain, that almost every unprejudiced person would understand its nature and design. And such we believe to be the case. Reasoning in the same way, we should come to the conclusion that the advocates of the true view would present a simple method in their argumentation, which would reach the common mind;—that though their reasons might be different, they would seldom be opposite, and never radically so. And this, also, we believe to be the fact. Hence when we see the advocates of a certain view of a matter so plain in itself, differing from each other as to the very ground on which to rest a defence, we have a strong suspicion that the view itself must be erroneous. Is not this true in regard to the arguments used in support of infant baptism? Many Catholic writers defend it on the authority of the church, and say, as Bellarmine did, that it can be proved from Scripture. There are those who ground it on circumcision; while others, equally talented and pious, reject this foundation as insufficient to support such an edifice. Not a few acknowledge that there is no certain command

or example for this rite in the New Testament; while very many refer us to Christ's commission to his disciples and to the baptism of households. Some writers believe that there is grace bestowed upon the child in baptism, and hence the propriety of the rite; others, however, reject this view, and regard it as an act of dedication. Augustine held that the prayers of the church procured this regenerating principle, while with many it is the faith of the parents, which is substituted for the actual faith of the infant. We certainly need the republication of an old tract by Joseph Wiston, called "The right method of proving Infant Baptism," printed in London, 1690.

Before the divine origin of this rite can be proved, the principle must be established, that baptism ought to be administered on the faith of the parent. One clear case of such a baptism would establish this rule. One command to the parent, whom the apostles so often address on their duties to their children, would demonstrate its truth. One brief exhortation to children, in view "of their covenant obligations," would settle the question, and establish forever the law of Christian baptism, as it applies to infants. How is such a silence to be accounted for, on the part of Paul? Would our Pædobaptist brethren have been silent, had they written the epistles to the churches, in which they had occasion to allude to the duties of the Christian father to his children? Nor is it any where intimated in the Scriptures that baptism takes the place of circumcision. This is not the case, even when such an admission might have allayed the prejudices of the Jewish Christians. In truth one rite cannot be said to take the place of another, unless in reference to one and the same economy. Nor is any rite in the old dispensation a type of another rite in the new Christian economy.

But though Calvin believed that the children of Christians were proper subjects of baptism, he evidently preferred immersion to sprinkling, as the mode of baptism. In proving that "ignorance does not vitiate a first baptism," he says, "And among us, what rivers would be sufficient for the repetition of ablutions, as numerous as the errors which are daily corrected in us, by the mercy of God." After remarking that it is of no importance

"whether a person be wholly immersed, whether thrice or once, or whether water be only poured or sprinkled upon him," he adds, "The very word baptize, however, signifies to immerse; and it is certain, that immersion was the practice of the ancient church." A distinguished preacher of the present day admits that if the word βαπτίζω means to immerse, when used to designate a religious rite, then immersion is the true mode of baptizing. But on the other hand, we are told that there is no certain evidence that this mode was practised at all in the days of the apostles." We are compelled to say, however, that the great majority of critics are with Calvin.

Nothing more clearly reveals the character of Calvin than his views on the Lord's supper. Had he possessed less independence of spirit, or had his religious life been less deep, we should have found him among the followers of Zwingli. He not only rejects transubstantiation, and the equally absurd consubstantiation of Luther, but repudiates the notion of the minister of Zurich as resting "in contemplation merely." He regarded this sacrament as involving a mystery "too sublime for" him "to be able to express or comprehend." At the same time, he declares in his chapter on the Lord's supper that "his view contains nothing absurd, ambiguous or obscure."

We give his own statement: "The sacred mystery of the supper consists in two parts; the corporeal signs, which being placed before our eyes, represent invisible things in a manner adapted to the weakness of our capacities; and the spiritual truth, which is at the same time typified and exhibited by these symbols." The spiritual truth thus exhibited includes three things,—“the promises”—“Christ with his death and resurrection”—“the benefits which Christ confers upon us.” Thus it was not in his opinion a mere memorial, and the moral enjoyment which results from calling to mind an absent friend. He believed that the communicant who partook of the elements did receive a special spiritual influence from his crucified Redeemer. And that thus he did eat his body and drink his blood; and that in this way his soul was spiritually nourished. We quote a few passages from the Institutes. In the sacrament, “the Lord communicates his body to us in such a manner that he becomes completely one with us, and we become one with



him." "His life is transferred to us and becomes ours, just as bread, when taken for food, communicates vigor to our body." The manner in which this union is effected is not by having the bread and wine changed into the body of Christ, or having them include that body, nor is it by giving an objective efficacy to the mere symbols; but through the secret operation of the Spirit. Calvin uses the following language: "Though it appears incredible for the flesh, from such an immense local distance, to reach us, so as to become our food, we should remember how much the secret power of the Holy Spirit transcends all our senses." "Now that holy participation of his flesh and blood by which Christ communicates his life to us, is by the exertion of the energy of his Spirit." The reason why he alludes so often to our eating "the flesh" of Christ, is this. The fountain of divine life is in the Logos, the divine nature of the Redeemer; but that fountain has been opened for us through the suffering and death in human nature. It is only in union with Christ crucified, that we receive the principle of a holy life. In his short treatise on this subject, against Hesshuss, in 1561, he explains what he means by partaking of Christ's flesh, in these words. It is "not in the way of any carnal mixture, or as if the flesh of Christ drawn down from heaven entered into us, or was swallowed with the mouth; but because the flesh of Christ as to its power and efficacy vivifies our souls, not otherwise than the body is nourished by the substance of bread and wine." So that "through the secret energy of the Holy Spirit, this life is made to reach us from heaven, out of the flesh of Christ."

That this impartation of divine life is not, in Calvin's view, different in kind from that which the Christian receives in hearing the truths of the gospel, is evident from the following quotation from the Institutes. "We are to understand those words by which the elements are consecrated, to be a lively preaching, which edifies the hearers, which opens their minds, which is deeply impressed upon their hearts, which exerts its efficacy in the accomplishment of that which it promises." "He gives it (his flesh) daily, when, by the word of the gospel, he presents it to us that we may partake of it as crucified." "It (the flesh of Christ or the life which flows from it) is

applied by the gospel, but in a more illustrious manner, by the sacred supper."

Zwingle's view only allows of a mere moral influence such as a Socinian might acknowledge, without recognizing a real communication of life from the divine Spirit. Let it be transferred to an earnest religious mind, and it begins to approach the Calvinistic view. The memorial of Christ brings him near to the communicant, makes him present to his soul. And when the union has taken place, then the spiritual life flows from Christ crucified, into the very heart of the believer.

FRANCIS TURRETIN.

A BRIEF NOTICE OF HIS LIFE.

The family of the Turretins came from Lucca in Italy. They were forced to leave on account of their religious views, about the year 1575.\* Francis Turretin, the grandfather of the theologian of the same name, is the first of whom we have any knowledge. He abandoned his home about the time we have mentioned. He went to Holland and then to Switzerland, where he spent the last years of his life. He was a man who resembled the Puritans not merely in the place of his exile, but in his character; for he was stern in his faith and loyal to his conscience. Benedict, his son, was born at Zurich, A. D., 1588. He was elected pastor and professor in 1612. He wrote separate dissertations on nearly all theological subjects, besides a "History of the Reformation of Geneva," which is still preserved in MSS. in the library of the Academy. Francis was born the seventeenth of October, 1623. He gave, when a boy, evidence of a superior intellect. He studied with great success under Tronchin, Spanheim and Morus. His first theological essay was written in his seventeenth year, with this title, *Thesis theo. de felicitate morali et polit.* His second attempt secured for him quite a reputation, *Thesis theo. de necessaria Dei gratia.* It was written in his twenty-first year. Soon after he visits Paris and studies under Gassendi, where he became acquainted with Daille, the

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\* Besides the Turretin family, there were the Diodati, the Calendrini, the Burlamachi. The latter was distinguished in the law.

author of a work very famous in its day. He was received into the company of pastors at Geneva in 1652, and the next year he was elected professor in theology, having a few years before refused the chair of philosophy. The University of Leyden wished to secure his services as professor in theology; and, on his declining, they requested him to nominate some one to fill the place. He mentioned M. le Moyne, and he was elected. Turretin wrote his great work on theology, between the years 1679 and 1685. He had previously published dissertations on some of the most difficult theological subjects. He died in 1687. Pictet delivered his funeral oration.

#### HIS METHOD AND THEOLOGICAL VIEWS.

The "*Institutio theo. elenctica*" in three parts is the ablest work of the Genevan school. It is equal to Calvin's Institutes in depth and reach of thought, and superior to it in method. It is a complete system of Divinity. It is inferior to the great work of the reformer, only in the warmth of life which bound his doctrines together. Perhaps the "body of Divinity" cramped a little its spirit. But we shall have occasion to allude again to this peculiarity. We will give a brief account of the method and contents of this work. It is divided into three parts. Each part contains a number of "*Loci*," devoted to the discussion of one general subject. In each of these "*Loci*," several questions are proposed, the solution of which leads the mind to the reception of the truth. The mode of discussing these questions is certainly admirable. We have first an introduction consisting of the statement of the question, or the occasion of its being offered,—its origin or importance,—a brief history of opinions, or an explanation of terms. Which of these shall appear in the opening of the question depends on the subject discussed. Sometimes there is no need of any introductory remarks. In this case he proceeds directly to the proof of his position, from reason and revelation, and then to the results, in the light of which all objections are removed. Locus 1, treats of theology—its nature and design. 2. The Sacred Scriptures. 3. The one and triune God. 4. Decrees of God and predestination. 5. Creation. 6. Providence of God. 7. The state of man

before the fall, and the covenant of nature. 8. Concerning sin. 9. Concerning the free will of man. The first Locus of the second part treats of the law of God. 2. The covenant of grace. 3. The person and condition of Christ. 4. The mediatorial office of Christ. 5. Calling and faith. 6. Justification. 7. Sanctification. The first Locus of the third part treats of the church. 2. The sacraments. 3. The last things.

Turretin resembled the scholastics. They were a race, notwithstanding their occasional boyish pranks, of intellectual giants. The history of their times is even now quite an unexplored field to the English student. The few dead leaves which have been blown in his path are a very poor measure of the strength of the living tree. If we judge of them on such grounds, we shall be guilty of greater folly than they ever committed. One might open Turretin's theology where he proposes the question, "At what season of the year was the world created?" but the discussion here would hardly give a fair view of the theologian's ability. Nor would the question, "whether the terrestrial Eden still remains," seem to the reader worthy of a place in such a work. But it is in his exposition and defence of the atonement and other kindred doctrines, that he shows his power. Our limits will not permit us to quote at that length which would be requisite, fairly to present his views. But in treating of the attributes of God, he is clear and profound. We will venture to translate at some length.

"The attributes of God do not, in reality, differ from the essence (of God,) or among themselves, as one thing differs from another; because God is, in the highest sense, simple and perfect." "We may define the very thing itself, or our conception of it. These are two different matters. The former, not the latter, argue a real distinction; now the definitions of the divine attributes are the definitions of the conceptions we have of God, when we consider him under this or that relation, rather than of the thing itself, which is one and most simple."

The general division of the attributes. "God produces in his creatures, especially those who are rational, effects analogous to goodness, justice and wisdom." These are called communicable. The attributes which are so peculiar to God, that nothing like or analogous to them, nor



any image or trace of them can be found, as eternity, are incommunicable."

The simplicity of God. "In whom there are many real entities, in him there is composition; but this is not so, where there are only many modes; for modes only modify and characterize the essence; they do not compose it. But in the Godhead there is one essence and three hypostases; these are the modes which truly distinguish the persons from each other, but do not compose them."

"Simplicity and triplicity are opposed to each other, that they cannot exist at the same time; but not simplicity and trinity, because these terms are used in different senses. Simplicity has respect to essence, trinity indeed to persons, in which sense there is nothing to prevent God, who is one in essence, from being triune in person."

The eternity of God. "The infinity of God in respect to duration is called eternity, to which these three things belong. 1. That it is without beginning. 2. Without end. 3. Without succession." "The eternity of God cannot have succession, because the essence, with which it is in reality identified, admits of none; both because it is, in the highest sense, simple and immutable, and thus rejects the change of the former into the latter, of the present into the past, of the present into the future, which succession involves; and because it is immensurable, as original and independent; but what allows of these successions can in some way be measured." "The eternal duration of God embraces indeed all times, the past, present and future; but in him nothing can be past or future, since his life continues always unchanged." Although eternity coexists with all the different periods of time, it does not follow that these coexist among themselves, since it (eternity) does not coexist with these (periods) at the same time as several and at the same time existing, but it coexists with them as they are separated, and as they succeed each other." "A point is either mathematical, the beginning of a line, or of time; or it is physical and civil, a very brief extension of a body, or of time; or it is metaphysical, which marks the negation of extension and divisibility; in this last sense, it is not absurd that the world and time are contained in a point of eternity." "Eternity alone has been and will be."

The omnipresence of God. He "is entire; entire in

all; entire without all; included in no place, and farther, excluded from none." "He is in himself, in the infinity of his own essence, as he was before the world was founded." "The immense spaces of the world cannot exhaust the immensity of God, that he should be contained in them or circumscribed by them." "He is called omnipresent, not that he comes into composition with created things as a part of them, or that he is contained in them, but because the essence of no one of them either limits or excludes him."

The immutability of God. "By this it is affirmed concerning the Deity not only that there is no change, but that there is no possibility of a change, both in regard to his nature and in regard to his will. Because, 1. He is a necessary and independent entity. 2. Because he can neither be changed for the better, since he is the best of beings; nor for the worse, since in that case he would cease to be the most perfect. 3. Because all causes of change are removed from himself—a prior dependence on a passive power, error of mind and inconsistency of will." "When God became the creator, he was not changed in himself, for nothing was added to him *de novo*." "And as to the act in creating, since it is transient, not immortal, it is not so much in God, as it is for him." "The power of varying his own acts is not the principle of mutability in him, but only in his objects, unless it be understood of the variation of his own internal acts, which a perfect will does not vary, but only an imperfect one; for no one varies his purpose, unless he detects some imperfection in it, which can never be the case with God." "God can will the change of various things, his own will remaining unchanged, because he had already from eternity decreed such a change." "Penitence is attributed to God, not by reason of the resolve, but on account of the event; not because of the will itself, but of the things willed; not on account of an emotion and internal grief, but because of the effect and the external work, since he does what a penitent man is accustomed to do." "The promises and threatenings which are not fulfilled, do not argue a change of will, because they were conditional and not absolute, as is plain from Jer. 18: 7; and though the condition is not often expressed,

but as it is tacitly understood and implied, it ought to be taken into account."

Turretin was a very able defender of the doctrine of "original sin." He held that the sin of Adam had brought the race into a depraved state. This is one of those points which may be said to characterize the Calvinistic system. That there are difficulties connected with this view of human corruption, none will deny. But it is equally true that there is no escape from them by adopting a theory, according to which the condition of the human race is equally hopeless, and where there is no interposition on the part of God, even when the obstacles to it seemed to be less. The view, that God sends each soul into the world with a certainty that it will fall, affords no relief. But is it wise for us to construct a scheme, according to the feeling we have, as to what our Creator ought or ought not to do? It cannot be philosophical to reject the obvious drift of Scripture, confirmed as it seems to be by the teachings of nature. We cannot see why a theologian should deviate from the rule which the man of science has adopted—to found the system on the facts in the case. Nor can we consider it as altogether a speculative question, without any practical bearing. It cuts off all hope of saving any man through moral instruction. The plea cannot now be raised, that it is within the limit of possibility that this or that soul may not need the atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ. Hence the Bible represents the race as being morally and physically like Adam, after he had fallen. The apostle Paul represents all to be in such a state as to require the infusion of a new divine life. He teaches us that "if Christ died for all, then were all dead," and brings out this thought more fully in the fifth chapter of the epistle to the Romans. John also declares that "whatsoever is born of flesh is flesh." It is on this last passage, more than on any other one, that we rest the doctrine. It is impossible, on any fair principles of interpretation, to make it mean any thing else. The early and universal developments of depravity are not certainly out of harmony with this scriptural view.

But such a view involves a peculiar relation between Adam and his posterity. So Turretin regarded it. We will here quote a paragraph from him, in which he gives us

the connection we hold to our first parent. "Adam in a manner included the whole human race which should spring from him, both as the root and seminal principle, from which the entire family must spring, and as the public person and representative head, who should represent all men, who in the course of nature might derive their origin from him; whence the covenant pertains not only to Adam, but to all his posterity in him. The ground of this communion arises from a double chain, by which men are bound with Adam, it (the chain) being in one respect natural, according to which he was the common father of all and they were his children, in another light being forensic, by which, in the most wise providence of God, he has been constituted the chief and head of the human race, who might contract for himself and his people, and might keep or lose for himself and his descendants, those benefits which were conferred upon him, as benefits for the entire human nature." It is a remarkable fact that God never renewed the covenant he made with Adam. Eternal life is never again offered on the ground of obedience. It would seem that the whole race were involved in the dreadful consequences of the first sin. But if our first parent had gone through the trial, then his posterity might be considered safe. The moral conservative influence would have been constantly increasing. Such a relation, too, would make it possible to provide one plan of redemption for the human family. Thus this unity of the race is also fraught with the greatest blessings. Had each one come into the world unaffected by Adam's sin, and been required to go through the same trial that awaited him, the same baneful consequences would have followed; but it would seem to exclude such a common redemption as that which Christ has procured.

There is, however, in Turretin's view, a vein of speculation. This is especially true of his doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin. We do not say that it is erroneous. But we should prefer a different phraseology, and a little less certain and dogmatical tone. It is well to endeavor to explain the reason of our suffering in consequence of the transgression in the garden. But let it be kept in mind that this explanation may not, after all, be the true one; that the rejection of it is not a rejection of



the fact. Turretin regards this suffering as a kind of punishment, and consequently assumes a kind of guilt, which he calls "an exposure to punishment on account of sin." But this theologian does not teach a transfer of personal sin and guilt. It is in a "judicial" and not a personal sense, that men are sinners in Adam. Turretin uses the following language in reference to this point. "But when the sin of one is said to be imputed to any other, it is not to be understood that the sin becomes another's in itself and in every respect; but that in some way it pertains to him, to whom it is said to be imputed, if not properly, separately and personally, yet it does by common participation, on account of the communion which subsists between him and the proper author of it. For there can be no imputation of another's sin, unless some peculiar connection, which one party has with the other, has been established." Turretin pledged himself not to deviate a hair's breadth from the received doctrine of the Genevan church. He undoubtedly had a confidence in the truth of his system, and his ability to defend it. We respect him for his positive faith. But we hold that the object of theological discussion is religious truth. We have no sympathy with that class of men who dread an honest investigation in the truths of theology. We have no idea that the word of God is to be overthrown by learning and philosophy, whether they have their home here or in Germany. If we are earnest and faithful, we need not indulge such fears. It is only when there is a stagnation in the mind and heart, that the seeds of heresy are scattered over the land.

Turretin, as we have intimated, was the logician of the Genevan school. He was a lover of subtle distinctions. His logic, so admirable in the discussion of some isolated and obscure question, sometimes failed when a great sweep of thought was required. His work, though hardly suited for a text-book, is yet of immense value for the consummate ability with which he treats some of the essential truths of theology. He seems to overlook the fact that there is a unity in the Christian scheme. He dissects the system with all the skill of an anatomist; but to reconstruct this frame-work and breathe into it the breath of life is out of his power. It is easy to see from the references he makes to "the Master of Sentences" and his

expositors, that they were his favorite teachers. The scholastic mode of discussion leads him at times to overlook those indirect arguments, which often are of much greater weight than certain isolated passages, which might be considered as proof texts. We will close our remarks upon Turretin, with an illustration of this principle, in reference to the Divinity of Christ. We will be as clear and concise as we can.

A diligent reader of the New Testament must be struck with the fact, the idea of a divine and adorable Redeemer interwoven with the apostolic mode of thinking and feeling. It had evidently taken root in the inmost depths of the minds of the New Testament writers. Hence we do not find so many formal statements of the doctrine, as we find assumptions of its truth. We see it associated with every other doctrine of Christianity, and made the moving principle of every Christian duty. But let us consider in a very brief manner, Christ's relation to the believer.

1. He is, in some sense, the Christian's substitute. We do not mean to enter into the discussion of the theological question. He is represented as suffering for him. His agony and anguish came from human guilt. No other being has endured what he has experienced. He stands alone in this respect. The load of our sinfulness was upon him through his life, in the garden, and on the cross, in a manner and to a degree which cannot be said of any other being. Hence we are bound to him, not merely as our benefactor, but as one who procured for us the greatest possible blessings, by the greatest possible sacrifice.

2. He is the source and support of spiritual life. From him it springs, by him it is sustained. Our Redeemer said, "I am the vine, ye are the branches." And on another occasion, "I am the bread of life." The apostle to the Gentiles tells us, in reference to himself, "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." Thus, in his view, all holy life was derived from our Saviour, Jesus Christ.

3. He is the great object of our faith and love. All are invited "to come to him," "to believe on him," "to love him." Hence Paul says, "I take pleasure in distresses for Christ's sake." "I count them but dung, that I may win Christ." "If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be Anathema Maranatha." No caution

is thrown out, either by our Saviour or his disciples, that there was any danger of loving such a being too well. We are not then surprised, when we read that the seer of Patmos saw the redeemed, ascribing to the Lamb that sitteth on the throne, "dominion, power and glory."

Christ also held a peculiar relation to the system of redemption. He did not come simply as the ambassador of God—as his agent. For he not only seeks to bring back the rebellious to their allegiance, but he aims to secure their affections for himself, to make his own character the object of their love and homage.

The writer of the epistle to the Hebrews draws a comparison between Moses and Christ. "For this (person) was counted worthy of more glory than Moses, inasmuch as he who hath builded the house hath more honor than the house." "And Moses verily was faithful in all his house, as a servant, for a testimony of those things which were to be spoken after; but Christ as a son over his own house." We may express it thus,—Christ rules over the dispensation of which he was the founder; Moses serves in the economy of which he was a member.

The record of the lives of these two confirm this view. Christ approaches the Father, as one whom he had eternally and perfectly known. He who was "in the bosom of the Father" could "declare him." He had a glory with him "before the world was." The Jewish law-giver approaches the Almighty with profound trembling and awe.

As the author of the new dispensation, he sends the Spirit into the world to carry on his work, and promises to come again and gather his people home to himself. Acting in the same capacity, he commissions his apostles to preach Christ. They are not to make it their great work to enlarge on the moral beauty of virtue, nor simply to unfold the attributes of God; but to make the character and work of the Redeemer the great theme of their sermons. Thus Paul says, "I determined not to know any thing among you, save Jesus Christ and him crucified."

Again, as the founder of the new economy, Christ established two rites, baptism and the supper. The first is a profession of faith in him. In the death to sin, and the rising to a new life, which it symbolizes, it also points to Christ's death and resurrection. The supper is a memo-

rial of Christ's broken body and bleeding side. By it we are mindful of the sacrifice he made for us, and that he is the spiritual manna for our souls. Thus these rites have a peculiar relation to our Redeemer.

Now we ask, what must be the nature of a being holding such a connection with us, and with that system of religion by which we obtain eternal life? It is these considerations which influence the great mass of believers, and make their faith strong against the attacks of the skeptic or the Socinian. It would be easy to show that Christ held a peculiar relation also to the creation; that between him and all other beings, there was an immense gulf; that no where is he spoken of as a creature, but as existing in eternity, enjoying perfect intimacy with God, and as endowed with creative energy, through which the world was brought into being; but we meant only to indicate this indirect method of proving our Lord's divinity, without developing it to that extent of which it is capable.

#### BENEDICT PICTET.

##### A BRIEF HISTORICAL NOTICE.

Benedict Pictet was born in Geneva on the thirtieth of May, 1655. He studied with great success under Francis Turretin, in the Academy of his native city. At the age of twenty, after his studies were completed, he visited France, where he formed an intimacy with the families of Claude and Allix, distinguished Protestants of that country. He then went to Leyden, where Frederic Spanheim was teaching. Here he acquired such a reputation that afterwards, on the death of that theologian, he was invited to fill his place. After spending a short time in England, he returned to Geneva and was soon admitted into the company of pastors. In 1702 he was elected professor of theology. Having filled this chair with great credit to himself, he died on the ninth of June, 1724. John Alphonso Turretin performed the same sad service which Pictet had rendered to his distinguished father. He was a man of great benevolence and piety, and seems to have gained the esteem of all classes of Geneva, by the urbanity of his deportment. He may be considered the last of the distinguished theologians of the Genevan orthodox school. Besides his principal work on theology, he



also published a treatise on Christian Morality in eight volumes, duodecimo, and a history of the eleventh and twelfth centuries in two volumes, quarto, besides many excellent tracts of a controversial or practical character.

#### HIS CHARACTER AS A THEOLOGIAN.

His Christian Theology was first published in Latin, in eleven volumes, octavo, in 1696, at Geneva. It appeared at Amsterdam in 1701, in two volumes, quarto, and again with a third volume containing a brief history of the councils, the popes, and distinguished Protestant theologians, besides a sketch of profane and sacred history, in 1708, also in 1721. This last is the best edition. This work has been translated with some abridgment into German and English. The Presbyterian Tract Society has also issued a translation of the same character, containing rather the results of the theologian's discussions, than the investigations themselves.

The following is a synopsis of the contents of the work. The first book treats of "the proofs of the existence of God. 2. The nature of God and his perfections. 3. The holy and adorable Trinity. 4. The decrees of God in general. 5. Creation. 6. The fall of angels and men. 7. Providence. 8. Of that which God hath determined concerning the salvation of men. 9. Of the means by which God has saved men—of Jesus Christ, the Mediator, and of grace. 10. Of vocation. 11. Of justification. 12. Of sanctification. 13. Of glorification. 14. Of the church. 15. Of the sacraments."

Each of these books is divided into a number of chapters, under each of which is discussed a separate branch of the general subject. His mode of treating theological topics is very simple. He first gives a clear statement of the subject, and proceeds at once to the proof of the proposition, drawn from reason and Scripture. After this he enumerates all the principal objections, and gives to each a separate answer. In addition to this, he generally adds a history of the doctrine, which, however, is of little service to the critical student. In this department of theological science, he must rely on German scholarship. One may well object to this method of disposing of the objections. It leads the mind into a servile dependence on his text-book. So long as the student can remember the objection and answer, he

is able to meet his antagonist ; but if a difficulty be raised, of a somewhat novel character, the student is at a loss how to remove it. Thus lifted from the sphere where alone he was invincible, he is thrown, like the giants of old, in the first encounter. In short, he has not been taught to master the great principles of the science, and to see how they will apply to overthrow not only all existing objections, but all that may arise in the brain of the infidel or heretic. It is worse than useless to follow every single foe through the windings of the forest, when by merely taking and holding certain commanding positions, we can compel the whole opposing army to surrender. The Jesuit mode of controversy may be agreeable to those who are fond of making a display of their skill in the use of the old scholastic weapons ; but the cause of truth often suffers from the signal defeat of such champions. Still there are specific objections which must be taken up, especially those which rest on a false interpretation of Scripture. Pictet is not so profound as Turretin ; but he is as clear, and perhaps more learned than that eminent theologian.

We may here notice another doctrine, which has been identified with the Calvinistic system,—the Holy Spirit, the only efficient cause of the new holy life of the Christian. The “means of grace” have no efficiency in producing this moral state. There is no course of action which a sinner can take, that, without an element of holiness, will secure the grace of God. We cannot say with the Scotists, that there is a merit in a sinner’s acts, which will bring down upon the soul the regenerating influence of the Spirit. It is not only contrary to the direct teachings of Scripture on this subject and on the doctrine of election, which such a view would overthrow, but when stated in all its nakedness, is offensive to our moral feelings. If we may venture to give it in plain terms, it is this. There is a certain form of human sinfulness which, either by its own merit or by the sovereign promise of God, will secure the renovating power of the Holy Ghost. We know this seems a very different statement from those glowing descriptions of the outward phenomena which appear, as the man passes from one moral state to the opposite. But one greatly imposes on himself, when he thus covers the very points in question by a multitude of words. We must see clearly in all such descriptions

what was the condition of the sinner prior to the moment when his regeneration is supposed to have taken place, and also what connection there was between that state and the efficient cause which worked a new creation. There is as much truth as beauty in the words of our Lord on this subject. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit." It is true, that truth is the grand instrumentality in the conversion of the sinner; but God uses it when he pleases, and in a manner above our comprehension. The preaching of this doctrine in an earnest Christian manner, will continue to exert, we have no doubt, the most salutary influence.

We will give here a translation of a short chapter from Pictet, on the personality of the Spirit. It is an interesting subject, and, though not treated with as much power as some others, yet gives a fair view of the writer's method, with his excellences and defects.

THE MOST HOLY AND ADORABLE TRINITY. THE HOLY SPIRIT;  
HIS PERSONALITY.

BOOK III. CHAP. XV.

We must now speak of the third person of the most holy Trinity—the Holy Spirit. But first of all it is needful to state that the term "spirit," in all languages, signifies, in a literal sense, wind or breath; and that this word is employed to represent the nature of the Divinity, because among all material objects, from which we borrow emblems to express divine things, there is not one which better represents the spiritual essence of God, joined with an infinite efficiency and power. We also remark that as the wind is in its nature less known and yet more sensible, so it is true of the Deity, whose influence all intelligent beings feel, but of whose nature they are nevertheless ignorant. We must besides add, that the name "spirit" is given to souls and angels. The third remark we have to make is that this term is often used to denote the gifts and graces of the Spirit of God; but that it most often designates the third person of the truly adorable Trinity, and it is in this sense that we use it in this chapter.

To treat this subject as clearly as its difficulty will allow, we must examine these five questions.

1. Whether the Holy Spirit is a virtue of God, or a person distinct from the Father and the Son. Gregory of Nyssen seems to have doubted whether it was a substance.

2. Whether it is a divine person,—that is, if it is the Deity.

3. From whom did it proceed?

4. Why do we name it “holy”?

In regard to the first question, whether it is a virtue of the Deity, or a person, it is easy to demonstrate that the Holy Spirit is a person, and a person distinct from the Father and the Son. It is only necessary to read the sixteenth verse of the fourteenth chapter of John, and the thirteenth verse of the sixteenth chapter. “And I will pray the Father, and he will give you another comforter, that he may abide with you forever; even the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive.” “Howbeit, when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth; for he shall not speak of himself; but whatsoever he shall hear that shall he speak, and he will shew you things to come. He shall glorify me, for he shall receive of mine and shall show it unto you.” It is not possible for one to persuade himself that there is a question whether, in these passages, a virtue or a person is spoken of.

If the Holy Spirit were only a virtue, would Jesus Christ have said to his disciples, Go baptize in the name of the Spirit? One cannot say, we may baptize in the name of an attribute.

In answer to this we are told, that if we are baptized in the name of the Holy Spirit, so also it is said we are baptized with the Holy Spirit.—Matt. 3: 11; Acts. 1: 5. Now this, they declare, cannot be predicated of a person. I reply, 1. That if this reasoning could hold, we should have to say that Jesus Christ was not a person. For it is said, we are clothed with Jesus Christ; we eat Jesus Christ. Yet we can affirm that one does not clothe himself with a person, and does not nourish himself with one. 2. When it is said, we are baptized with the Holy Ghost, we are taught that we receive the graces and gifts of the Spirit.

All those passages which represent the Spirit as show-



ing, testifying, making overseers of the church, separating, and searching the deep things of God, confirm the truth of this doctrine. One must desire to blind himself, to wish to explain these passages in the same way as when we say of sin, that it seduces us, or that it slays us, Rom. 7 : 11 ; of charity, that it suffereth long and is kind ; of the blood of Abel, that it cries ; of heaven, that it hears, Is. 1 : 2 ; since one has only to compare these passages with the others, in order to see the difference.

But above all, one cannot doubt, when he sees in the twelfth chapter of the first Corinthians, the Spirit is distinguished from its gifts, and this in a passage where the Spirit is spoken of in distinction from the Father and the Son. "There is a diversity of gifts, but the same Spirit ; and there are differences of administration, but the same Lord ; and there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God."

But the matter will appear yet more plain, if we notice those passages where we are warned not to grieve the Spirit, which could be said only in reference to a person. The mention of the sin against the Holy Ghost clearly shows that the Spirit is not only a person, but also a divine person. One cannot doubt, if he considers that the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is distinguished from sin against the Father and against the Son ; Matt. 12 : 31, 32.

In short, when one reads that the Spirit has descended upon Jesus Christ in the form of a dove, and on the apostles in the form of tongues of fire, one cannot understand this as not said of a person ; for we cannot say of qualities and accidents that they descend under visible forms.

No valid objection has been made against this truth. It is argued that the Spirit is called the power of God, Luke 1 : 35 ; 24 : 49, compared with Acts 1 : 4, 5, 8 ; 10 : 48, and cannot be a person. I reply that it does not follow that the Spirit is not a person ; Jesus Christ is also called the power of God, 1 Cor. 1 : 24. Simon, the magician, called him the great power of God. Acts 8 : 10. In order that in all the passages which they cite, they may distinguish the Spirit from the power of the Spirit, let them only read the eighth verse of the first

chapter of Acts. "Ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost has come upon you."

They make use of all those passages, where it is said, the Spirit is given to men, and that they receive it. Luke 11: 13; John 14: 16, 17; Rom. 5: 5; John 20: 22. But has not God told us, in many places of the sacred Scriptures, that he is the portion of the faithful? Lam. 3: 24. Is it not also said that Jesus Christ is given to us, that we receive him, John 3: 16; Col. 2: 6; that he dwells in our hearts, Eph. 3: 17? St. Paul says of Christ, that God sent him, as he also said of the Spirit, Gal. 4: 4, 6. We cannot conclude from these expressions that the Spirit is not a person. Besides, we ought to remark that in these passages, when the Spirit is represented as a gift, it is also described as a person, distinguished from his attributes, Rom. 5. "The love of God shed abroad in our hearts by the Spirit which is given us." The love of God, which is the effect of the working of the Spirit, is separated from the Spirit itself.

They do not admit those passages as proof-texts, where it is said that we are anointed and filled with the Spirit. But first it is also said we are filled with all the fullness of God. And when it is said, we are anointed with the Spirit, it is clear that this is spoken in reference to its gifts. They bring up the passage in John, 20: 22, where Christ gave the apostles his Spirit in breathing upon them. But who does not see that the breath of Jesus Christ was only an emblem of the Spirit which Christ communicated to them? It is then clear, that the Spirit is a person. But we must now see if it is a divine person; or, to speak more clearly, if it is the Deity.

Although the works of these theologians\* are of great

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\* We give a list of the professors in theology, from the commencement of the Academy to near the close of the eighteenth century. The dates show when they entered on their duties, and when they resigned or died.

	Accessus.	Exitus.		Accessus.	Exitus.
John Calvin,	1559	1564	Charles Perrot, (e)	1598	1608
Theo. de Beza, (a)	1559	1605	J. Diodati, (f)	1609	1645
N. Colladon, (b)	1566	1571	G. Alexius,	1610	1614
C. B. Bertram,	1572	1586	Theo. Tronchin, (g)	1615	1657
Lambert Daneau, (c)	1572	1581	Ben. Turretin,	1612	1631
Ant. la Faye, (d)	1584	1615	F. Spanheim, (h)	1631	1642
J. B. Rotan,	1587?	1589	Alex. Morus,	1642	1648
H. Signardius,	1596	1598	Ant. Leger,	1645	1661

value, from the literary information which they contain, and from the signal ability exhibited in the discussion of many subjects, yet they are hardly suited for text-books. They were written more than a century and a half ago, and are not adapted to the wants of the present age. We are aware that the doctrines of Christianity do not change, and that the relation they hold to each other does not alter. But as new forms of error arise, we are called upon to pay special attention to those truths which are the object of attack. No new place or prominence is given to them in the system; but only in the discussion of theological topics. Thus we have to meet those who deny the authority of the apostles. There are very many who, satisfied that a fair interpretation of the Scriptures will not sustain their faith, are the more disposed to reject the inspiration of the writers of the New Testament. There is, too, an æsthetic view of religion which has taken hold of some minds, and which is not treated of by the older theologians. We sometimes hear individuals talk of love of holiness, as though it was one with the artist's love of the beautiful, as though religion had its seat, not in the affections, but in those sentiments which are awakened by the presence of the objects of taste. We are to remember also that science is making new discoveries, and opening a wider field for illustration. And

	Accessus.	Exitus.		Accessus.	Exitus.
Ph. Meztrezat,	1649	1690	Samuel Turretin, (k)	1719	1727
Francis Turretin,	1653	1687	Ant. Maurice,	1724	1750
Louis Tronchin, (i)	1661	1705	J. Bossonet,	1727	1750
B. Callendrin,	1690	1713?	L. Tronchin.	1737	1756?
Benedict Pictet,	1702	1724	De Roches,	1749	1769
J. Alph. Turretin,	1705	1737	J. Vernet,	1756	1789
Ant. Leger, (j)	1713	1719			

(a) See his life, written in German, by J. W. Baum, a close follower of Calvin, learned, but less profound than his master. He was more of an artist than Melancthon, but with less delicate sensibility.

(b) He was removed from his place for his abusive language.

(c) A voluminous writer, but deficient in genius.

(d) His chief work is *Enchi. dispu. theo.* 8vo. 1605. A friend of Calvin.

(e) He wrote against the separation from Rome, which was effected at the Reformation.

(f) A learned and sound theologian—distinguished at the Synod of Dort. Translator of Sarpi's *History of the Council of Trent*.

(g) He sustained, under the famous Gomar at Leyden, a thesis "*de pecc. originali*."

(h) His most noted work is, *Dubia evan. discus. et vindicata*, quarto, 3 vols.

(i) His best work is "*Theses theologicae*,"—the teacher of J. A. Turretin.

(j) More of a philosopher than a theologian.

(k) Talented, as all the family were, but died too soon to distinguish himself.

speculative systems of philosophy are setting up their rival claims to universal dominion. Besides all these considerations, the older theologians were somewhat faulty in the interpretations they give of Scripture. In this department a real progress has been made. It cannot be denied that while the critical study of the Bible has set aside many of the proof-texts of the orthodox theologians, it has also placed all that they hold essential, on the only sure foundation—the word of God.

A BRIEF NOTICE OF THE CHANGE OF VIEWS IN THE GENEVAN SCHOOL.

Here it may be proper to notice the change which took place in the Genevan school of theology. We will briefly note some of the events connected with it. In the first half of the seventeenth century, a controversy arose in Geneva with regard to the imputation of Adam's sin. From a letter which Claude wrote to Turretin, it is manifest that the professors were divided on the question. Morus and Meztrezat were suspected by the council of denying this doctrine, together with election. In 1649 a "consensus" was drawn up by this celebrated teacher; and, to prevent any mental reservations, the council called on the ministers to sign it with these words, "*Sic sentio, sic docebo, et nihil contrarium hisce docebo, vel publice vel privatim.*" But in 1705, J. A. Turretin, the son of the theologian, whose works we have noticed, procured the repeal of this regulation. He was a man of great learning, but with a strong leaning to the Socinian view. His work published in 1719, "*Disser. de arti. fundamentalibus,*" translated by Mr. Sparks, gives us his character. It professes to be a work on the essentials of religion; but it is without depth or earnestness. It is difficult to see how a Christian could write such a tract on such a subject. He was elected professor, but he did not adopt any system, but only read his lectures on certain theological topics, as the evidences of Christianity. In 1725, the students were released from signing the Helvetic confession of faith, and were pledged only to preach the doctrines of the Bible, as the catechism summarily set them forth. Vernet followed, or rather went beyond, Turretin. This course produced an apathy; but the general silence was at last broken. D'Alembert in 1757, in his article in the *Encyclopedie* on Geneva, accused



most of the ministers of denying the Deity of Christ. This drew forth from the pastors a vague declaration of their opinions, which tended to confirm the charge. Rousseau, in a letter to Montague, says of them, "They are asked, what mysteries they believe? They dare not answer. One knows not either what they believe, or what they disbelieve; one does not even know what they pretend to believe; their only method of establishing their own faith is by attacking that of others." The influence of Rousseau and Voltaire was the greater, from the fact that there was no vital energy in the Unitarian view of Christianity to resist their attacks. In 1788, Calvin's catechism was given up, and another one adopted, more suited to the tastes of the pastors. The open controversy broke out in Geneva, not far from the time when it appeared in New England. But we do not mean to enter further into the history of this subject. The chain of causes which brought about this apostacy may be thus stated: unnatural connection of church and state, an intolerant dogmatism, the passive reception of the doctrines of the creed, and the stagnation which followed. And when the spiritual life seemed to have reached its lowest point, the great infidels of Europe appear, and complete the work of destruction. And now, as might be expected, the theological school of Geneva has lost all its glory. It has no positive system of theology, no enthusiasm in its study, and, we fear, no divine life.

## ARTICLE II.

## RHETORICAL STUDIES.

WITHOUT the formality of a definition, we shall here consider rhetoric as aiming to produce good public discourses; good as to their matter, their structure, and their delivery. This view of the design of rhetoric is sufficiently near, for all practical purposes, to the definition which Quintilian prefers; namely, rhetoric is the science of speaking well; or, if we may expand the definition in order to show the full meaning of the principal terms, rhetoric teaches the proper composition and the proper delivery of a good oration. It agrees sufficiently, also, with Campbell's definition of eloquence:—"Eloquence is that art, or talent, by which a discourse is fitted to produce its end."

The design of rhetoric, as here expressed, renders it unnecessary to discuss the utility of this department of study to a candidate for the ministry. All will agree as to the utility of the end proposed by sacred rhetoric. A judicious system of instruction in the forming period of life, with direct reference to this end, will evidently contribute to its attainment, and must therefore be pronounced useful.

§ *Objections against the Study of Rhetoric.*

Objections have very gravely been urged against rhetoric, as a department of study, both by the unlearned and the learned. These objections arise, however, in part, from misconceptions of the study itself. It has been supposed that its main design is to teach a writer how to marshal his words and sentences in the most elegant manner, and particularly, to form a flowery style of writing, that may please, without solid benefit. This is a misconception; for while rhetoric seeks to cultivate style, and to produce an agreeable and at-

tractive mode of writing, it also enjoins, as of far higher value—indeed, as the only foundation of a truly good style—sound sense and solid argument.\* The style which rhetoric enjoins on a public speaker, is precisely that which nature, in earnest operation, prompts as most surely, most readily, and most impressively conveying his thoughts to an audience; a style, far remote from that which often calls forth the praise of being a beautiful one. Let a man honestly set himself, in real self-forgetfulness, and in deep solicitude for the one object of “communicating important truths to others, in the best, simplest, strongest, briefest mode;” and he is, in that way, conforming to the precepts of genuine rhetoric.

An objection has arisen, also, from the fact, that men, who had the credit of much rhetorical power, have not unfrequently succeeded, by this power, in vanquishing a good cause and making error and falsehood triumphant. This objection involves the idea of an intimate connection between rhetoric and logic, and this connection it is well to observe. The fact, stated as a ground of objection, must certainly be conceded. But it only illustrates the abuse of a good thing, or the mischievous misapplication of a most salutary power. On the other hand, it may be said that, while rhetorical power may “make the worse appear the better reason,” it is able also to detect the perversion, and may secure an ultimate triumph for virtue and truth. The forces of rhetoric act more freely and effectively in behalf of truth and of a just cause; and it is no solid objection against it, that sagacity may often so conceal circumstances, or so color them, as to give an undue temporary advantage to error. In almost every sphere of action in this world, truth has to conflict with error. Now this simple statement implies, that error has powers at its command. It is no wonder, then, that rhetoric shares the common lot. It is one of the facts which we must meet, and for which we must become prepared by putting on the whole armor, with which our nature and divine providence have furnished us. A truly philosophical training in rhetoric materially increases a person’s ability to expose error in

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\* *Scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons.*

its deformities, and to strip the unfair writer, or speaker, of his unlawful advantages.\*

It is very obvious, however, that a rhetorical training is not justly chargeable with the impositions which have been practised on the unwary; for such a training is far from being necessary, in order that one may learn the modes of deception, or of concealing truth, or of wrongly coloring circumstances. The truth is, the elements with which rhetoric deals, and by which she would form able writers and speakers, and which may be made, according to men's dispositions, or principles, subservient to a righteous or an unrighteous cause, are originally in our constitution; they are exhibited by the uneducated as well as the educated, in private life as well as in public. So true is this, that we shall probably only express what has been a matter of observation to our readers as well as to ourselves, when we say that one of the most crafty public speakers we ever heard was a man who could make no pretensions to rhetorical culture.

An objection has also arisen from the fact, that rhetoricians have given rules for the express purpose of showing how to defeat a good cause, and to secure triumph for a bad one. Justice does not permit an attempt to vindicate those who professedly arm an opponent of truth and right for the purpose of securing his own, or others', selfish ends. It deserves, however, to be remarked, that those who are called to plead a good cause ought also to be clad in armor, and be able to defeat dishonest artifices, and ought not to allow any legitimate means to be neglected which the author of their nature has given them for carrying a good point. If error may be promoted by a skilful reasoner, or advocate, shall truth be allowed to be overborne through the failure of its friends to cultivate, or to employ, their natural, or acquired, endowments in the best manner?

It ought, also, as an offset to this objection, to be considered, that an adequate acquaintance with the most

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\* The above paragraph regards rhetoric and logic as combined; and this is the true view, since rhetoric has to deal so much with reasoning. Compare Whately's *Rhetoric*, Introduction, § 1, and the remark of Zeno, who, as Cicero relates in his *Orator*, § 32, clenching his fist, said, "This is logic;" opening his hand and spreading it out, said, "This is rhetoric." In other words we may say, rhetoric is logic expanded,



promising modes of approaching men's minds for a good purpose involves, from the nature of the case, a knowledge of the most promising modes of approach for an opposite purpose, provided a man has the disposition to attempt such a purpose. A good course of training and instruction for a physician, makes him acquainted with the nature of poisons as well as of remedies, and with the mode of using the same article for a good purpose or a bad one; so that the very skill which makes him a preserver of life may, if he be so disposed, make him a destroyer of it. But where is the blame in such a case? In the art, or in the man? In the knowledge, or in the application of it? In medical principles, or in the individual practitioner? And who would wish his physician to be ignorant of the human constitution, and of the principles which are indispensable to his practice, but which can be most easily abused?

We have thus far looked at the subject generally; and that the rather, because the opportunity could thus be employed to correct some of the partial and false conceptions, which are current concerning this department of study. When we take a view of sacred rhetoric specifically, it would seem as if scarcely any specious objection can be raised against it. For we place before our minds a pious man, engaged in preaching the gospel, and in vindicating its principles from error and perversion. Such a man's object is, not to deceive on any occasion, but to exhibit and enforce divine truth, to forestall, or to correct, errors and misapprehensions concerning it, and to form a holy character in his hearers. Sacred rhetoric designs to help him present religious truth intelligently, attractively, convincingly, persuasively; and this not for accomplishing a present, or merely temporary, purpose, nor for producing a single act, or series of acts, under a kind of irresistible impulse; but to make men righteous in heart and life, towards one another and towards God, and to prepare them for heaven. If now by instructions having specific reference to preaching, men can be qualified to preach the gospel in a more effective manner, there can be no hesitation in concluding that such instructions are too important to be dispensed with. It need scarcely be added, that sacred rhetoric proposes as its special object,

to cultivate in candidates for the ministry, the power of being intelligible, convincing, persuasive preachers.

§ *Relation of Rhetoric to other Studies.*

While, however, the object of rhetoric in general, and of sacred rhetoric in particular, is thus confessedly important, it will not be gained unless this study be allowed to occupy its appropriate place. Now rhetoric does not undertake to furnish the materials of a discourse; it teaches how to employ materials which have been gained from other sources. It does not design to make a man learned; but to direct him how to use his learning and his natural skill. It does not design to increase a person's knowledge, as theology, for instance, does, or history, or the sciences in general. It takes for granted, that stores of learning have already been acquired and will be increased, and that the mind has become disciplined; so that the person, whom it would aid in preparing to address public assemblies, is regarded as having all the substantial qualifications for this service, and as needing instruction and preparatory practice in reference to the proper manner of using his materials. Should a person, therefore, enter on this branch of study with the expectation of its adding to his knowledge, or of its being able alone, or mainly, to make him a good writer and an orator, he will necessarily be disappointed; for he is expecting from it what it does not promise to give, and what, from its very nature, it has not the capacity of giving. But let it occupy its proper place, and it will greatly aid him in making his acquisitions available to the purpose for which he has sought those acquisitions.\*

Such, indeed, is the nature of rhetoric, that the interests of a person who is destined to some department of public oratory would by no means suffer, should his rhetorical

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\* Compare Cicero's declaration in his treatise entitled *ORATOR*, § 3. *Fateor, me oratorem, si modo sim, aut etiam quicumque sim, non ex rhetorum officinis, sed ex Academiæ spatiis, existisse. . . . Hujus [Platonis] et aliorum philosophorum disputationibus et exagitatus maxime orator est, et adjutus. . . . Positum sit igitur in primis, sine philosophia non posse effici eloquentem.* See also § 33.

The reader will remember the latitude which was given to the term *philosophy* among the ancients. Theology was one of the branches of philosophy; at least, so far as discussions on the being, the nature, and the attributes of God are concerned. The remarks of Cicero should be understood rather with reference to the general principle involved in them, than to any particular class of studies.

training be deferred until his general education is far advanced, and he has secured its substantial parts. A very early, and especially at the commencing point of a literary course, a disproportionate attention to rhetoric—such as seeks its benefits directly and mainly, rather than indirectly and incidentally—is in danger of making a showy, superficial writer, instead of a solid one, and of forming habits in writing which must be corrected in order to produce efficient public speaking, but which will most strenuously refuse to yield to the maturer judgment of the man. A mere lad, who learns somewhat concerning figures of speech, and contemplates some choice specimens of what is called fine writing, and exercises his skill in presenting his thoughts in various pretty forms of expression, is apt to conceive of this as studying and practising rhetoric; and it may be that he will not, through his whole life, be disabused of this idea.\*

A due consideration of the nature, the proper relative position, and the purpose of this department of study, at once explains how it happens that men may be very useful in the ministry who have not attended to it; though, clearly, if with their attainments in religion and general knowledge, and with their industrious habits, they had enjoyed rhetorical culture also, they might have been far more useful.

This view also explains why a mere, or a chief, attention to style, or phraseology, may terminate in producing only a shallow, or a feeble, though, it may be, a showy writer. If a man's aim is to write in a beautiful style, without a just regard to copious and exact knowledge, to weight of thought and vigor of conception, it is surely not surprising that he is not an instructive, or influential, or permanently interesting writer or speaker.

These remarks are specially applicable to candidates for the ministry, in whose expected calling solid usefulness, rather than reputation for any external graces, is the real and the proposed aim. They, above all men, should avoid the mistake of valuing light and trifling ornaments of language; while at the same time, they can-

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\* Cicero has the following appropriate remark in the *ORATOR*, § 34. *De materia loquor orationis. . . . Volo enim prius habeat orator rem, de qua dicat, dignam auribus eruditiss, quam cogitet, quibus verbis quidque dicat, aut quomodo.*

not, if truly wise, neglect as of no value a branch of study which may so directly subserve the end and aim of their intellectual discipline and of their literary acquisitions, both general and sacred; namely, the increased ability to proclaim the word of life clearly, attractively, forcibly.

§ *Value of Rules.*

By these views of the utility of rhetorical studies, we may judge of the value of rules in the preparation of public discourses. Rules cannot furnish materials, nor supply the lack of genius; and hence can, by themselves, never form a profitable public speaker. They can give a right general direction to genius, and suggest modes of properly employing materials. But they cannot, from the nature of the case, supersede judgment in considering the demands of each particular case, nor supersede reliance on a person's own resources, and on his own invention, in regard to a method of proceeding. No system of rules can anticipate the vast variety of circumstances, which will arise in active life; and it is eminently true in the case of a public speaker, that he must have judgment and tact, so as not to be fettered by any rules. The proper end of a truly philosophical education is, not to impart a certain amount of knowledge, nor to mould a pupil's mind by a certain model to which he must ever after be slavishly conformed, but to fit the mind for independent action, to make it an inventing agent, ready to exert its own inherent powers on all the occasions of activity. Rhetoric, consequently, can only mark out a general course, as suggested by the teachings of nature and the results of experience on the part of men who have been successful public speakers. And a due consideration of such men will show, that, while in their efforts they paid a general regard to certain rules, they also followed the impulse of their individual genius, and no one of them could have walked in the track of another. We need not, as is suggested by a judicious writer in the *Edinburgh Review*, we need not a system of minute technical rules; still less, a formal application of any system whatever. But to imbue the mind with great general principles, leaving them to operate imperceptibly on the formation of habit, and to suggest, without distinct



consciousness of their presence, the lesson which the occasion demands, is a very different thing; and this is precisely the thing which rhetorical precepts aim to accomplish.

There are, then, two extremes to be avoided; one, that of servile subjection to rules, which cramps genius, or rather which can be exemplified only in men of no genius; the other, that of entire disregard of rules, which does not condescend to receive benefit from the success of distinguished men. The vanity of this latter extreme should receive as little quarter, as the dulness and servility of the other. A wise man will know how to make a good use of rules, and will be able, through their proper influence on him, to make rules for himself, or rather to obey the impulse of a well trained and suggestive genius with the same freedom as if his principles and resources were all self-originated.

The case of a public speaker who has been trained by the precepts of rhetoric in the earlier period of his life, is the same as that of any man who has passed through a process of training for any employment which tasks the intellectual powers. Even a mechanic, who during his apprenticeship was required to follow the rules of his master, obtains at length, by observation and experience, superiority to mere rules; and though he was trained by rule, yet his inventive powers, properly cultivated and directed, enable him to strike out and execute new plans, which prove him to be the master, not the slave, of his profession. But how much he owes to the tedious, formal processes of his apprenticeship, he may not be able to estimate; or, perhaps, none will be more ready than himself to acknowledge. The same is eminently true of many who have obtained distinction in the fine arts of painting and statuary. And in general, it may be said,—and the important bearing of the remark on candidates for the ministry is instantly obvious—the more intellectual a person's employment may be, the greater will be the demand on his independent ability to guide himself. This suggestion is made, of course, not in order to provoke a disregard of regular instruction,—for that, in many cases, would be suicidal,—but to show how lofty should be the aim of such men, and how earnest should be their purpose, by well directed efforts, in the early period of

life, to become qualified for the responsibilities which they are hereafter to bear, personally, as leaders, not as followers; as teachers, not as pupils.

As sustaining the opinions here advanced, the following thoughts are appended, in part, suggested by certain passages in Stewart's *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, and, in part, extracted from the *Discourses of Sir Joshua Reynolds*.

Rules may sometimes be hurtful to the student, or to the practical man. When this happens, the cause will probably be found to be one of these two: 1. The rules were not properly philosophical, but arbitrary, not founded in the nature of the human mind. 2. The rules were not sufficiently familiarized, so as to be almost, if not altogether, insensibly applied. In order that a system of rules may be useful, they must, by familiar acquaintance, become a sort of second nature. (Compare Stewart, Vol. I, pp. 51, 52.)

Rules are the results of successful experience. One who follows a judicious system of rules, then, avails himself of the experience of predecessors, and enables himself to save, at least, a great amount of time which would otherwise be spent in making experiments, or in acting blindly. Such a system of rules puts him far in advance of what he would be without them, and makes his success far more likely. The difference between a man who enters on his employment without such study and one who avails himself of such aid, is akin to that between a man who has experience and one who has it not.

In this view, a man of ordinary powers may rise near the level of an uncommon man, and may sometimes even succeed better than a superior man, who does not choose to profit by the experience of predecessors. At the same time, a man of uncommon genius, instead of finding his powers cramped by attending to a judicious system, may find himself placed on vantage-ground by the successful labors of predecessors. No one can wisely slight, or neglect, a judicious system of instruction in regard to any important department of labor. (Compare Stewart, Vol. I, p. 47.)

Sir Joshua Reynolds, the eminent painter, and first president of the British Royal Academy,—whose *Discourses* well deserve the perusal of all who are contem-

plating any department of public oratory, as well as students in painting and statuary, of all indeed who love good sense and pure English—in his Discourse at the opening of the Academy, (*Literary Works*, Vol. I, p. 12,) has the following instructive thoughts on the value of rules.

“Every opportunity should be taken to discountenance that false and vulgar opinion, that rules are the fetters of genius. They are fetters only to men of no genius; as that armor, which upon the strong is an ornament and a defence, upon the weak and misshapen becomes a load, and cripples the body which it was made to protect.

“How much liberty may be taken to break through those rules, may be a subsequent consideration, when the pupils become masters themselves. It is then, when their genius has received its utmost improvement, that rules may possibly be dispensed with. But let us not destroy the scaffold, until we have raised the building.”

H. J. R.

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### ARTICLE III.

#### EDUCATION OF THE CONSCIENCE.

BY R. E. PATTISON, D. D.

THE importance of metaphysical studies is, perhaps, never duly appreciated. The exhibitions of a vigorous intellect are rare, in an age in which the study of metaphysical philosophy is fallen into disrepute. The athletic vigor and versatile skill, which characterized the European understanding in the sixteenth century, is attributed by Sir James McIntosh to the influence of metaphysical controversies. “We may be allowed to doubt,” he says, “whether any knowledge, dependent directly on experience, and applicable to immediate practice, would have so trained the European mind as to qualify it for that series of inventions, and discoveries, and institutions,

which begins with the sixteenth century, and of which no end can now be foreseen but the extinction of the race of man.

While metaphysical studies are eminently favorable to the cultivation of the understanding and to the sharpening of the wit, some of them are equally useful in their influence on the heart and character. It is believed that eminent examples of moral excellence are rare, in proportion as these studies fall into disuse. And nothing, in this general department of human investigation, can exert a more favorable influence on man's moral nature, than the science of conscience; or that specific view of it which we propose—its education. It is a theme involving principles purely philosophical, and in their practical bearing as vast and as important as the immortal interests of man, whether as an individual, or in his social relations.

Before entering, however, upon the consideration of the main subject—the cultivation of the conscience—it will be necessary to consider several elementary principles, which will show a foundation laid in our moral constitution for successful education.

Duty is the condition of man's being. By this fact, as much, if not more, than by any other, he is distinguished from the lower orders of the animal creation. We never say of a beast that it is its duty to do any thing, any more than we say of grain, that it is its duty to grow, and yield fruit. Such language is peculiar to man. Such is his nature and the circumstances under which his Creator has placed him, that there are certain acts which he ought, and others which he ought not to perform; by the former he is eligible to reward, by the latter he is the fit subject of punishment.

This idea of obligation is, also, something wholly distinct from every other. It is neither self-interest, nor general benevolence, nor truth, nor fitness of things, nor justice. It is never contrary to any of these. It palpably accords with justice and truth; and were our views sufficiently comprehensive and vast to embrace the eternity of our existence, it would unquestionably be seen to harmonize, not only with the dictates of general benevolence, but with our highest individual interest. Duty, however, is something distinct from each and all of these; and with some of them it appears, at the time at least, to be



at variance; one of which is required to succumb to the other.

We are not required, perhaps, to answer the question, why we ought to do one thing and to omit another; that is to explain the reason of duty. It is enough for our present purpose, that it be admitted that there are obligations, which our race cannot escape; which, though utterly distinct in their nature from hope or fear, are as much a motive of action as either. Some have made truth the foundation of duty; others, the greatest good of the universe; others, the will of God. It will meet our present object to admit the fact, that men are accountable creatures, whether that obligation arises from God's command exclusively, or from that command in accordance with other reasons. It matters not whether God's will be the ultimate reason of our duty: or because it is God's prerogative to enforce on his creatures the observance of the immutable distinctions of right and wrong,—a prerogative arising to him from the fact that he is our Creator. Perhaps it is the glory of the self-existent Deity, not only to do right himself, to have given existence to innumerable finite beings, all in his own image and so his children, whom he also requires to do right; or to act in accordance with an immutable morality, as eternal as his own being and throne. The practice of virtue being important in all, in the ignorant as well as in the learned, the motives which induce to it are many and obvious; while the ultimate foundation, or the reason why a given action should be performed, may require a revelation, or a mental penetration, exceeding mere metaphysical acuteness. The profoundest philosophers are often divided in their opinions as to the foundation of virtue. Every Christian admits that the will of God, when known, is his rule of life. But good, as well as great men, may differ, when they endeavor to assign reasons for the divine will's being what it is; or when, without a divine revelation, they attempt, on the principles of natural religion, to infer what is the will of God. We pass over these more subtle inquiries, and only say, as a preliminary remark, that there are right and wrong actions; and that *ought* and *ought not* are, to man, motives of conduct.

It is necessary to admit, still farther, that man has a moral constitution, fitted to feel the force of these moral

reasons. That is, he has a moral faculty to be acted upon, so that when a case of duty occurs, the mind shall give birth both to the idea and to the feeling of duty. And as this moral idea, as a motive of action, is distinct from every other idea, so the faculty which it addresses must be equally distinct from every other faculty of the mind.

It has been said that no tribe is so rude as to be without a faint perception of the difference between right and wrong. This statement some have denied. Not to mention Locke and others, Rev. Mr. Moffat, a missionary for many years in Southern Africa, says that some of the entire tribes among whom he labors were, on his first visiting them, destitute not only of all notions of a Supreme Being, but of moral distinctions. His testimony goes to prove that, previous to the introduction of the gospel, the people were ignorant of duty as a motive. They neither perceived it, nor felt its constraining influence. As to the correctness of this testimony, we have no means of judging beyond that which is common with our readers. Of Mr. Moffat's eminent piety, the world has had undoubted proof; and though not to be compared with his colleague, Dr. Philip, in his power of generalization, by which the latter has earned the title of the philosophic missionary, yet Mr. Moffat has quick perceptive powers; rare talents of observation. It is this mental habit, exhibited in his graphic style, which gives such enchantment to his missionary details. To deny the statements of the missionary, would be unphilosophical. Theory is a suspicious method of disproving facts; since facts are the only true basis of theory. Instead of attempting to invalidate the testimony, we shall endeavor to account for his facts as stated, in accordance with the doctrine, that every man has, constitutionally, as a man, a conscience. A block of marble, chiseled into a human form, cannot be so acted upon by moral ideas as to have a feeling of duty. It can be changed; it can be made to receive any shape, or aspect, the ingenuity of the artist pleases to give it. But that genius a hundred times told cannot give it a perception or an impulse of duty. It is not in its nature to experience either. It may be made to look like a man, but it never can be made to feel like one. All this is equally true of the brute. Neither the ox, nor the more sapient elephant, can ever perform an

action from a conviction of duty. For this, they want the capability.

Let us carry this consideration still farther. There is no evidence that the infant has, at the commencement of its mental activity, a developed moral constitution—a conscience in action. No one supposes it to perceive any thing to be its duty, or to feel the force of ought and ought not, until after several of the other faculties of the mind have been developed. It is scarcely possible that self-love, in distinction from the appetites and passions, is awakened, till after the mind begins to take cognizance of its own acts; specially, of its pleasures and pains. The fruit tree bears foliage years before it blooms. Blossoms are an after development. So the mind of an infant is capable of receiving the idea and of exercising the feeling of moral obligation, when the appointed time arrives. It is the peculiar endowment of the human mind, that moral exercises shall result from others which are antecedent to them. On this principle there may be tribes of men so degraded, so destitute of the necessary antecedent mental conditions, that the moral faculty has not been brought into distinct being. What might be said of a given number of infants previous to their consciences being quickened into action, might be with equal truth of a whole tribe of adults, on whom the requisite moral influences for giving activity to the conscience had not been brought to bear. The seed lies buried, and needs, in order to germinate, a genial influence. Moral law, and those exercises of the soul which moral law awakens, or coöperates with, are necessary to the development of the conscience. Reason, in such tribes, is but little above that of the infant. Self-love is feeble. Appetite and passion are supreme. The savage has his full growth as an animal, but not as a man.

But it should be borne in mind, that as in infants, it is difficult to distinguish the incipient and the very faint action of the conscience, begin when it may, so Mr. Moffat may not have been able to detect what actually existed in the mental habits of those tribes. Nothing is more unsatisfactory than the accounts which men, not educated, nor accustomed to take cognizance of their own mental phenomena, give of them. The less educated the human mind is, the less observant it is of its own exer-

cises. Of this every Christian pastor, accustomed to elicit from religious inquirers their first religious views, is sensible. There is no place like the room of religious inquiry to study mental philosophy. The religious teacher, of accurate habits of observation, soon becomes skilful in discriminating amid the chaos brought under his observation. Mr. Moffat may have been deceived; but if not, it is sufficient for our purpose that his poor Hottentots, and Bushmen, and Namaquas, came to have consciences, so soon as the doctrines and precepts of the gospel were expounded to them.

Till of late years, very little attention has been given to an analysis of the general powers of the mind, and still less to that of its moral faculties. The recent progress in psychological investigations is scarcely less than that in some of the physical sciences. A rigid analysis of the mind not only assigns to men an appropriate moral faculty, as distinct as memory is from judgment, or taste from reason, but it also subdivides the faculty into the moral understanding, and the moral sentiments, or feelings. It makes it the office of conscience both to perceive duty, and to influence the will to discharge it.

The history of the terms employed to express the action of conscience will give additional clearness to our views. The Hebrew language has no term that means precisely what we do, when we speak of the conscience. The Hebrews employed the word which we translate, heart; the Greeks, *καρδια*, a term that includes the understanding, the feelings and the will. In the word heart, therefore, there is nothing that distinguishes the moral faculty from every other mental power. In the Greek of the New Testament, however, a term is occasionally found, which, so far as it regards precision, is in advance of the word heart. The philosophical character of the Greeks is as manifest from the genius and precision of their language, as from those philosophical speculations which have been transmitted to us. And the writers of the New Testament, though Jews by birth, being familiar with the Greek language, naturally availed themselves of this improved nomenclature in morals. What gives us more confidence in these remarks is that the same New Testament writer, in the choice of his terms, is sometimes a Hebrew, and at others a Greek. The apostle Paul, as



he was better instructed in the Greek than his brethren, frequently uses the word *συνείδησις*. The other apostles ordinarily employ the term, *καρδια*, or heart. "If our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart," etc. He who, in turning the moral eye in upon the temper of the soul and the motions of life, discovers there nothing but purity and rectitude, which action is a moral perception, has confidence toward God, which is strictly a moral feeling. All this is ascribed, in the Old Testament and often in the New, to the heart. But in the writings of Paul, we frequently find the term *συνείδησις*, or conscience,—a good conscience, a pure conscience, a weak conscience, a testifying conscience, an accusing or excusing conscience. It is to be observed, however, that in the etymology of this last term, there is no recognition of moral feeling. The perceptive power only of the moral faculty is included. The simple meaning is that of consciousness; but the *usus loquendi* is that of moral consciousness.

An accurate analysis of this faculty is of modern date. Even so late as the beginning of the last century, Dr. Samuel Clarke, in attempting to overthrow the infidel philosophy of Hobbes, considered the whole moral power to be pure reason: endeavoring thus, by elevating its operations above the feelings, which were looked upon as transient in their nature, to give to morality an immutable basis, and so a more honorable rank. This, though well intended, was a partial view of the phenomena of conscience, omitting one of its most important elements—the feeling included in every exercise of approbation or disapprobation. Lord Shaftsbury, who wrote about the same time, obtained a better analysis of the faculty. He distinguished in it feeling as well as reason. Bishop Butler improved on this incipient discovery. He showed not only that the perception of a moral idea by the conscience was attended by a corresponding moral feeling; that is, of pleasure and pain, of approbation and disapprobation; but that one of the essential attributes of this feeling was authority. According to his analysis, we are not only happy in contemplating right actions, and unhappy in regarding those of an opposite moral character, but over and above this, there attends the idea of duty an urgent internal sensation, essentially like the feeling experienced

when we receive a command from one whom we ought to obey. The tone of authority in the human voice acts upon the mind of any one,—even of a child. The mind of man was intended by the Creator for obedience; and causes are provided, adapted to such a result. One of these is the authoritative sensation of conscience. So palpable is this now, to those who reflect on this element in the operations of conscience, that it is often called the voice of God in the heart of man. It does not imply a willingness to obey; for this spirit of obedience to the divine commands is lost in the fall of the race; but the authoritative faculty yet remains; impaired by sin, but not destroyed. The Deity has withdrawn from the unsanctified mind those holy influences on which a spirit of obedience depends. But his presence in the conscience is not withdrawn. He is still seated there, uttering his mandates, through the medium of our moral constitution, with the authority of his eternal throne, and he will continue thus seated, through eternity, in hell as well as in heaven.

We are now prepared to consider this faculty as susceptible of education. It is not pretended that the consciences of all men are equally capable of improvement. The moral influences brought to bear on two individuals, otherwise equal, might develop their moral powers very unequally. We say of some, even of children, that they are naturally conscientious. This is looked upon as a kind of constitutional virtue. Some are quick to distinguish between right and wrong; others are slow. In some, the impulses that attend this moral perception are vigorous and urgent; in others, they are feeble, and thus are easily overcome by the demands of appetite, or by sudden gusts of passion. Degrees in the original susceptibility of the consciences of different individuals is analogous to other parts of the mental constitution. No one presumes that memory, imagination, or taste, is in all men equally capable of improvement, though all may be improved by proper training. The same is true of the conscience. No faculty is more susceptible of culture. By culture of the conscience, we mean that it can be educated on principles as scientific as those which govern instructors, in forming a system of liberal educa-

tion designed to give the greatest power to the understanding.

Much of the improvement of the conscience is, it must be admitted, a spontaneous growth. This is the case with the intellectual powers. Some of these are often successfully developed by the circumstances under which a man is placed as a social being, when neither the individual himself, nor his teachers have any correct idea of the analysis of the human mind, or of the scientific principles on which the result is realized. A remarkable instance of this occurs in the memory of the Karens. They appear to be one of the broken fragments of the original inhabitants of Eastern Asia,—chiefly dwellers upon the mountains. They have, doubtless, been a distinct race, from a period antecedent to Moses, if not to Abraham. They and the Jews are two parallel streams, flowing from a common fountain. They have brought down from remote time some portions of the early history of our race, which the Jews have transmitted by means of the sacred record. Though their traditions do not appear to be, any of them, of an earlier date than the historical records of Genesis, and these are greatly corrupted, yet, between them and this portion of the Bible there is often a verbal agreement. Never having had a written language, the memory has been made the sole channel of transmission from parent to child, for a hundred and fifty generations. That the faculty of memory in that people has a national development, is evident from the fact that its power is not witnessed merely in retaining and transmitting these ancient historical events. The native converts, especially the preachers, frequently commit to memory the Karen translations of the Bible, as fast as the separate portions of it are published by the missionaries. So tenacious is the memory of the native preachers that they are often capable of repeating to their congregations, with an almost incredible accuracy, the expositions of large portions of Scriptures as given orally by the missionaries, on whose instructions they attend. In reasoning and in general knowledge, they are mere children; but the development of their memories is not probably equalled by any other people in the world. And all this is without education. It is purely spontaneous. The absence of a written language, and the importance they

attach to their religious history, has been the occasion of this singular mental development. It was doubtless owing to the same unequal exercise of memory, that the Greeks were enabled, without a written language, to transmit to succeeding generations, with such entire accuracy, the poems of Homer. There is often a spontaneous growth of some one or more of the mental powers, quickened and brought forward through the influence of circumstances, under which the providences of God place men. In this way the world is a school, of which society in general is the teacher; and though blind as to those philosophical principles on which a systematic education is conducted, yet powerful in its action on the mind. The wild fruit tree is sometimes seen richly laden. Nature, though never to be relied on, often in her spontaneous productions, outdoes the most scientific cultivator.

Another instance of this spontaneous mental development, may be seen in those sections of society in which the code of honor is observed. In such a community, there is not only a nice distinction in the principles inculcated by the school, if we may so call it, for the government of social intercourse, but a keenness and strength of feeling which it is difficult for men, differently educated, to appreciate. A sense of wounded honor overcomes the natural fear of death, enabling men to expose themselves to it, under circumstances requiring unspeakably more courage than the hottest battle field. Society itself becomes a school, in which the great mass exhibit a special mental development,—immoral we admit, more so than we have words to describe,—yet showing the capability of the mind to receive a peculiar spontaneous growth. It is on this principle, rather than on seats of learning, that the characters of different nations are so dissimilar. It is the influence of causes abroad in society, over which no one seems to have any control, and for the origin of which it is often difficult to account, giving an unequal growth to one or more of the natural endowments of the inner man.

In Christian countries, where the influence of religious principles pervades society, like an invisible atmosphere, the development of the conscience is likewise chiefly spontaneous. The object proposed by religious teachers is virtuous practice and the promotion of a virtuous char-



acter. These teachers agree in the end proposed. But we put the question to every parent and to every teacher, whether there is that specific regard to the conscience in their moral and religious training, to which the supremacy of that faculty in the moral constitution entitles it. Socrates and Plato, without any very definite ideas of the analysis of the moral powers, and without a tithe of the moral truth at their command, with which to influence the minds of others, which we possess, were, nevertheless, enabled to throw around virtue such an attraction as to win many an otherwise wayward youth to its practice. Much of the virtue, however, of which those moral teachers were the occasion, was the result of a virtuous taste, which they were successful in cultivating in their pupils; and not the dictates of an enlightened and commanding conscience. There is vastly more of this kind of virtue at the present day, than we are ordinarily aware of. There is often a perception of the beauty of virtue, without a deep-seated, solemn conviction of the obligation to be virtuous. The heart is attracted to it, and not commanded by it. This moral taste no one should undervalue. It can never be too carefully cultivated. The culture of it should begin with the first budding of character. It should increase in degree and delicacy with ripening age. A mere moral taste, however, is a feeble barrier to those strong temptations to which all are liable. It can never be the soul's anchor in the day of trial. No man is safe in this life, with his path beset with allurements to vice, until the authority of his conscience is supreme over every thing else. The loveliness of virtue may please the soul amid days of calm contemplation, far removed from the storms of life; but it will require a louder voice to be heard, and a stronger arm to save him, amid the confusion of the boisterous elements.

It requires no unusual observation to be satisfied that in our moral and religious education, sufficient regard is not had to the peculiar offices of conscience, and more especially to its perceptive and authoritative functions. In the education of the memory, its different functions are separately considered. A skilful teacher discovers, perhaps, that the retentiveness of his pupil's memory is feeble, or that the power of recollection is imperfect; the result of some imperfection lying still farther back, in the

facility with which he associates his ideas of objects and not of principles, or of principles and not of objects. These defects are pointed out to the pupil, and his whole course of study adjusted, if necessary, with special reference to the correction of the evil. But we are not aware that the memory, lucid and beautiful as is its analysis, is any more easily cultivated in its distinct parts than the conscience. And certainly its full and harmonious development is infinitely less important.

Rules for educating the conscience, like all rules of education, would be, at best, a dry detail, destitute of interest to most of our readers. Of those moral and religious teachers who are not versed in the science of ethics, or who have not studied the analysis of the moral faculties, little can be expected, either in self moral culture or in the training of others, except that in the motives urged, greater regard be paid to that of duty; the simplest and most sublime motive of human conduct. Such other motives as the word of God authorizes should not be omitted. The combined influence of every virtuous motive should be employed. Every thing should be done that can be, to form in men, especially in youth and children, the habit of being governed by duty. There is needed, for the aid of parents and Sabbath school teachers, an elementary text-book, in which there is given a simple analysis of conscience, and in which the states of the mind, during the action of this faculty, are illustrated by examples fitted to impress the heart.

The abridged edition of the *Elements of Moral Science*, by President Wayland, is exceedingly valuable for pupils of twelve or fifteen years of age. Though but a portion of it has direct reference to the conscience, its general tendency is to cultivate that faculty. The *Child's Book on the Soul*, by Dr. Gallaudet, though an exceedingly valuable help to this department of juvenile education, has but little more than an allusion to the conscience as a faculty. No child in reading it sees precisely where the helm of the ship is. Professional teachers, who make education an art, conducted on scientific principles, do not need to be told that the study of a few chapters in ethics, near the close of a liberal education, will not train the conscience. The knowledge thus acquired is exceedingly important to the pupil, and will greatly assist in his

future efforts at self moral culture. But a moral influence must distil on the soul of the pupil throughout the whole of his academic course. He may not be aware of what he is the subject. But his teacher must be. The connection between these moral influences and the moral faculties must not only be studied by the teacher, but, as far as possible, should be pointed out to the pupil. From it the eye of neither should ever be diverted. The teacher should be disappointed and grieved, if the transition—the growth of the soul in conscientiousness—be not as perceptible as that of the understanding.

We close this article by a few considerations designed to show the importance of the education of the conscience.

1. Conscience is always the advocate of what is right. We do not mean to advance the idea that man never mistakes his duty; or that the impulses of conscience are not frequently overcome by other and evil influences. But the conscience can never be bribed to approve of what it perceives to be wrong; or the contrary. Whatever other derangements there may be in the moral faculty, this quality of its action is unchanged and unchangeable. Every other sentiment and desire, even those which are ordinarily exercised virtuously, such as pity and general benevolence, may urge a man to do what justice forbids;—passion, appetite and self-love are perpetually doing this;—but conscience never does. A man's pity is not extinguished or diminished, because justice forbids the relief of pain inflicted as a punishment for crime. He still pities the sufferer, though he is restrained from interposing with the exercise of justice. But that peculiar urging power which attends the action of conscience is extinguished, the instant that it is seen to conflict with justice, or duty of any kind. And it rises, either coöperating with other motives, or as a sole motive, the instant any act is perceived to be a duty. Conscience, as an impulsive power, invariably sets in the direction of supposed virtue, and away from supposed vice. There are various methods by which a man may be so deceived as to think he is doing God service, while in the commission of sin; but no sooner is the moral judgment corrected, than the authority of conscience utters, with more or less imperativeness and force, its remonstrance. The man may not desist; but if he do not, conscience is not to

blame. The feelings of conscience never play false. They may become enfeebled by habitual neglect; but whatever amount of strength remains, is on the side of God and of virtue. Whatever view we take of this fact, in the office of conscience, it is full of interest. It is the moral lever, by means of which the character of man is, by the grace of God, to be raised from that abyss into which it has fallen through sin. Every parent, every teacher of youth, especially every preacher of the gospel, should accurately study the analysis and functions of this faculty, and never cease to ply it with all means favorable to its development.

\* 2. The action of conscience is universal. To have a faculty of the soul constitutionally virtuous, and invariably so, though its action were infrequent, would be highly important. But the conscience stands inseparably connected with all the voluntary powers, in every one of their exercises. This is true of no other faculty. Duty is the only motive which necessarily constitutes an element of every desire, volition and action. The presence of conscience is, therefore, never an intrusion; its authority is never an assumption. As it acts directly on the dispositions of the heart and the will, and of itself furnishes a motive, nothing can so interpose as to displace it. It may be overwhelmed by superior strength, but cannot be dislodged from its position.

No one, to our knowledge, has so distinctly explained this fact as Sir James McIntosh, in his *General View of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy*; a work which, as an ethical commentary, seems not to have received in this country the attention it merits. In commenting on the writings of Bishop Butler, in regard to this faculty, he says, "Nothing stands between the moral sentiments and their object. They are, as it were, in contact with the will. Being the only desires, aversions, sentiments, or emotions, which regard dispositions and actions, they necessarily extend to the whole character and conduct. They may and do stand between any other practical principle and its object; while it is absolutely impossible that any other shall intercept their connection with the will. Conscience may forbid the will to contribute to the gratification of a desire. No desire ever forbids the will to obey the conscience."



This gives to conscience, as all must perceive, the position of universal command over the entire man; and, had it strength equal to the service assigned it in our constitution, it would exert a universal and illimitable control. This is a wonderful fact in our natural history. In wisdom and goodness, God has made us. Be the will pressed upon by any other motive,—by appetite or passion; by self-love, or fear, or hope; by ambition or patriotism; by pity or revenge; by envy or benevolence,—conscience is ever present at its post, closely connected with the will, giving its sanction or its remonstrance. To it the darkness and the light are the same. It is as vigilant and as faithful in the minutest private or domestic duty, as in the most comprehensive and solemn offices of public life. It is a living spring of holy influence in the child and the parent, in the humblest peasant and the most august monarch, ever laboring to secure the perfect fulfilment of every duty both to God and man. On its supremacy, therefore, depends alike the peace of the soul of each individual, the bliss of every domestic circle, the prosperity of nations, and the dominion of God on earth. We do not look to the influence of conscience exclusively for the reformation of man. There are other virtuous impulses which must coöperate with this. But those pious sentiments which are excited in the heart by the renewing grace of the gospel do not take the place of the conscience, and thus render this faculty useless. That divine love which is shed abroad in the heart at regeneration only redeems the conscience from its thralldom. It mortifies the sinful propensities, gives birth to such as are holy, and quickens the faculty itself. It is through the conscience that the law does its work, in bringing men to Christ. And after the sinner has become a new creature in Christ Jesus, an enlightened conscience is the directing power of his soul. And as no motive can come between its dictates and the will, its destiny is to perfect the man.

3. Again, conscience may be rendered very powerful. It ought to be the ruling faculty of the soul. Such was its design. It doubtless is so in heaven. How vigorous it can be rendered in our sinful race, generally, by mere culture, it is presumed no one is prepared to say. To its healthy growth, under any degree of culture, the depravity of the heart is a sad obstacle. But it is safe to

say that the amount of conscientiousness there is in any community depends on the degree of attention paid to its cultivation ; and, if what we have before said be correct, the more scientific the principles are, on which its culture is sought, the greater will be the success. There are instances in which the power of conscience defies every other power,—ambition, avarice, lust, anger, yea, the love of life itself. In the martyr, the authority of conscience may not be the only impulse—the hope of heavenly rewards, the love of truth and of Christ, are coöperating motives. These may be the most palpable to the soul's consciousness. But the basis of all is a deep and solemn conviction of duty. Remove this, and the foundation of every other motive is sapped. The awful remorse of the guilty shows to what a pitch of energy conscience can be raised. But as a silent law of the soul, it may be amid the ever varying scenes of human life, like the universal, dominant principle of gravitation, which holds the orbs in their courses, and gives to the universe its precision, order and glory.

It was no part of our present design to illustrate these principles by reference to the practical duties of life. A single reflection, however, is too obvious and too important to be omitted. The continued enjoyment by this country of its institutions, which have hitherto been so productive of practical freedom and of general prosperity, depends, in an eminent degree, on a more general education of the conscience. There is wanting, to a fearful extent, a national conscience. We are often told that the general intelligence of the people is the salt of the earth ; assigning to the want of this, the dissolution of other republics. Others, less confident of the saving power of the general intelligence of the people, would still confide in profound intellectual attainments. Bacon says, "A little knowledge makes men irreligious ; but profound thought brings them back to devotion." Though a beautiful apothegm, few are so false ; a sad proof of which is seen in the foul blot that must eternally rest upon the name of that illustrious philosopher and statesman. Mr. Alison, the author of the history of Europe during its recent eventful periods, acknowledges the utter moral impotency of knowledge, whether superficial or profound. "Science," he says, "had never attained a more commanding

station than in France at the close of the eighteenth century. Astronomy, investigated in its farthest recesses by the aid of mathematical calculations, had—first of all the exact sciences—been brought to perfection; the profound researches of her geometricians had rivalled all but Newton's glory; while the talents of her chemists, and the genius of her naturalists, had explored the hidden processes of nature, and made the remnants of animated life unfold the pristine order of creation." To the inquiry, what was wanting to fit the people for rational liberty, and qualify them for the exercise of the rights of freemen, he replies, "a sense of religion, the habits of sober thought, and moderation of general opinion. And the want of these rendered the others of no avail." This writer adds, in another paragraph, "They had yet to learn that no reliance is to be placed on the affections of mankind, when their interests are at stake." Though there is nothing false in the statement of this admirable writer, when first reading the passage we could but think that he had not felt out, with sufficient care, the foundations—the elementary principles—of all public virtue. "There was wanting," he says, "a sense of religion." As it is in all Catholic countries, so, with the exception of the libertines—a bare sprinkling of the nation—the mass of the French people were penetrated with a sense of religion. But there was no conscience in it. There was a wide gulf between morality and their religion. To be holy, to obey law, to be swayed by a solemn sense of duty, is not the end of the Catholic religion, nor was it of that of France. There was, however, no want of a "sense of religion." On the evening preceding the opening of the States General, on the fifth of March, 1789—which was in fact the opening of the bloody scenes of the Revolution—the king, his family, his ministers, and the deputies of the three orders, walked in solemn procession from the church of Notre Dame to that of Saint Louis, to hear mass!— "First marched the clergy, in proud costume, with violet robes," next succeeded the noblesse, and last, the mighty congregation of the people. Surely France was a religious nation!

By "habits of sober thought and moderation of general opinion," the author must mean, we presume, that freedom from rashness which ordinarily results from the

experience of frequent failures, whereby the expectations of men are moderated. But this chastening effect of experience must always come too late. Their defect was simple and obvious. The authority of right was not acknowledged. The national conscience had been but feebly developed. There was no anchor to the soul, to hold in check an inexperienced people, violently urged forward by a lust of power, by a fanatical zeal for freedom, and burning, often with a spirit of revenge, for wrongs, inflicted in the name of government, and under the solemn sanctions of the altar. There was nothing to withstand that overwhelming tide of interest and passion, which, in its violence, swept from society the accumulated wealth, and beauty, and glory of centuries.

If this country do not experience a fate analogous to this, at a day too near at hand for the peace of us and of our children, it must be saved by awakening in the people a more practical regard to duty. To this point must be directed the energies of the pulpit, and of the press. Deeper fountains of morality must be opened in our seats of learning, while every common school should be a well-spring of moral life. On the educated men of this nation generally devolves the duty of saving this nation, in its present downward tendencies, by quickening into action a public conscience, causing the voice of God in the hearts of the people to speak clearly and universally.



## ARTICLE IV.

HEBREW POETRY MADE INTELLIGIBLE TO READERS OF OUR  
COMMON BIBLE.

NOURSE'S EDITION OF THE BIBLE.

*The Common English Translation of the Scriptures,  
arranged in Paragraphs and Poetic Parallelisms.*  
By JAMES NOURSE. New York. American and For-  
eign Bible Society. 1847.

THE laudable endeavor now making to introduce into general use the English version of the Scriptures, so arranged as to preserve the convenience of the common notation of chapters and verses, and yet not mar the sense, by making each verse a paragraph by itself, as our Bibles now do, should meet the cordial approval of all the intelligent students of the sacred writings. This edition, for neatness, cheapness, and, so far as we have been able to examine, for the general judiciousness with which it is prepared, will compare favorably with any former attempts of this kind; indeed, in most respects, it seems preferable to any we have seen,—unless the smallness of the type used in a portion of the text, should demand an exception to this general commendation.

But we are now chiefly moved to call the public attention to this book, on account of the other feature in its arrangement named in the title, viz. the Poetical Parallelisms so extensively exhibited throughout many of the books of the Old Testament. If we do not misjudge, a very important practical question is involved in their introduction before the eye, and hence to the mind of the general reader of the Bible. Not a few will ask with serious earnestness, is it wise thus to introduce them? Some of the more easily alarmed, may think this is tampering with things sacred, and others may doubt whether any practical good result is likely to follow, adequate to compensate for the innovation. It seems to us the wisdom and desirableness of the measure deserves to be

placed in a fair light before those who have not, perhaps, given to it any adequate consideration.

It may serve to give more of completeness and intelligibility to the view which is now proposed, if we prefix to it a slight sketch of the labors of some of our wisest and ablest Biblical scholars to make the nature of Hebrew poetry better understood, and to present some of its most interesting features to the eye of those who depend on the mere English translation for their acquaintance with the sacred writings.

Relying on the authority of Josephus, Origen and Jerome, some writers, a little later than the middle of the last century, undertook to defend the metrical character of the poetical books of Scripture; some imagining that rhyme, even, was discoverable to such an extent as to warrant the assumption, that it formed in part the peculiarity of Hebrew poetry. It is not difficult, indeed, in the thousands of instances in terminations of proximate lines, to find some accidental rhymes; but this has never been insisted on by the more sober and judicious. Bishop Hare of England, and Dr. Edwards, as his defender, each contend, however, for the exact measure or rhythm of the lines in Hebrew poetry. Dr. Robert Lowth, afterwards bishop of London, has, in his Latin lectures on the Poetry of the Hebrews, pretty effectually controverted this assumption. He has shown, at least, how far from conclusive is the evidence on which reliance had been placed for establishing the exact measure of Hebrew verse. In other parts of his writings, however, and especially in the dissertation prefixed to his new translation of Isaiah, he has expressed himself as still doubtful on this point, and perhaps more inclined to yield to, than controvert the theory of a regular measure as once existing, but now hopelessly lost.

It was reserved, therefore, for another prelate of the British established church, the late bishop Jebb, to prove almost to demonstration, that nothing of this kind really existed in Hebrew poetry. His admirable work, entitled "*Sacred Literature*," embraces a review of the principles of poetic composition, as laid down by Dr. Lowth, and carries out, by a great variety of examples and illustrations, the assimilations to this poetic Hebrew style of composition, found in many parts of the New Testa-

ment. Among the Germans, Rosenmüller, and Herder may be named, as having given to this feature of sacred literature their assiduous and successful attention. Still, for the purpose we now have more particularly in view, it is not requisite that any one should look beyond the writings of Lowth and Jebb. They furnish the storehouse, whence many, and indeed most, subsequent writers have drawn all their materials. Nor should we do justice to our own convictions, were we to fail earnestly to recommend the perusal of their writings on this subject, to all English students of the Bible, who desire to understand the peerless beauties of the sacred poetry of the Scriptures.

But it may reasonably be asked, if this Hebrew poetry is not distinguished from prose by rhyme nor by measure, what is its great line of demarcation,—what the prominent and obvious distinction? We answer, in a word, by a system of parallelisms. Or, in the language of Dr. Lowth, the “verse is distinguished from prose, not only by the style, the figures, the diction, by a loftiness of thought and richness of imagery, but by being divided into lines, and sometimes into systems of lines; which lines, having an apparent equality, similitude, or proportion one to another, were in some sort measured by the ear, and regulated according to some general laws of harmony or cadence. That the verses had something regular in their form and composition, seems probable from their apparent parity and uniformity, and the relation which they manifestly bear to the distribution of the sentence into its members. But as to the harmony and cadence,—the metre or rhythm, as contended for—of what sort they were, and by what laws regulated, there are no sufficient principles on which to build any theory or to form any hypothesis.” Hence Bishop Jebb insists that there is no evidence of the existence of such rhythm, no reason for it, and one strong reason to which we will by and by revert, why it should not have had place, in poetry designed for universal transmission into all languages. Such are, very briefly the results to which the indefatigable efforts of scholars in this department have led; and this therefore may be regarded as just about all that we know, or can know of the peculiarity of the poetical portion of the Bible. The extent to which it exists

may be definitely ascertained. Besides brief instances which are found interspersed in the historical books, even in some parts of Genesis—nearly the whole book of Job, the Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Solomon's Song—and the larger part of the prophecies, are of this poetic character.

Two interesting questions here arise. 1. Is it desirable to attempt making mere English readers acquainted with the principles and the general structure of Hebrew verse? 2. Is it practicable, within any reasonable limits of requisition, to do so?

We cannot but think both these inquiries may be answered affirmatively, and shall proceed in the briefest space practicable to assign such reasons as to us seem conclusive.

In the first place, the advantages of such an acquisition seem to be both numerous and important. As an indispensable aid to the correct interpretation of Scripture, a full and familiar acquaintance with these several laws of parallelism seems incontrovertible. They have been denominated parallel lines gradational or synonymous; parallel lines antithetic; parallel lines synthetic or constructive, and parallel lines introverted.\* How much aid a clear conception of the idea, the plan on which such passages are constructed, must give, by throwing a flood of light on their interpretation. Indeed so obvious will this become to any one who has spent a few hours only in the examination of such specimens, or illustrative examples, as may be laid before him, for the development

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\* A few illustrations of the parallelisms, in each of the above forms, may conduce to a fuller understanding of the subject. In Gen. iv, 24, the earliest specimen of poetry in the Bible, we have an instance of the synonymous, or *gradational*.

Adah and Zillah hear my voice.  
Ye wives of Lamech, hearken unto my speech.  
For I have slain a man to my wounding,  
And a young man to my hurt:  
If Cain shall be avenged seven fold,  
Truly Lamech seventy and seven fold.

See also Psalm i, verse 1; Isaiah lv, verses 6, 7, and Joel ii, 7.

The antithetic parallelism occurs most abundantly in the writings, especially the Proverbs, of Solomon. See Prov. x, 1.

A wise son maketh a glad father.  
But a foolish son is the heaviness of his mother.

x, 7, 1st Samuel ii, 4—7, and Isaiah liv, 10.



of these various kinds of Hebrew verse, that all argument will be rendered unnecessary.

Again, as an exercise of taste, it must be very desirable for the intelligent English reader to understand, constantly, whether he is reading prose or poetry. Suppose that any fine poem, with which he was familiar, were to be broken up into the style of exhibition in which the ordinary copies of the English Bible exhibit the rapt effusions of David and Isaiah, would not his whole nature recoil at it, as a most revolting barbarism? But is it less an offence and a sin, because of the greater dignity and sacredness involved in it, when such perversion is practised in the best of all books, the very fountain and refectory of man's whole nature, his taste not excepted?

It is indeed a striking proof of the transcendent power and excellence of the inspired poets, that they cannot be altogether divested of their inherent majesty and beauty, even in a translation far from the most perfect, with the superadded disadvantages of having the poetic structure almost entirely veiled from notice. But why should not the best efforts of the noblest minds be employed to remove this intercepting veil, and let the full light and beauty, which God has here displayed, shine upon our understanding with its instructive and cheering effulgence?

Nor is it altogether unworthy of notice, in this connection, that by making ourselves more familiar with the true poetic character of large portions of the sacred writings, we shall be incomparably better prepared to appreciate those works, which are most assimilated to their

The *synthetic* or constructive parallels, consisting in the similar form of construction. See Job xii, 13—16, Psalm xix, 7—11, and Isaiah xiv, 9.

Hell from beneath is moved for thee, to meet thee at thy coming,  
It stirreth up the dead for thee, even all the chief ones of the earth.  
It hath raised up from their thrones all the kings of the nations.

The *introverted* parallels are stanzas so constructed that whatever be the number of lines, the first shall be parallel with the last, and the second with the last but one. See Isaiah xxvii, 12, 13; also Psalm cxxxv, 15—18.

The idols of the heathen are silver and gold,  
The work of men's hands.  
They have mouths, but they speak not;  
They have eyes, but they see not;  
They have ears, but they hear not;  
Neither is there any breath in their mouths.  
They that make them are like unto them.  
So is every one that trusteth in them.

imagery. Who would not relish Milton and Cowper with enhanced pleasure, after having tasted the richness of the fountain from which they so freely drank?

Moreover, a clear perception of the poetic character and relations of such parts of the Scripture as have this impress stamped on them, will furnish a ready and interesting key to very much that pertains to the Archæology of Jewish literature and customs. The mould into which the sacred writers were led to cast their thoughts has certainly very much to do with the appropriate spirit in which they are to be investigated. The antiphonal or responsive method in which many of their sacred odes, and perhaps other poetic portions of the inspired writings, were chanted, or even read in unison in the temple service, while it accounts for much in the structure of some of these compositions, enables us the better to enter into their spirit and appreciate their various excellences, according to the original design. Bishop Jebb justly remarks, "It is my firm persuasion, that one great object of this prevalent duality of members, accompanied by a distinction and commonly either by a progress or antithesis in the sense of terms, clauses and periods, is to make inexhaustible provision for marking, with the nicest philosophical precision, the moral differences and relations of things. The antithetic parallelism seems to mark the broad and palpable distinction, between truth and falsehood, between good and evil; the cognate parallelism discharges the more difficult and more critical function of discriminating between different degrees and shades of truth and good on the one hand, of falsehood and of evil on the other." Now if this be the design of the great author, can we intelligently advance it without a knowledge, a conviction of this wise design?

Once more, if the poetic style of the Hebrew penmen of a large part of the Old Testament, has indeed, as Bishop Jebb contends, to an extent so much greater than is usually supposed, imbued the minds, and shaped the forms of expression in the writers of the New Testament, how immeasurably important does it become, not only to the interpreter of the sacred Scriptures, but to all those who would enter into their spirit, and with full relish appreciate their unequalled beauties, to master the principles of this poetic style.

Very frequently the quotations of poetry from the Old Testament, by the writers of the New, makes the right interpretation of their sense in a great degree dependent on the just appreciation of the peculiar principles involved in that kind of writing. Or even where there is no direct quotation of Hebrew verse, fragments are combined from different parts of the poetical Scriptures, and wrought up into one connected whole. Or such fragments, either in form or spirit, are mingled with the original truths communicated by the writer; and in either case, the principles involved should be understood, in order to the clear interpretation of the passage. Nor can it be thought strange that in some of the simple and beautiful teachings of Him who spake as never man spake, there should be found the distinct exhibition of the sententious parallelism, so inwrought in Hebrew poetry. The last four verses of our Saviour's sermon on the mount, if arranged and read in this manner, will seem invested with new force and felicity of enunciation. The same feature, in a degree, is seen also in Paul's writings. See 1 Cor. ii, 11, and 2 Cor. ii, 15, 16.

Our second principal inquiry,—Is this attainment practicable, for any considerable proportion of English readers; or, if practicable, is it worth the time and pains and persevering study which it will cost?—is susceptible of an affirmative response, on the most satisfactory and lucid considerations.

For we insist, in the very outset, that this attainment is by no means so difficult as is generally supposed. Let any intelligent reader of our common version prepare the way, if he will, by the perusal of the first forty pages of Bishop Lowth's Preliminary Dissertation, prefixed to his Translation of Isaiah, or some twenty pages of Mr. Barnes's Introduction to his Notes on Job, and then, with a Bible arranged like this of Mr. Nourse, he will with pleasure and facility relish and discriminate the poetical character of these sacred writings.

We speak what we know, and testify what our personal experience has verified, in assuring all our readers that the effort to master this new branch of knowledge, as they may regard it, is neither tedious nor difficult. Long before we were proficient in Hebrew learning, the good providence of God threw in our way Lowth's Lec-

tures on Hebrew Poetry, and subsequently, his Isaiah. The interesting and instructive perusal of these volumes, worth more than their cost for other things than the single point here contemplated, has given us an appreciation of the nature of sacred verse, which, every month and year since, has brought its abundant reward.

In these days of enlarged and general interest in Biblical investigations, why should not some portions of time, and some degree of attention, be turned to this subject? The larger, proportion of our ministers, especially the younger and more privileged, have already enjoyed advantages for becoming proficient in this branch of sacred science. Why should they not diffuse around them these advantages? and, by becoming reflectors, and raying out as widely as possible the light which has cheered and blessed them, why should they not, to an enlarged circle, become, in a new way and form, benefactors of their race? In three or four lectures, of half an hour each, they might make the more intelligent of their hearers,—the teachers of their Sabbath schools, and the members of their Bible classes, familiar with the principle, and adepts in the solution, of the problems of Hebrew verse. Then, with what enhanced satisfaction might they ever afterward rely on this intelligence, which their efforts had planted and fostered. In how many ways would it prove an indirect assistance to them in their weekly ministrations; enabling them, without seeming pedantry, or any affectation of superior learning, to allude to, and rely on, their people's understanding, and appreciating those well known principles of similarity or contrast, which the parallelism so often develops.

Perhaps we cannot more appropriately conclude this article, than by indicating, in somewhat fuller detail, the scope and method of such a course of lectures. The first might be merely introductory, and embrace the history of the sacred books; their authors, their respective dates, their transmission, the order of their arrangement, the principles on which the sacred canon has been definitely settled, and such concluding remarks of a pious and practical character as would be adapted to leave a happy impression on the mind.

The second might properly take up the twofold division of the sacred writings; the former regarding their



form, as either prose or poetry, marking the distinction, and of course giving in full the definition of Hebrew poetry, showing in what its peculiarity consists, how it differs from that poetry which depends on rhyme and measure, and how, without either of these adjuncts, it is still easily distinguishable from plain prose. Here, too, the advantage of possessing such editions of the Scriptures as readily mark, even to the eye, this distinction, might easily be illustrated. Those who desired to profit as largely as possible by the lectures, might be encouraged to procure such a copy for themselves, and their own daily and profitable use, since it is just as good as any other Bible for common reading, and has these advantages, of paragraph and poetic parallel arrangement, besides; or, at the very least, a Testament with the Psalms thus arranged, which may be purchased for a few cents, being published in a pocket form by the American and Foreign Bible Society. With such helps, all the attendants on the lectures might be led to see how largely their own interests would be promoted.

When the lines of demarcation, which mark the poetry of the sacred books, are clearly fixed, the lecturer might properly introduce the subdivision of this class of writings, having reference to their object, as pastoral, didactic, elegiac, strictly devotional, amatory or prophetic, furnishing, of course, copious examples for illustration, under each head.

The third lecture might take up the division of Hebrew poetry with regard to its different forms of the parallelism, including the acrostic, or initial letter of some of these compositions; might make all and each kind sufficiently familiar, by so exhibiting and explaining the several kinds, as should give an intelligible idea of them all, fix them in the memory, and stimulate each one to go on for himself, in carrying out such a classification of the various dual, or tri-verse, or poly-verse stanzas, so that in a short time it would require no more time or effort to resolve the compositions as they are read into their appropriate forms and designed arrangements, than it requires of a good ear, accustomed to English verse, to mark the ever recurring cæsural and final pauses in each line, or to note the appropriate structure of the sonnet, or the Spenserian stanza.

These two last lectures might easily be subdivided, if likely to prove too long; and special care should be taken to recapitulate, and review the several points, till they are clearly understood.

The whole might be appropriately closed by pious and grateful contemplations of the affluence of that divine wisdom and goodness, which has so amply provided the requisite aliment for each and all the elements of our mental constitution; that will not overlook even the gratification of a taste for the beautiful, the harmonious, and by ever-recurring comparisons heightens our admiration, or sharpens the discriminating powers of our moral perceptions. How striking to mark that structure of the sacred poetry of the Bible, which, by rejecting such common adjuncts as rhymes and fixed measure, has admirably adapted this book of God to be translated with literal fidelity and exactness into all languages, without losing aught of the original features of poetic beauty and instructiveness, which divine inspiration impressed on it.

R. B.

*New Bedford, June, 1847.*

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#### ARTICLE V.

##### THE CHARACTERISTICS AND EFFECTS OF ORIGINAL THINKING.

*Duty and Rewards of Original Thinking.* An Address by Prof. G. W. EATON, of Madison University, N. Y.

ORIGINAL thinking has ever been the theme of eulogy. The mass of men are more inclined, however, to praise it than to think for themselves. Still every man desires to be regarded as having a mind, and as exercising it in forming his opinions. Vague and conflicting, however, are the notions of many respecting the essential attributes of original thinking. To arrive at definite views, the reader's attention is called to its characteristics and effects.

I. Original thinking has been justly defined, "the exercise of our intellectual faculties." Intense thought is its most prominent and fundamental characteristic. Without this, talent or attainment, however great, will be of no avail. If unemployed, they can never supply any defect in it, nor be substituted for it.

Many wish to be original thinkers, but fall short of their object. Some appear to imagine that originality can only be seen in selecting strange subjects, and astounding the world with wonders. They substitute a display of the marvellous for deep, energetic thought. Efforts to produce such results, however, are generally a burlesque upon it. They exhibit either stupidity or vanity.

The affectation of singularity, borrowing the airs and assuming the style of celebrated authors, are the cloaks of ignorance, indolence and imbecility. An original thinker will be himself, and not the shadow of some one else. Copyists and imitators, of all grades, are content to look through the eyes of others. They do not employ them to aid their own vision. Their authors are their oracles. Like the vine, leaning upon the oak, with them they stand or fall. "In this age of books, they may throw themselves into the thoroughfares of knowledge, and be borne to any point of the intellectual horizon," and dispense by wholesale the productions of others; but they think only by proxy.

To oppose or reject acknowledged truths is no sure test of originality. A blind zealot may do this with resolute obstinacy, as the only way to acquire distinction, as thousands have done. But to act thus fanatically is not to think.

Myriads may swarm around great authors, like bees around flowers. They may display skill in extracting their sweets, and exhibiting their beauties and sublimity; but they do not deserve the name of original thinkers, because they have not taxed their own abilities to create objects of equal or greater beauty and grandeur.

There is a mental sluggishness, which is the great reason why so few ever attempt to think; and why so many, who make the attempt, take the shadow for the substance. To call forth the energies of the mind in their full vigor, it must be brought into collision with great subjects. It must be taxed; and, the more severely, the

better. In digesting a subject, whatever aid a man may receive from others, he must exercise his own powers. "It must undergo such a thorough excogitation in his own mind as to become a part of his intellectual furniture, or become incorporated with his mental framework." To give himself full scope, he must select subjects worthy of his strongest efforts, and then grapple with them with all his ability, till he has thoroughly explored, and perfectly arranged and embellished them. In a word, "let drive his mind through them like a burning ploughshare," and he will leave traces of originality, broad and deep, so that none will mistake them. Such intellectual exercise may justly be dignified with the name of thought.

II. Individuality is another characteristic of original thinking. The minds of men are as different as their countenances. As new coins fall from the mint, so do the intellectual productions of men, from the mind that melts, moulds and burnishes them. They bear the peculiarities of their respective moulds; and the vividness of the outline is in proportion to the intensity of the mental heat required to fuse, form and polish them. These peculiarities constitute the individuality of an author. It is by these, that we discover the source of intellectual productions.

One peculiarity or distinctive feature of a writer's individuality is his selection of subjects.

Every person has his taste for particular kinds of truth, as he has for particular articles of food. Some departments of truth may be relished in common by all; but there are others, which feast some while they disgust others. Each one delights to dwell on those subjects which are most congenial with his taste. Some departments of truth, on account of their congeniality, may promise success to those who cultivate them. Thus Bacon might have become a Newton in mathematics, and Newton a Bacon in metaphysics. But it is very doubtful whether Shakespeare could ever have become a Newton in mathematics, or Newton a Shakespeare in poetry.

To reach some subjects requires the efforts of great minds. Few, for instance, would ever have dreamed of those vast projects, which Bonaparte originated and accomplished with such celerity as to astonish the world.



Again, the thought of that grand alliance, which wrested the destinies of Europe from his grasp, and which has since been the great political regulator of nearly two thirds of the earth, first found a lodging place in the mind of Pitt. Some are noted for the boldness of their subjects; others for their depth or abstruseness; others for their simplicity or their show. Minds of a mathematical, metaphysical, or philological cast glory in their respective departments of labor. Minds of a poetic stamp have their home in the regions of ideality. They delight in the delicate and tender, they are charmed with the beautiful and grand, they glow with the terrific and awful. They can make virtue more lovely, and vice more ugly, and transform the one into Satan, and the other into an angel of light. They are in ecstasy, when they can melt, charm or overwhelm the world by their power. The kind of truth in which any mind luxuriates, shows this feature of its individuality.

Another feature will be seen in the conception of subjects. No two persons, acting independently of each other, will treat the same subject in precisely the same way. This is owing to the different ways in which they conceive it. Did they conceive it alike, they would treat it alike. This peculiarity will be more or less apparent in all the productions of any sterling thinker, and its prominence will be proportioned to the force of thought which gave them birth.

The clear conception of any subject embraces its object, outlines and arrangement. In vast and abstruse subjects, this requires the highest exercise of the human intellect. The skeletons of sermons, the plans of treatises, and the framework of productions of genius, cost their respective authors far greater mental effort than the productions themselves. What vast effort must the clear conception of the plan of *Paradise Lost* have cost its author! Thus it is also with other works, in proportion as they approach to this in magnitude and importance.

Some are distinguished by logical arrangement; others by an illogical arrangement, joined with many strong points. Some are noted for their confusion; others for their discrimination. Some bring their subjects to their method; others bring their method to their subjects. In

these and other points, pertaining to the conception of their subjects, are seen the peculiarities of different minds.

A person's style will exhibit another feature of his individuality. The would-be thinker is, at best, an unskilful dauber. To experienced eyes, the strokes by which he designs to conceal his defects only heighten them. His efforts remind one of the fable of the ass in the lion's skin. He need only open his mouth to show his true character, and excite the pity, the indignation, or the contempt due to his hypocrisy.

The peculiarities of the style of an original thinker are seen in his use of single words, in his delicate or striking forms of expression, in his simple stately sentences, in his plainness, or ornament, and the like.

Some inundate you with a sea of words; others show such power of condensation that their solid thoughts, like shot from a cannon's mouth, either shiver or sweep down every thing they strike.

Some aim at embellishment. They gem and jewel every thing. Their drapery may fascinate; still they may possess little thought. Others regard their matter, more than their manner. They lay strong hold of truth's deepest foundations, and overwhelm their readers or hearers with their power. "They are lumbering wagons, freighted with gold."

The peculiarities of the original thinker are more or less striking, in proportion as his strength has been taxed in quarrying his productions from the mine of truth, and his taste put to the highest test in their embellishment. His thought befits his expression, and his expression his thought. Both have life, reality and power.

Another feature is seen in the object and manner of employing the aid of others.

Some make crutches of others, and do not exert their own abilities. This is one extreme. Others attempt to dispense with all foreign aid. This is the other extreme. These resemble the man, who, to show his independence, should travel on foot a rugged route along some great thoroughfare, rather than enter the rail-car or steamboat, and despatch his journey with ease and delight, saving his time and strength for more worthy objects. Some seem to suppose that an original thinker must create the materials of thought. This is a great mistake. "The

great mass of truth, in science, morals and religion, is the common property of all men. Every man has a perfect right to take as much or as little as he pleases." The skill shown in illustrating and enforcing simple truths, in making abstruse ones plain, in freeing others from misapprehension and perversion, in separating, combining and arranging others, exhibits more or less originality. An architect shows his skill, not in hewing timber, sawing boards, making brick, burning lime, etc., but in the construction and finish of his edifices. Again, the events of the life of Henry V were on the historic page for men to read, but it required the genius of Shakespeare to breathe into them their original life. Similar events on a much grander scale are now recorded in almost every tongue; but where is the mind to awe the earth, by raising from the grave the great actors in them in their ambition, power and glory? This requires genius of the highest order. Original thinking does not depend upon employing or not employing the aid of others, but upon the object for which, and the manner in which, it is employed.

Another feature of the original thinker is that he is a discoverer of new truth. The existence of truth does not depend upon its being known. The truths of physical science have existed since the creation of the material universe. Moral and religious truth, so far as it respects man, had its birth with his own existence. Political truth has had being since the organization of human society. Exhaustless mines of truth have been locked from human sight for ages. What mines are still concealed, no one can tell. Their discovery, therefore, does not create, nor originate them. It only makes them accessible. Some, like mines of gold, have been discovered by accident; but by far the greater part have been brought to light by the efforts of the greatest minds. All men had seen bodies fall to the earth for ages; yet it was reserved for Newton, from the fall of an apple, to discover those simple laws which hold in harmonious action the diversified operations of the universe. Myriads had witnessed the hues displayed on soap bubbles, floating in the sunbeams, and the brilliancy of the prismatic spectrum; but from these phenomena he also developed his theory and laws of light. The facts upon which the system of induc-

tive philosophy is based, have been observed in every age; but it remained for Bacon to deduce from them those simple principles, which have revolutionized the philosophical world. None will doubt the originality of such minds.

Again. The employment of the aid of others in exploring new fields of thought, may exhibit originality of great power. To illustrate this point, we borrow the substance of a historical fact, employed by an elegant writer for a kindred purpose. "Bonaparte in his Egyptian expedition, on crossing an arm of the Red Sea with his staff, came near sharing the fate of Pharaoh. He instantly commanded his officers to separate to the right and left. Some sank on either side of him, but these assisted him, as well as those directly upon the true fording place, in ascertaining its direction and width, and reaching the shore in safety." A person's originating power, in his search after any great truth, will be proportioned to his ability to make others do for him what Bonaparte's officers did for him on this occasion. He may be on its track, and make the success and failure of others aid him in determining its limits and direction, and thus lead him to a right conclusion.

In different persons there is as much difference of mental, as there is of physical, strength. Little minds may delight in trifles; but great minds glory in great achievements. A man's strength is stamped upon his productions. A glance at them will determine whether he be an infant or a giant. His talents are exhibited in the nature of his subjects, their arrangement, discussion, etc.; and his genius, in the power of invention which he thus displays. Here we see the difference between talent and genius. A man may possess talent, and not genius, because he is without invention; but he cannot possess genius and not talent, because invention is one species of talent.

There is an intimate connection between a man's talents and his attainments. Other things being equal, those who rely most upon the former, manifest the most originality; and those who depend most upon the latter, manifest the most learning. This is seen in comparing Homer and Virgil; Shakespeare and Milton; Ezekiel and Isaiah.



Again. Minds of equal strength may possess different degrees of activity. Some leap from premises to distant conclusions, which others must reach by attending more carefully to the intermediate steps. Some bound at once from earth to heaven, and career through the universe "in fine phrenzy rolling;" while others reach equal, or greater heights, but at a slower rate. But talents or genius above the ordinary laws of the human mind, exist only in imagination. Those who expect that splendid conceptions and burning thoughts will be showered down upon them, without the exertion of their faculties, only dream. In imagination they may entrance multitudes, astonish nations, and convulse the earth; but, like the inebriate, they glory on the broad road to oblivion. In a word, such reveries are to the mind what revels are to the whole man. They enfeeble, beggar, ruin. Intemperance has not been more direful in its wholesale desolation among men, than this species of mental inebriation has been to the minds of those who have indulged in it.

"Some attempt to make the impression that their productions cost them little or no labor—were the growth of a night"—the offspring of a single afflatus of their genius. This is foolish in the extreme; and as false as it is vain. The productions of labor, whether intellectual or physical, declare that labor has been performed. As well might we think that the most magnificent structures sprang into existence without hands, as to suppose that the *Iliad*, the *Æneid*, or the *Paradise Lost* came into being without protracted toil. Genius, however great, is not omniscient, nor omnipotent, and cannot dispense with labor. It shows what can be done with it.

An intense thinker will be an original thinker. All will recognize his individuality, and respect him. If unable to rank with the highest orders of talent and genius, he will at least be on the road to the upper walks of human thought.

Among the effects of original thinking we note the following.

III. It strengthens the mind. It is a law of our physical, intellectual and moral constitution, that the exercise of any particular part increases its strength. See the swarthy arm of the blacksmith; its size and power are in a great measure dependent upon its action. Thus it

is with our intellectual faculties. A man may become a living concordance, or a walking library, and still be a very weak man. But an energetic thinker will increase the strength of his intellect. The former may have knowledge, but the latter will have power. The one may secure attention, the other will command it. The one may be respected for what he has, the other will be for what he is. The one is a cistern, which must be filled from some external source, and may be drained, however vast; "the other is a perennial fountain, from whose exhaustless bosom gush ever living streams, which refresh and fertilize all surrounding nature." The one can do nothing without books; the other, though shut up in a dungeon, can create those that will live while time endures. The mental powers of the one will remain stationary, while those of the other increase in strength from infancy up to manhood.

2. It creates true intellectual independence. This the man without thought knows not. The past can only show him his imbecility. Any pretension on his part to grapple with profound subjects, is presumption. Generally, however, a consciousness of his own weakness will lead him to avoid such attempts altogether. The original thinker can trust his own powers. From what he has already achieved, he knows, to some extent at least, what he can accomplish. He knows how to use, and when to acknowledge, the aid of others. He loathes borrowed plumes, and is equally disgusted at the vanity which rejects all such aid. The genuineness of his intellectual independence will depend upon the depth, power and comprehensiveness of his thought. True moral independence is based upon a conscience void of offence towards God and man. The proper union of both kinds creates the most exalted independence, which a dependent sinful being can possibly possess. The possessor of such a character will think and let think, and act and let act.

3. It brings its own reward. Wealth acquired by a person's industry and economy, or fame secured by his own genius, afford him peculiar pleasure, because he enjoys the fruits of his own labor. Mental wealth, quarried from the mines of truth, by one's own hand, confers on its possessor higher, purer and more enduring felicity.

"He lays up treasures vastly more precious than gems and gold, with the seal of his exclusive proprietorship indelibly impressed upon them." He contributes his quota to the intellectual riches of the world, for which the whole race ought to show an amount of gratitude commensurate with the greatness, truthfulness and importance of his productions.

Again. The mere acquisition of knowledge is attended with pleasure. But profound and glowing thought confers a happiness peculiarly its own. "Its joy ranks next to those of pardoned sin, and a clear conscience." Excepting these, it is the highest and purest that the mind can enjoy on earth.

Again. The desire of power is an element of human nature. Its strength is seen in the infant's tenacious grasp of its toys, in the petty contests among men for victory, and in the seas of blood, shed by men aspiring to rule the earth. Its gratification, of course, produces happiness. But the amount and kind of happiness depends entirely upon the amount and kind of power exercised in producing it. That which springs from the exercise of intellectual power, is as far above that produced by the exercise of physical power, as the intellect of man is above his body; and, that which springs from the exercise of moral power, is as far above that originated by the exercise of mere intellectual power, as man's moral is above his intellectual. The physical power of man is nearly allied to the force of brutes; his intellectual and moral power is of a near kin to the energy of angels. Civil and military power is more or less physical. This must accordingly affect the character of the happiness which the exercise of them produces. He who causes millions to bend at his nod, may have their curses, and be overthrown; but he who sways the minds of millions, will have their praises, and be immortalized. Independently of these consequences, the rapture of him whose arm plucks up kingdoms, cleaves empires, sweeps nations from existence, and bows the whole earth to his will, is not to be compared with his, whose intellect lays in ruins the strong holds of vice, crushes systems of delusion, obliterates the dominions of error, and holds the race by the gentle reins of truth. The one makes the earth bleed at every pore, that he may play with straws;

the other feels himself as far above thrones and empires as mind is above matter. The exercise of man's physical power, subjected to his intellectual, and of both to his moral power, resembles the government of God over the universe of mind. The exercise of these kinds of power, thus subordinate to each other, gives birth to a happiness in kind and degree, like that enjoyed by God himself in governing his intelligent creation, in proportion to the perfection of their subordination. The earth, alas, knows but little of such happiness.

4. It gives great power over our fellow men. There is a perpetual warfare between truth and error, virtue and vice. Intellectual power may aid either, and thus become the cause of weal or wo. Such consequences, however, are connected with each, that where an equal amount of talent and skill is employed on both sides, the former will invariably achieve the victory. Intellectual power has freed nations from the yoke of despotism, and it has forged chains, under which men have groaned for ages. It needs a regulator. However great, it can never harmonize the earth. This is the sole prerogative of moral power. When supreme, it is to the human race what the attraction of gravitation is to the material universe. It neutralizes, counteracts, and balances the antagonist forces among men, forms them into every lawful combination, and holds every society, community and nation in their respective orbits.

The power of thought over mankind may be seen in the sway which single minds have had over the human race. Homer's *Iliad* has done more towards creating heroes, and moulding the destinies of succeeding ages, than Alexander and his sweeping victories. The whole energy of the one has been felt in every age; the glory of the other has departed with the lapse of time. The orations of Demosthenes and Cicero have done more towards governing the world than the power of tyrants. The works of the former have been the text-books of legislators in every succeeding age; while the examples of the latter are held up to execration. Time will yet show that Carey, with his Bible, did more towards subjugating the world, than Bonaparte with marshalled Europe at his side.

A sterling thinker need not concern himself about being



overlooked or neglected. Like pure gold, his weight and worth will eventually be seen, felt and acknowledged. The *Paradise Lost* fell, still-born, from the hand of its author. It has since enrolled his name in the annals of immortality. The reward of men will, in the end, be according to their merits.

No one can give his intellect its full development without energetic thought. It requires severe and protracted mental toil. Were such thinking universal, thinking by proxy would cease. Instead of the mass of mankind never passing beyond their childhood in mental power, every person of ripe age would stand forth in full-grown intellectual manhood, and be known to the world by the commanding features of his own individuality.

Of all men on earth, ministers of the gospel should, in this respect, be the most thoroughly disciplined. Almost every department of literature, science and morals, furnishes us specimens of the highest exertions of the human mind. The themes of the minister throw all others into the shade. They are grand, glorious, awful. He should never content himself because he is within the pale of orthodoxy and sustained by a mass of great authors. Each should see for himself the grounds of his faith, and be able to give the reason of his hope. Misapprehension, mistake, or perversion may be fraught with consequences sufficiently tremendous to veil the heavens in sackcloth, and make the earth weep tears of blood. His responsibility is inconceivably awful. Study, thought and prayer should form his native element. In it he should live, grow and glory. In justice to ourselves and to man, and for the honor of God, let us strive to be energetic and prayerful thinkers.

After having sketched the outlines and written the substance of the present article, the production of Prof. G. W. Eaton, of Madison University, on "*The Duty and Rewards of Original Thinking*," fell into our hands. The careful reading of it made a deep impression upon us. How much of it has been incorporated into the preceding pages is left for the reader to decide. We intended to mark every passage taken from it; yet the similarity of some strains of thought in both articles has made it difficult to decide at all times how much we have been indebted to that excellent production.

## ARTICLE VI.

## MIRACLES.

*Art. VII, in the June No. of the Christian Review.*

*Question Book on the Miracles of our Saviour Jesus Christ.* By REV. LEMUEL PORTER.

IS THE PERFORMANCE OF A MIRACLE PROOF OF A DIVINE COMMISSION  
TO REVEAL TRUTH?

WITH this question a writer in the last number of the *Christian Review* commences a criticism upon the book named at the head of this article. We propose to examine the same question by way of reply. Its solution depends, according to our reviewer, upon the following, *Can any other being than God perform a miracle?* It seems to us, however, that there is still a third question to be asked, the answer to which will decide both the former, viz., *What is a miracle?* It is very evident that this word may be so defined that the first question can be answered only in the affirmative, and the second only in the negative. Or, it may be so defined as completely to reverse the answers. Every thing then depends upon the definition of the word "miracle." It is to be regretted that our reviewer has not stated the meaning which he affixes to it. "We ought always," says Ernesti, "to inquire in respect to any word, whether we have a distinct perception of the thing or idea, which it is meant to designate." Scientific and critical writers should be precise, to prevent embarrassment to those who may read their works, and to those who may reply to them. Let us briefly notice some of the significations of this important word as given by authors of established reputation. Dr. Emmons says that "a miracle is an effect wrought by God himself." If this means that God, by a distinct effort of divine power, works miracles, then no other being can perform them. But did not Moses and Paul work miracles? Are they God? If not, then a miracle

may be performed by an indirect effort of divine power. If now asked whether any other being than God can perform a miracle, we cannot give a categorical answer. To reply no, or yes, would not be safe. You would be obliged to reply either, no, not directly, or yes, indirectly. Other writers use the word in a much wider sense than Dr. Emmons. We find it applied to the acts of angels, good and bad; to the results of skilful legerdemain; to the triumphs of genius, and to the mysterious operations of nature. An inspired writer uses this expression, "They are the spirits of devils, working miracles." A medical instrument is thus praised: "Galen doth affirm cupping glasses to work as miraculously as if their operation had depended upon enchantment."

President Everett alludes to a watch in the following terms. "What a miracle of art, that a man can teach a few brass wheels and a little piece of elastic steel to out-calculate himself; to give him a rational answer to one of the most important questions, which a being travelling toward eternity can ask! What a miracle, that a man can put within this little machine a spirit, that measures the flight of time with greater accuracy than the unassisted intellect of the profoundest philosopher; which watches and moves when sleep palsies alike the hand of the maker and the mind of the contriver, nay when the last sleep has come over them both."

The poet Young also applies this word to effects produced by the intellect of man,—

"Gazing on miracles by mortals wrought,  
Arches triumphal, theatres immense,  
On nodding gardens pendent in mid air!  
Or temples proud to meet their gods half way!"

A still more ancient poet says,—

"Omnia transformant sese in miracula rerum."

These quotations are sufficient to show with what latitude this word is used. Lest therefore there should be any doubt as to our own meaning, we shall define it, bearing in mind the remark of Professor Stuart, that "The meaning of a word must always be a simple matter of fact, and of course it is always to be established by appropriate and adequate testimony."

We are not disposed to avail ourselves of any figurative or poetical definitions. Our inquiry is, what is the true, theological meaning of the word? What did Jesus mean, when he appealed to his magnificent miracles? What did the sacred writers mean, when they used this word in recording his wonderful works?

We shall assume that the definition in the introduction to the Question Book is correct. "A miracle is such a deviation from the known laws of nature as can be effected only by a power superior to that of man." It will be perceived that this definition contains two assertions. First, that a miracle is a deviation from the known laws of nature. Second, it is such an one as can be effected only by a power superior to that of man. To each of these assertions we shall now give our attention.

A miracle is a "deviation from the known laws of nature." This position we understand our reviewer to deny. We affirm it, and shall endeavor to justify the affirmation by "appropriate and adequate testimony." Our first appeal naturally is to the lexicographers. Among them our own Webster holds the highest rank. He defines a miracle to be "an event or effect contrary to the established constitution and course of things; or, a deviation from the known laws of nature." The philosopher Locke says, "A miracle, I take to be a sensible operation, which, being above the comprehension of the spectator, and, in his opinion, contrary to the established course of nature, is taken by men to be divine. It is argued that, as a miracle must be that which surpasses the force of nature, in the established, steady laws of causes and effects, nothing can be taken to be a miracle but what is judged to exceed those laws." Bishop Butler, "whose thoughts, according to Dr. Barnes, are condensed into as narrow a compass as the nature of language will admit," says, "a miracle in its very notion, is relative to a course of nature; and implies somewhat different from it, considered as being so."

It seems then, that lexicographers, philosophers and theologians, of the highest order, sustain this part of our definition, and, we may add, that after a somewhat extended examination, we find no good writers who oppose it.

The question now fairly arises, what are the laws of



nature? We mean by them, the uniformity of the arrangements of divine providence. We mean that, whenever a certain state of matter or of mind is found to be preceded or followed by a certain other state of matter or of mind, it will always, under similar circumstances, be found to be thus preceded or followed. We mean that, *ceteris paribus*, antecedents will always be followed by similar consequents, and that consequents will always be preceded by similar precedents. As in a chain, any link always has the same one before it and the same one after it, so in the known laws of nature, events are uniformly related to and connected with each other. The former event we call a cause, and the latter an effect; not that we mean one event to be the efficient cause of another, but simply its uniform antecedent. We mean that God, in infinite wisdom, has established these regular sequences, without which we could understand neither his character nor our duty. We agree with Dr. Wayland, that if God "had seen fit, he could as well have arranged entirely different antecedents and consequents, or, could have produced every change by itself, without having established any regular order of succession." Yet we do not see how he could have taken any other course but this, in nature, with the same benefit to man. It is by faith in the uniformity of these laws, that the farmer sows his "precious seed"; that the bold seaman trusts himself to the vast deep; that physicians give and patients take medicines; that the ambassador of Christ preaches salvation to guilty men, and that all the business of life goes forward. Let this uniformity be interrupted, even within the limits of a single law, and who can calculate its unhappy influence upon our race?

The object of a miracle is to excite astonishment, and thus to secure attention. It is to impress the spectator with the idea of superhuman power, and to prepare the mind for some divine communication. It is the knocking of Jehovah's hand against the doors of this world, summoning our race to come forth and hear his message; at the same time it is the impress of the great seal of the universe, in proof of the credibility of the messenger. But surely this cannot be done by exhibiting any of the well known antecedents and consequents of nature. The uniform order of natural events must be, or must

seem to be, strikingly deviated from, to arrest attention, or to ensure respect. It was not a burning bush, that prepared Moses to hear God's voice on Horeb, but a bush that burned continually without being consumed. The laws of nature are deviated from by miracles in only two ways; when they are suspended, and when they are counteracted. "A miracle," says Bishop Wilson, "is a visible suspension of those laws of nature, on the general constancy of which the order and preservation of the whole universe rest."

The definition of Dr. Dwight is, "a suspension or counteraction of what are called the laws of nature. By the laws of nature," he adds, "I intend those regular courses of divine agency, which we discern in the world around us." The laws of nature are suspended, whenever an antecedent, in similar circumstances, is not followed by its regular consequent; as, for example, if a person should drink some deadly thing, which, under precisely the same circumstances, has killed others, but which does not harm him. They are counteracted, whenever a consequent exists, without being preceded by its uniform antecedent; as if rain should fall copiously without the presence of clouds. Upon a careful examination of every recorded miracle of Christ, we believe that they, and all other miracles, may be classed under three divisions: those in which the laws of nature are suspended; those in which they are counteracted; and those in which they are both suspended and counteracted, which may be called double miracles. The miracles of the Old Testament were on a more colossal scale than those of the New; but through the whole series of both Testaments, where can one be found that resists this classification? As a specimen of the first class, we mention our Saviour's walking on the sea of Galilee.

" But what vision is yonder ! A human like form,  
By the wind unimpeded, unblenched by the storm,  
On the waves moving onward is seen ;  
The surges supply him a footing, the air  
Waves the folds of his garments and streams in his hair,  
But disturbs not his motion serene.

As the storm nourished petrels, the sons of the deep,  
Float at ease on its surface and fearlessly sleep,

So the surges that passenger bore :  
No more to his feet doth the water flood yield  
Than if planted they were on some grass mantled field  
Or the water was crystalized o'er."\*

Here we say was a suspension of the laws of nature. It is a law of hydrostatics that any body, of greater specific gravity than water, must sink in it when placed unsupported on its surface; but the body of our Saviour was specifically heavier than the waves of Galilee, on which he walked without any natural support, yet he did not sink. Here an antecedent, (a human body,) existed under the very circumstances, (placed without support on the surface of deep water,) in which a certain consequent, (sinking,) uniformly follows, without being followed by that consequent. Here was a cause without its effect. Here was a miracle. The preternatural darkness in Egypt is of the same kind.

As a specimen of the second class, we mention the change of water into wine. Here was a counteraction of the laws of nature. Wine, as a consequent, is uniformly preceded by a vegetable substance, in its second stage of fermentation, as its antecedent. But wine, preceded by any other antecedent, is a deviation from nature's regular processes, especially when pure water is the antecedent; which is neither a vegetable substance, nor is capable of fermentation. The widow's oil and meal is similar.

As an example of the third class, or of double miracles, we mention the resurrection of the body of Lazarus. It is a law of nature that animal and vegetable bodies after death shall be decomposed. Chemical and mechanical changes take place in their particles of matter, which assume new arrangements and relations, until the original form and structure disappear. The body of Lazarus had been undergoing this process for four days, when the Saviour came to his grave. It is also a law of nature that when an animal body is partly decomposed, and the process is arrested at a given point, by placing it under new circumstances, its particles of matter shall remain in the same state they were in when decomposition ceased. Arresting decay does not restore the body to its original

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\* Bishop Mant.

weight and structure. Various antiseptics may deprive tainted meat, for example, of its offensiveness to the senses, but they cannot recall any of the escaped gases, or rearrange any particles of matter that have entered into new combinations. The body of Lazarus was far advanced in decomposition. Now, in raising him to life, (we say nothing here of the life imparted to his body, but only of its preparation for life,) first, the process of decomposition was arrested without any change of circumstances. Here the law of decomposition was suspended. And, in the second place, every particle of that body, whether it had soared into the air, sunk into the earth, been devoured by reptiles or been chemically changed, was brought back and rearranged, until the body was entire as to weight, color and form. Here was a direct reversal of the law of decomposition.

We believe, then, that every genuine miracle is a deviation from the known laws of nature in one of the ways mentioned, and that every such deviation is a real miracle.

But against this sentiment our reviewer protests in the following words: "To say that such miracles are a violation or a suspension of the laws of nature is a very unsatisfactory account of them. As long as we live in the flesh, we constantly suspend some of the laws of matter. What are experiments in chemistry and natural philosophy but successful resistance to, or violations of, nature's laws? But are these things miracles? What should we think of such definitions as the following: Embalming is a suspension of the law of decay; climbing a tree or a precipice is an infraction of the law of gravitation; the ascent of sap is a violation of hydrodynamics? To say then that a miracle is a suspension or an infraction of the law of nature, does not distinguish it from other events, which we constantly witness. The raising of the dead, recorded in the Bible, is no more a violation of law, than the bursting of a chrysalis or the sprouting of a decayed vegetable." With this paragraph, as a whole, and in all its parts, we are obliged totally to disagree.

"We constantly," says our reviewer, "suspend some of the laws of matter." We ask what laws? We know of none. We can imagine none. We cannot conceive of a single instance in which it has been done, except



when a miracle has been performed. But we are referred to experiments in chemistry and in natural philosophy, as specimens of successful violations of nature's laws. We regret that our reviewer has not named some of these experiments; for we know of no examples. On the contrary, all that occur to our mind confirm us in the opposite opinion. We will examine one or two experiments of each kind mentioned.

The particles of a homogeneous body are united and held together by what is called the attraction of cohesion. Now, if without changing the circumstances, you can disunite those particles, you suspend the law of cohesion; but if you disunite those particles by changing the circumstances, you have merely taken the body out of the control of the law of cohesion and placed it under the influence of some other law of nature. Suppose that you strike a piece of granite with a hammer until you crumble it to powder, have you violated the law of cohesion? Not at all. What is the law of cohesion? It is a single department of that general law of physics, by which all bodies attract each other in proportion to the particles of matter they contain and to the distances by which they are separated. The particles of granite adhere with a certain degree of force. The blows you inflict exert a superior force. The particles are thrown beyond the sphere of each other's attraction. Cohesion no longer applies to them; but they come under the law of gravitation, which brings them to the earth, and of inertia, which prevents their changing places.

A pure acid, by itself, is united by cohesion. So is a pure alkali. But, when placed together, each separates into particles, which unite with the particles of the other body, forming a neutral salt. This salt is held together, not by cohesion but by chemical attraction. Cohesion is not suspended or violated; for the acid and alkali, being placed under different circumstances, are no longer subject to cohesion, but to chemical attraction. The neutral salt, now subject to the law of chemical attraction, may be made, by a change of circumstances, to renounce that law and to become obedient to another. Let a third substance be added, for which either the acid or the alkali has a greater affinity, and one of them, being set free, returns to the law of cohesion, while the other uniting with

the third comes under the law of elective affinity. The rule then seems to be, that every substance, with a change of circumstances, becomes a new antecedent, and is uniformly followed by a new consequent. Laws never suspend or violate each other. Each acts independently to a certain point, where another distinct law waits to carry on the process of nature. Nor can human beings suspend any natural law. It is according to a uniform law that any body, of greater specific gravity than a fluid or liquid, when placed unsupported upon it, will descend towards the earth. Now, if a person should, at any time, leap from the roof of his house, and, without any natural support, float around in the air, we will admit that he has suspended a powerful law; or, if he will rise up from the same place through the atmosphere, and soar among the clouds, we will confess that he has counteracted a law of nature. But, if he sustains himself by a rope in the air and thus remains stationary, we do not see that he suspends any thing but himself. Gravitation is in full force upon him, with a power of fifteen pounds to the square inch,—to prove which, you have only to cut the rope and to see the result. When smoke and vapor rise in the air, they do not violate the law of gravitation, but fulfil it. The air, being a denser body than smoke and vapor, is attracted with greater power, and thus presses the lighter bodies upward. Let the air be removed, and the smoke, vapor and gas will fall downward like lead. Thus, with a change of circumstances, former laws cease to operate and new ones take their place. This is true of man in his relations to society. It is a statute law of our country that minors are subject to their fathers. Now does a young man, on becoming of age, suspend or counteract the law of minors? Or rather, has not a change of circumstances placed him beyond its limits? The law of minors is not violated, when he is twenty-one years old. The apostle Paul understood this principle. "The wife," he says, "is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth; but if her husband be dead, she is at liberty to marry whom she will."

Embalming is not a suspension of the law of decay; for the law of decay is, that certain antecedents must precede decay as their consequent. Embalming removes those antecedents and substitutes others, to which belong

other consequents. For decay to take place under these new antecedents would be a miracle. Climbing a tree does not suspend gravitation. It still attracts, with the weight of fifteen pounds to the square inch. The ascent is by the same law by which birds fly and vapors ascend. Whoever throws off a weight from his body of fifteen pounds to the square inch, and adds but an ounce of upward force, must rise, and all do that by muscular contraction, who climb trees or scale precipices.

Sap ascends trees by capillary attraction, and by the alternate expansion and contraction of the minute tubes in the wood. Thus while gravitation exerts a downward force upon the sap, the other influences exert an upward force superior to it. It is a law of nature that, when two antagonist forces meet, the inferior yields to the superior. The inferior force, however, is not suspended or counteracted; for it continues to exert just the same energy when yielding, as though it was itself overcoming an inferior. Thus if two opposite forces, consisting of powers equal to ten and fifteen, meet, the ten on each side neutralize each other, and the five, having no resistance, by a law of mechanics moves the whole mass.

We have not agreed with our reviewer thus far; but still less do we agree with him in the remainder of the paragraph. Is it true that the raising of our Lord Jesus Christ's dead body is no more a violation, that is suspension or counteraction, of natural laws than the sprouting of a decayed vegetable? Let us examine. A decayed vegetable is partly decomposed; our Lord's body "saw no corruption." The law of nature was in full force in one case, but was suspended in the other. A decayed vegetable contains the germ of life, or it would not sprout. Our Lord's body and soul were entirely separated, or he was not dead, and the cross and resurrection are impostures. The sprouting of a decayed vegetable is the regular consequent of a natural antecedent; but the resurrection of all dead bodies has no antecedent, except the immediate will of God. The sprout was not the old vegetable, but another like it. "That which thou sowest," says an apostle, "thou sowest not the body that shall be." But the body in which Christ rose up from amidst his weeping disciples at Bethany, was the very one that was pierced for our transgressions.

“ For thou didst die for me, O Son of God !  
 By thee the throbbing flesh of man was worn ;  
 Thy naked feet the thorns of sorrow trod ;  
 And tempests beat thy houseless head forlorn.  
     Thou that wert wont to stand  
     Alone on God’s right hand  
 Before the ages were, the eternal, eldest born.”\*

It seems clear to us that there is no analogy, scarcely a faint similitude, between the two cases—the corpse of Christ and a decayed vegetable! We believe that our readers will generally agree with us, that “a miracle is a deviation from the known laws of nature.” Says Mosheim, “All wise men are now agreed that no event is to be accounted a miracle, if it can be adequately accounted for on natural principles, or in the common and ordinary course of divine providence.”

We admit that divine power as really causes the regular course of nature as deviations of it. The word power, as applied to matter, means nothing more than invariable antecedence. The will of God is the efficient cause, (in miracles the immediate, and in the general movements of nature, the remote,) of every change that occurs. To a reflecting man there is as much proof of the existence of God amid his ordinary works, in the changing seasons, in day and night, in vegetation, and in his own structure, as there would be in thronging miracles.

“ To common sense great Nature’s course proclaims  
 A Deity. When mankind falls asleep,  
 A miracle is sent as an alarm,  
 To wake the world and prove him o’er again,  
 By recent argument, but not more strong.”†

But in the one case, God acts by a series of established antecedents; in the other, his will is the immediate antecedent. In the former case, he guards the regular movements of nature with great care, for his own glory and for the good of his creatures. In the latter, he suddenly and publicly breaks into that course. And the intense wonder that such an interruption excites, proves the perfect regularity of nature’s usual arrangements.

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\* Milman.

† Young.



'The remaining part of our definition of the word "miracle" is easily settled. This deviation from the known laws of nature "can be effected only by a power superior to that of man."

Unless the laws of nature were uniform around the globe, we do not see how our race could long exist; but admitting that they did, it seems impossible to us that they could make any advance in knowledge, or pursue, to any desirable results, the present business of life. If thistles might be the product of wheat; if water, on a declivity, might remain at rest, or on a level rush in angry tides; if the magnetic needle might point to-day north and to-morrow south; if bread might become poison; or the air a solid body; if memory might cease; if conscience approve to-day what it condemned yesterday; if what is true now shall be false next month,—there could be no certainty, no reasoning from cause to effect, no dependence upon the past or faith in the future. Men would be worse than savages in their intellects; worse than heathen in their hearts; worse than cripples in their limbs. There could be no government, no literature, no arts, no religion, no life. In short, it seems to us impossible for a world to exist, unless its laws are uniform. He then, who can change this uniformity, can destroy the race of man; yea, can blot all beings from existence, and reduce the wide universe to utter ruin. This power God certainly has, and will use it in the general conflagration. But would he endow any of his creatures with it, except for a limited time and for a specific purpose? It is a miracle that man works miracles. We believe that neither Gabriel, nor Satan, much less puny man, can suspend or counteract a single law of nature by their own unaided power. God alone can directly do it. The only antecedent is his will. That is a miracle of which the immediate antecedent is the will of God. The sublimest passage in any writing is the celebrated one in Genesis, "And God said, let light be; and light was." God, the antecedent, and light, the consequent, are in immediate contact. Nothing interposes between his will and its effect. The time may be, when effects, which are now separated from God by an almost endless train of intermediate causes, shall appear consequents, of which his will is the immediate antecedent. It will be seen, then,

that his will rolls this huge earth upon its axis, covers its surface with joy and gladness, and gives to every event his impress. Sceptics have exulted to think that, in the rush of mind along the track of grand discoveries, our race will reach so high a point of intelligence that all the secrets of nature will be known, and the proudest miracle of Christ be explained and imitated. When the mental potassium was discovered by galvanism, infidels believed that the world would soon penetrate nature's "holy of holies," and discover some recondite law by which dead bodies could be raised to life, water changed to wine, and a loaf of bread be indefinitely increased, with ease. And so with animal magnetism. The truth, however, is that as no antecedents to miracles exist in nature, they belong to no natural law. They are *sui generis*; deviations from law, hence beyond discovery or imitation.

After this decided expression of opinion, it may surprise some persons to be told that the author of the Question Book on Christian Miracles teaches that "the devil may work and actually has worked miracles"! Yet such is the unqualified statement of our reviewer. What reason has he for making this assertion? Are we referred to the introduction to the Question Book? Let us examine. We find there the following sentence. "There is a class of evil beings, superior to men, who are supposed to be able to work miracles." Who will deny that false miracles have been performed, both by angelic and human agency? Who will deny that various men have supposed each of these to be real? Those wrought by the influence of evil spirits, our author calls "Satanic"; and those wrought by human influence, he calls "pretended;" and points out means by which each can be distinguished from the true. Is this asserting that the "devil can work and has worked real miracles," by his own power? Is it even asserting that the devil has worked real miracles by divine power entrusted to him, for a season, by Jehovah? We think not.

We shall now direct our attention to two points, and endeavor to prove, first, that evil spirits, and of course Satan, have been supposed to work real miracles; and, secondly, that persons could undeceive themselves, if they chose, by examining the messages of his emissaries. We have omitted to place at the head of our article, the name

of a volume which our reviewer has associated with the Question Book, in his criticisms, inasmuch as we fail to perceive any necessity for it. Nor do we feel called upon to defend that admirable work. Yet we may say, in passing, that we can discover there, no decided opinion to justify the reviewer's statement. The author, a pious and learned English clergyman, records several dialogues, which actually occurred between himself and various sceptics of his parish, whom he sought to win to Christ. He gives his reader one dialogue which he held with a talented and captious infidel, who, in prospect of a speedy grave, had become somewhat interested in religious things. The conversation turned at length upon miracles, as it always must, when the claims of Christianity are intelligently attacked and defended. The infidel asked whether his pastor believed that real miracles could be wrought by any other than a divine power. His reply was, "That is a question which I cannot settle. But, to argue safely, we must allow it. A miracle is something out of the common course of things, and beyond the power of man; and what beings there may be between God and man capable of performing miracles, it is impossible for us to conjecture. We know, however, from Scripture, of a whole class of beings superior in power to man and hostile to man, who probably can perform miracles. Scripture itself seems to insinuate that they can; and moreover, that we may be deceived by their miracles, whether true or false." What this clergyman's precise idea of a miracle was, we know not. His answer seems to us to be rather cautious than decided; yet, he may have seen its wisdom under existing circumstances. It is difficult to obtain an author's precise meaning upon important subjects to which he barely alludes. Even when an author is controverting an opinion, he may make statements which seem to confirm rather than to overthrow it. For example, our reviewer is attempting to prove that evil spirits cannot work miracles; but what are we to think of such statements as the following? "We are not disposed to deny that ungodly men may have performed miracles." "We freely admit that, if there are any beings, as we have reason to believe there are, endowed with faculties vastly superior to our own, it follows as a necessary consequence that they

can do things which would appear very amazing to us." "It is true, we know not with what extraordinary powers creatures above us in the scale of being are endowed. We cannot therefore say with certainty what they can or cannot do." "Miracles may be divided into two classes. First, those which apparently might be performed by an invisible being, endowed with powers similar in kind to ours, but exceeding them in degree." "The killing of the first-born in Egypt, for instance, might have been achieved by a created being, such as we can easily conceive to exist." "We feel no disposition to deny that Satan may have some part, which we cannot define, in the miracles here predicted, 2 Thess. 2: 9, 10."

From such admissions, a reader might infer that, after all, the writer was not quite sure but evil spirits and evil men could work miracles.

We now return to the author of the Question Book, and shall endeavor to prove, first, that evil spirits have been supposed able to work real miracles. We shall rely upon the known character of Satan, and upon the testimony of historians. The history of Satan is woven into all parts of the Bible. You find it in Genesis. You find it in the Revelation. Every where his character is the same, supernaturally intelligent, and utterly hostile to God and man. His plans of evil are adroitly laid and executed. Clothed with official omnipresence, he is every where. He sees with a million eyes. He feels with a million hearts. He acts with a million hands. Invisibly he works out his dreadful purposes. His treatment of Job indicates his ferocity, his intellect and his activity. God does not appear disposed to cripple his free agency. Having anchored him in hell, Jehovah lets him swing, without opposition, at the whole length of his cable. Thus situated, he can transform himself into an angel of light. The Bible warns the human race against him. "Be sober, be vigilant, for your adversary, the devil, as a roaring lion walketh about, seeking whom he may devour." Heaven is called upon to rejoice at his expulsion, and Earth to mourn at his advent, who was "to deceive the whole world." Although engaged in the worst of all causes, he is still little less

"Than an archangel ruined."



When Christ appeared among men, Satan's power was almost unlimited and undisputed. Never did he appear so truly "the God of this world." The only throne Jehovah possessed on earth was in the temple at Jerusalem; and that, beleaguered by the hosts of perdition, seemed every moment liable to surrender. "Wherever Satan looked," says Dr. Harris, "the expanse was his own; the teeming population were his subjects; the invisible rulers were his selected agents. Temptation in his hands had become a science, and sin was taught by rule. The world was one store-house of temptation; an armory, in which every object and event ranked as a weapon, and all classed and kept ready for service. Every human heart was a fortified place. Every demon power was at its post. He beheld the complicated machinery of evil which his mighty malignity had constructed, in full and efficient operation; no heart unoccupied, no spot unvisited, no agency unemployed, and the whole resulting in a vast, organized and consolidated empire."

Such was the being whom Christ encountered on entering this world. And when the Saviour produced his credentials; when he wrought miracle after miracle in proof that he was divinely authorized to communicate messages from God to man, would Satan stand tamely by and yield his sceptre without one effort to retain it? Would he quail at once before the almightiness of Christ? Was he, who quoted Scripture well, so ignorant of ancient predictions as not to know, centuries before, that Messiah was to come into this world, armed with miracles, for the very purpose of "destroying the works of the devil"? And, with this knowledge, would he not attempt to imitate some miracles and to originate others? Had he not talent enough to be a successful counterfeiter of miracles; or, is the idea of forgery too obscure to enter a mind like his? The idea long ago occurred to men, and has been acted on for ages, back to the time of "the world's gray fathers." With our reviewer, we would ask, "is not the old Serpent as cunning as his human children"?

By forged miracles Satan seems to have deceived multitudes in two ways. First, by making them believe that his emissaries came from God to instruct men, and secondly, by causing them to believe that Christ wrought

miracles by Satanic aid. By the first method, he could corrupt the doctrines of Christ, create heresies and divisions in his church, and set up new religions, where old ones had become antiquated and inefficient. By the second method, he could dilute or destroy the Saviour's authority. He was willing that his own name should be a watch-word of infamy, if he could only fix it upon Christ, and thus obscure the splendors of the Saviour's character. How well he succeeded in both these attempts, history tells us. The Saviour was aware of all this, and often exposed "the wiles of Satan." In some places "he did not many mighty works, because of their unbelief." The only reply to his stupendous miracles was, "he casteth out devils by Beelzebub, the prince of devils." After his resurrection, he showed himself only to his friends. "To his enemies," says Mosheim, "he would not appear visibly; among other reasons one was that he knew those unprincipled men, who had before accused him of sorcery, would impudently affirm that only a spectre appeared, bearing his likeness and produced by the power of the devil."

Whenever a report of our Saviour's miracles spread among the heathen, they were accounted for by magic. Hierocles, Celsus,\* Julian, Porphyry and Eunomius admit his miracles as facts, but account for them by sorcery. So prevalent was this, both among Jews and Gentiles, that the Christian fathers, in their apologies, preferred the argument from prophecy to that from miracles. Justin, Irenæus, Lactantius, and other writers, confess that the authority of miracles was greatly weakened by the general scepticism in regard to the power by which they were wrought. Was not Satan supposed to be able to work miracles? Have not multitudes been deceived

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\* Says Celsus, "Supposing those things to be true that are written concerning healing and the resurrection, or concerning a few loaves feeding multitudes, of which many fragments were left, or as many other things as the disciples speaking marvellously, have narrated; supposing these things to be wrought by them, they are of the same nature with the works of enchanter, and with the things performed by them that have learned from the Egyptians, showing for a little money, in the midst of markets, the grand things they have learned; such as expelling demons from men, and blowing off diseases and calling up the souls of heroes, yea, showing sumptuous suppers and tables, and meats differently dressed, and animals moving, not truly animals, but to the fancy appearing such. Because they do such things, are we therefore to believe them to be Sons of God? Or should it not rather be said that these are the acts of wicked and deceitful men?"—*Origen contra Celsum.*

by him? Were not the Pharaohs and their magicians? Was not Saul?\* And, in our own times, to say nothing of whole continents and islands full of pagans, what was the Salem witchcraft but a wide spread delusion of the devil?

“As we are sure that a man of piety and prayer enlists good angels on his side, and engages them to perform towards him the ministrations of kindness, we know not why there cannot be such a thing as a man, whose wickedness has caused his being abandoned by the Spirit of God, and who, in this his desertion, has thrown open to evil angels the chambers of his soul, and made himself so completely their instrument that they may use him in the uttering or working of strange things, which shall have all the air of prophecy or miracle.”—*Sermons of Henry Melville, B. D.*

If, then, men supposed Satan to work real miracles, he did practically work them. He did what answered his purpose. The true coin and the counterfeit alike passed current.

If this is so, then, we ask, had the people no means of distinguishing between the ambassadors of heaven and hell, both of whom they had received as prophets of the Lord? Our reviewer replies in the negative. We are obliged to reply in the affirmative. What was the object of our Saviour's miracles? It was to convince men that he came from God. But why wish to convince men of this fact? It was that they might receive his teachings, as truth from heaven. And what was the object of Satan's counterfeit miracles? We have already seen, either to make men believe that Christ's instructions were not true, or that his were equally so. The mighty apparatus of miracles, then, true and false, had reference solely to the messages delivered. Now was there nothing in the very messages, by which men could decide, if they chose, upon the real character and origin of the messengers?

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\* Our reviewer devotes about one-quarter of his whole article to prove that the Egyptian magicians wrought, not real miracles, but skilful tricks, and that the raising of Samuel was a mere deception produced by necromancy. We need not dispute either of these positions. Our purpose is answered, if the Egyptians supposed the magic acts they witnessed real miracles, and if Saul supposed that Samuel actually was raised and prophesied to him. That such was the case, who will deny? Hence these cases fall quietly into our current of proof that Satan has been supposed able to work miracles.

We fully believe there was. The messages consisted of two parts, doctrines or facts to be believed, and duties, or moral precepts, to be practised. Religious doctrines are facts, of which reason cannot judge except by evidence. Moral precepts appeal at once to man's moral nature. The judge sits enthroned within his own bosom. He intuitively decides upon their truth or falsehood. If then his moral nature rejects a precept as wrong, his intellect must reject the doctrine, out of which it seems to grow, as wrong also. The message being rejected, so is the messenger. The reverse also is true. We believe in conscience, in the moral nature of man, whose decisions are uniform, the globe around. We believe also that right and wrong are immutable; that they exist in certain actions every where, alike unchanged and unchangeable. We believe that the human conscience instinctively recognizes this right and wrong, or the moral qualities of actions, as soon as they are presented to it: hence, that the decisions of unseared consciences are uniform throughout the whole world. Says Dr. Abercrombie, "there are certain actions, which are immutably right, and which we are bound in duty to perform; and certain actions, which are immutably wrong, apart from any other consideration whatever; and an absolute conviction of this is fixed upon us in the moral principle or conscience, independently of knowledge derived from any other source respecting the will or the laws of the Almighty." "We can hardly entertain a doubt," says Professor Upham, "that the decisions of conscience may justly be regarded as being, at the bottom, uniform throughout the world. It is not true, as some seem to suppose, that nature has established one code of morals for civilized, and another for savage, nations; one law of rectitude on the banks of the Thames, and another on the banks of the Ganges; but in all parts of the world, in every nation and in every clime, on the borders of every river and on the declivities of every mountain, she utters the same voice, announces the same distinctions, and proclaims the unchangeableness of her requisitions.

For example, let the parental and filial relation be understood, and where is the man, in all Adam's family, whose conscience would not affirm that it was right for children to intend the happiness of their parents, and



wrong not to intend it? Who would not say that every child ought so to act towards his parent as to fulfil that intention, and ought to refrain from actions opposed to it? There would be similar uniformity in regard to all actions possessing moral qualities. No sooner is a relation perceived by the intellect, than certain duties appear involved in it; and conscience, like the lightning's flash, approves or disapproves; urges to do or not to do. This testimony and impulse of our moral natures, is that of an essential and independent faculty of the human mind. It is as sure as instinct, and as universal as man. The question is not whether heathens will discover moral truth or not, or whether they will obey it when known; but whether, when a moral precept is actually presented to their minds, in all its important relations, they can distinguish the true from the false.

Does our reviewer ask, "where can the performer of miracles obtain competent judges to examine his moral precepts and to pronounce a righteous judgment in regard to them?" We answer, any where, every where. Not only Plato, Socrates, and other heathen sages, who, our reviewer admits, "stumbled on some grand but most obvious moral truths"; not only these ancient sovereigns of moral science, but the meanest helot, the wildest North American Indian, and the most degraded Laplander, (excepting only infants, idiots and maniacs,) could be a competent judge. We admit that the human heart is depraved; we believe all that St. Paul tells us, in his epistle to the Romans, of the blinding sins of Jew and Gentile; but we also believe with him, that "conscience accused or excused" the most abandoned of all whom he describes. Heathens every where will agree with you as to the right and the wrong of actions, and as to moral obligation, though they may utterly refuse to do their duty. They may

" Know the right, and yet the wrong pursue."

A mission to teach heathens that some actions are right and some wrong; that the right ought to be done and the wrong ought not to be done, would result in nothing but failure. The only way, as the experience of the Moravians in Greenland proves, is to preach at once Jesus

Christ and him crucified. Fundamental moral truths, however important, are either already known to all men, or are so easily understood, when communicated, and fall in so entirely with the instincts of their moral natures, as to make no great impression.

"The half naked animal," says Dr. Brown in his *Philosophy*, "that has no hut in which to shelter himself, no provision beyond the precarious chase of the day, whose language of numeration does not extend beyond three or four, and who knows God only as something that produces thunder and the whirlwind,—even this miserable creature, at least as ignorant as he is helpless, would turn away from his civilized instructors with contempt, as if he had not heard any thing of which he was not equally aware before. The vessel which carried out these simple primary essential truths of morals, might return as it went. It could not make a single convert, because there would not have been one who had any doubts to be removed."

Our opinion then is, that the worker of miracles would find in every man's conscience a competent judge of his moral precepts.

Let two men appear among the Jews, at Jerusalem, each claiming to be a prophet of the Lord, and each prepared to deliver messages from heaven. Each works what is believed to be a real miracle, and each, (though one is an emissary of Satan,) is received without suspicion. The false prophet must communicate truth or error. If truth, he unites with the true prophet in subverting Satan's kingdom. If error, he delivers a message unlike that of his rival. Thus two opposite systems are promulgated by men who claim to come from the same infinitely wise and holy God. Would not this discrepancy awaken suspicion, and direct attention anew to the miracles? But, it may be said that Satan would not at once teach error. He would for some time keep his cloven foot out of sight. Very well. As long as he taught truth, to escape detection, he would serve God to his own overthrow. Truth does not become error, though spoken by the father of lies. "Every thing," says Bishop Butler, "is what it is, and not another thing." Satan could not teach truth long; and as soon as he taught error, his message could be contrasted not only with that

of his fellow prophet, but also with his own former instructions.\*

But let Satan's emissary go to the dark parts of the earth, where no prophet of God ever was, and, by forged miracles, cause the heathen to believe him a messenger from above. He rings what is supposed to be the great bell of the universe, and nations crowd to hear the sermon. If that sermon contains moral truth, he destroys his master; if moral error, every conscience before him can detect it; and thus if any obey him through the influence of corrupt motives, they do violence to conscience and add to their guilt. We believe that the correct decisions and impulses of conscience may be resisted, and admit, with Paley, that if men choose to bear the pain of its violation to gratify some appetite or passion, they can violate it. And we admit that every act of treason against the monarch of the human breast weakens his authority, until, at length, he sits silent upon his throne. We also understand that conscience can give no correct decisions upon moral questions, whose relations are not comprehended; and that, when relations are differently comprehended, consciences will give different answers. But we mean that whenever relations are fully and correctly understood, by child, by sage or by savage, the decision of their moral natures is prompt, correct and similar without an exception. When Moses, in the name and by the authority of the God of Israel, commanded the king of Egypt to let the children of Israel go free, what response would Pharaoh's conscience make? It would depend altogether upon the relation which he supposed to exist between his throne and the Israelites. If they were slaves by conquest, or by purchase, or were the children of such persons, he would have believed that his right to them was perfect, and his moral nature would have ap-

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"The Scriptures make mention, not only of a holy, heavenly power, as the cause of miracles, but also of an evil power. Two series of miracles run through the sacred history. As the works of the Egyptian magicians stood over against those of Moses, so in the New Testament do the miracles of anti-Christ stand contrasted with those of the Redeemer. But although these representatives of the kingdom of lies may mingle much which is true in word and in work, and endeavor to appear as the messengers of the kingdom of light, still the whole spirit of their agency betrays itself to a pure mind, capable of perceiving truth, as unholy; and no miracles which can be supposed, could induce such a mind to yield itself to their influence."—*Olshausen Biblischer Commentar.*

proved his treating them as slaves. In all good conscience, he would have held on to his rights, and have resisted Moses to the last with self-approbation. But if, calling to mind the history of their coming into Egypt, and the foul outrage by which their ancestors had been enslaved, he believed that he had no just right to control their inclinations, then he could not detain them a single hour, without violating conscience; without resisting an inward impulse to let them go. The road to conscience is through the intellect. If you wish to awaken conscience, you must show men their true relations. Fifty years ago the people of New England had false ideas of alcohol; hence false ideas of their relations to it. If then an apostle of temperance had broken suddenly in among them, and his first words had been, "it is a grievous sin to distil, vend or drink ardent spirits," though he wrought a miracle, he could not have drawn a single response from man's moral nature upon his side. But let him expose the character of alcohol, let him convince men of their true relations to it, and so accurate would be the decisions of conscience, that, though he warned no one to avoid making, selling, or drinking it, all would be convinced that to do so was wrong and ought to be abandoned. Those in whom conscience was superior to avarice and appetite, would immediately change their course; and those who did not thus change, would act on against their convictions of duty. It was in precisely this way that the temperance reformation was effected, and that all moral revolutions will be effected. That men do violence to their consciences every day, is admitted; and it is this very act which constitutes their guilt. We believe, finally, that moral error cannot pass itself off upon the world for moral truth; hence, that teachers of iniquity can be distinguished from teachers of righteousness.

We have now established, we think, the following principles.

1. A miracle is neither more nor less than a deviation from the laws of nature.
2. No being but God can directly work a miracle.
3. Satan can so far imitate real miracles, as to have caused multitudes to suppose him able to work real miracles.



4. That, as many persons have been deceived by him, a miracle is not in itself an absolute proof of a divine commission.

5. That in the messages delivered by each, there exists the means to distinguish an emissary of Satan from a prophet of the Lord.

We believe, of course, that there are intrinsic differences between real miracles and their counterfeits, by examining which, they may be distinguished. But as our purpose is merely to notice what has been criticised by our reviewer; and, as we begin to fear that we shall soon strike our wings against the wires of our readers' patience, we omit an examination.

In concluding this part of our subject, we may as well say that, in our opinion, the question of Satan's miraculous powers is of but little practical value at the present time. Infidels do not now ascribe the miracles of Christ to magic, sorcery or to evil spirits. The fashion for years has been to deny that they were ever performed, after the manner of Hume; to affirm that they were skillful tricks, after the manner of Paine; to account for them on natural principles, after the manner of Gibbon; or, striking at the very root, to deny that Christ ever existed, after the manner of Volney. There is a growing disbelief in such a being as the devil. This Sadducean spirit gains ground. The human mind, which, like the pendulum of a clock, always tends to extremes, in swinging clear from superstition entangles itself in infidelity. Yet the miracles of Christ, these great credentials from heaven, will always be minutely scrutinized; and the fiercest conflicts of the church with her enemies will be around them. No religion, but the Jewish and Christian, ever presented miracles and prophecies, at the outset, as proofs of divine origin. All others stand or fall without their aid. But Christianity boldly claims to be tried by them, and her very existence depends upon their integrity. Christians should understand the whole subject, and our youth should be especially guarded, in this age of scepticism, against unbelief, by being well informed upon the history of the origin of our religion.

The real, spiritual Christian, indeed, needs no proof from miracles to convince himself of the divine character of Christ. There appears to him in the Saviour's life

and teachings such purity, exaltation, unparalleled benevolence; such originality, such adaptation to the spiritual wants of man, and such ineffable holiness, that his whole soul is irradiated by faith in him. Christ is the light by which he sees; the air he breathes; the food that nourishes his soul. He would as soon ask miracles in proof that God created the world, as in proof that God so loved it as to give his only begotten Son for man's redemption. He has experienced the power of truth over his whole being, changing him into the moral image of God; and, from this experience, is as sure of Christ's divine character as though he should hear a voice proclaim it from heaven. A true Christian has the evidence within himself; an evidence so pure, so high, so holy, that it is a stoop in him to gather proof from any thing external. Like the Samaritan, he can say, "I have seen him myself, and know and believe that he is the Son of God." Miracles are, then, an inferior source of evidence, especially adapted to unregenerate men.

ARE THE PROPHECIES OF CHRIST, IN ANY CORRECT SENSE OF THE WORD, MIRACLES?

Our reviewer denies that they are, and asserts, "that a more unfortunate definition could hardly have been given." Our author, in calling prophecy "a kind of miracle," he informs the reader, "unavoidably creates a suspicion that he did not understand the nature of those things, which he professes to explain."

We regret to be obliged to dissent from our worthy reviewer so often; but are compelled to do so once more. Although we must "unavoidably create a suspicion" to their disadvantage, certain distinguished authors will pardon us for quoting their opinions on this question.

"Miracles, (under which we include prophecy,) are the only direct evidence which can be given of divine inspiration."\*

"There is just as much probability that miracles will exist, (for prophecy may be considered one kind of miracle,) as that a revelation will be given."†

"Predictions, now in progress of fulfilment, are mira-

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\* Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge. † Alexander's Evidences.

cles, which centuries can only render more certain and impressive."\*

"It is a standing miracle."†

"You have the greatest and most striking of miracles in the series of Scripture prophecies accomplished. What stronger miracle, therefore, can you require for your conviction?"‡

This we consider "appropriate and adequate testimony."

We infer also that fulfilled prophecy is, in some correct sense of the word, a miracle, from the meaning of a miracle. It seems to us to include prophecy within its natural limits. We ask our reviewer what definition of the word "miracle," he can produce from standard authors, which excludes fulfilled predictions? If our author's definition of prophecy as "a kind of miracle," is "unfortunate," it must be so either in the sentiment or in the language. The sentiment, we have seen, is sustained by some of our highest theological authorities.

Is it unfortunate in the phrase "a kind of miracle"? That very phrase is used by good writers in scientific works. Dr. Comstock, in his *Botany*, describing the Chinese Pitcher Plant, says that "its cup is furnished with a kind of lid." President Hitchcock, in his *Geology*, says that "Trass is a kind of mud, poured out of some volcanic craters." The phrase is common where great fulness of description is not required.

Suppose we should write a book of *Zoölogy*, and, being disposed to describe Madrepores, Millepores and Corallines, which some naturalists suppose to be both animal and vegetable, should mention in the introduction, as a brief reason for including them, that they were "a kind of animal,"—we ask whether this definition would not be correct as far as it went? And whether it would not go far enough for our immediate purpose? And suppose that when we came to Madrepores, etc., we should state that some considered them entirely vegetable, but that in our opinion they were both; a connecting link between the animal and vegetable tribes, and should give other reasons for introducing them into *Zoölogy*, should we "unavoidably create a suspicion that we did

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\* Bishop M'Ilvaine. † Bishop Wilson. ‡ Bishop Newton.

not understand the nature of the things which we professed to explain"?

But a similar course was taken by our author. In his introduction to the Question Book he maintains, not by way of full definition, but as a brief reason for presenting some of our Saviour's predictions, with his miracles, that "prophecy was a kind of miracle." And, at the appropriate place, he appended the following note, which could hardly have escaped a critic's eyes.

"I am well aware that prophecies are usually considered as distinct from miracles. In some respects they certainly are distinct; yet not so much so as to be excluded from the general head of miracles. It seems desirable that, in a work like this, the young should be permitted to examine the proof of our Saviour's divine authority, which fulfilled predictions so abundantly furnish. For the sake of convenience and uniformity, I have arranged several of our Lord's most prominent prophecies into a class, and have added them to his other wonderful works, which are generally, though not exclusively, denominated miracles."

Our author's unfortunate definition of a prophecy, naturally reminded our reviewer of Mitchell's definition of a railroad. Now a prophecy and a railroad may be somewhat alike, inasmuch as the one carries you along through time, and the other through space; but we suppose it was not by this resemblance that one suggested the other. It was because both were unfortunate, as the sight of one cripple brings another to mind. We have sufficiently examined the original definition; let us now look at the suggested one. What is Mitchell's definition of a railroad? Our reviewer says that it is "a kind of an improved road." We are obliged to say that this is not quite the fact. Mitchell says, it is "an improved kind of road," not "a kind of an improved road."

It should also be remarked that our reviewer gives us but part of the definition. He does not even take a whole sentence, but breaks off at a comma. Mitchell's definition, we allow, is "unfortunate," to be first mutilated, and then inaccurately stated. We think his definition of a railroad, as he gives it, very full and clear; for there is not only a written explanation of the word, but also a beautiful picture of the road with its iron rails, on which is a train of cars at full speed. Let one child read the whole definition of a railroad, in our reviewer's favorite



dictionary, and let another examine Mitchell's, and which will have the most accurate idea of a rail road? Which, then, is the best definition?

Our task is done. We have reviewed the reviewer, in self-defence, and have sought to sustain the following principles: viz.—

1. That, as real miracles have, in some cases, been successfully counterfeited, the performance of a supposed real miracle is not certain proof of a divine commission to reveal truth.

2. That as "right and wrong" immutably exist in all moral actions and precepts; as the human conscience is a sufficient and instinctive judge of this "right and wrong," and as all religious instructions must contain moral precepts, so all intelligent persons in the world can distinguish, if they choose, between a teacher of truth and a teacher of falsehood, between moral purity and moral impurity.

3. That the prophecies of Christ, from the testimony of our best authors, and from the fact that they are included in the definition of a miracle, are, in a certain sense of the word, one kind of miracle.

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## ARTICLE VII.

### HUMAN AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF FAITH.

By human authority in matters of religion, is sometimes meant the right of any man or body of men to compel assent to a particular creed. But human authority likewise signifies "respectable opinion," and this is the sense in which we purpose to use the expression.

The proposition which we intend to bring some considerations in support of, is that human authority in matters of faith ought never to be regarded as conclusive. It may appear unnecessary at the present day, when we think religious light is beaming all around us, to take a position so little contested. But as there are those in all sects who, though they admit the truth of the proposition

in the abstract, receive more or less of their faith upon trust, since we seldom or never find them inquiring or examining for themselves, the question has a practical bearing, and is therefore worthy of an attentive consideration. Human authority is fallible. The fact that man is a fallible being shows it. His faculties are progressive. To the eye of the mind, objects at a distance, at first dimly seen as in the twilight, now, from the greater strength and perfection of the vision, appear as in the light of noon-day. Truth is often at first obscurely apprehended, and subsequent light proves opinions previously formed to have been incorrect. If it be true that we are doomed to error, it is equally true that our mistakes are often our best instructors. A few slips along the path of life teach us more impressive lessons than the precepts of sages. Owing, therefore, to the unfolding of the intellect, the authority of the same man this year may be entirely different from his authority twenty years hence, when his faculties shall have become more vigorous, and experience shall have made him wiser. Besides, since the opinions of no two men are precisely alike, it must either be that one man is without error, and, consequently, that those who differ from him are in some error, or that all are in some error; and the latter conclusion is probably the correct one. If, then, mere human authority be received, whatever truth we may gain is likely to be accompanied with an alloy of error. But whose authority shall we abide by? That of Calvin, or of Priestly? of Pius IX, or of queen Victoria? Neither can we come much nearer the truth by yielding to the authority of great bodies of men,—for instance, the eighty-eight hundred clergymen of England, who changed their views on the accession of Elizabeth. And when we reflect upon the littleness of man's knowledge, and the great diversity and contrariety of opinions even among men of learning and genius, we seek, but we seek in vain, for a rule to guide us in the selection of authority. We know not whom to trust. And we doubt not that the intelligent who do acknowledge authority, think that they trust not blindly, but that they have based their faith, in the last analysis, upon reason. They imagine that reason has legitimated authority. Since, then, human authority is fallible, its influence may be pernicious.

Again, acquiescence in human authority fosters dogmatism. It is easier to be imperative than to reason,—that is, to reason correctly. The more dogmatic, other things being equal, the more sure of gaining assent; for how could we expect that the credulous even would have much confidence in the opinions of a man who does not seem to have much confidence in those opinions himself? Such a temptation to be dogmatic most men would not withstand, and this over-confidence in assertion on the part of the teachers would beget over-confidence in opinion on the part of the people. Dogmatism may arise from clear-sightedness. A mathematician may be very positive, because he knows his deductions are true. And a theologian may be equally positive on some points. For instance, he knows that there is adaptation in nature. But dogmatism may also spring from prejudice or passion. A man of strong feeling may look at a question only in that point of view which harmonizes with his inclination. He sees a subject through the medium of passion, and concludes that side to be true which pleases him most; while he neglects to look at other sides, or looks at them cursorily, since the love of truth is not so strong in him as some other love, which a one-sided view agrees with. Now the dogmatism of the followers of authority is not the result of what they know, but of what they think they know.

Though it is flattering to the teacher to have his simple *ipse dixit* taken upon trust, and though it be a great saving of labor not to be called upon to bring forward the credentials of his authority, yet the habit of dealing in assertions without proof, seriously impedes his improvement. Too little realizing his need of improvement, the reasoning faculty lies dormant, and a habit of loose and desultory thinking is indulged in. But the evils of dogmatism are not confined to the teacher. It fosters a spirit of intolerance among his followers. As he is, so are they. As they catch his spirit, they naturally cherish a blind prejudice against those who entertain different views, and who adopt a different mode of worship;—a prejudice, whose noxious fruit is sectarian bitterness. But dogmatism, the one extreme in theology, drives the thinking portion of the community to scepticism, the other extreme. Perceiving

the incorrectness of some of the statements, they doubt when truth is really advanced.

Again, reliance upon human authority is a bar to free inquiry. Most men will not task their own powers to investigate, as long as they think they can find some one else to supply them with the truth. True, man loves knowledge, but he does not love to labor hard for it, when he can get it on easy terms. How hostile then to inquiry is the persuasion that it is unnecessary for him to investigate! And how much more so, when he is persuaded that he has no business to investigate! What follows? The noblest powers are not exercised on the noblest subject. He may survey any science, but the queen of sciences. He may gaze upon the heavens, and investigate the laws of revolving worlds, till his soul is filled with the grandeur and sublimity of the universe; but he must not kindle with wonder and delight in the study of him who sits upon its throne. If it be true that great thoughts make great minds, and if man is dignified by the exercise of abstraction, concentration, observation, and reason, in studying the soul and the external world, how much nobler must that spirit become when it gives itself to the loftiest theme!—to Him, of whose glory all created things are but the gleam!—to Him, in studying whom, genius both acute and comprehensive glows with the highest admiration!

Stay free inquiry, and the cause of popular education would languish. There would be no theorizing, and consequently no research necessary to establish theories. All the education which would receive encouragement, would be only such as would be of assistance to the people in their respective vocations. The consequence would be a small amount of mental activity, and little or no exercise of invention; just as we find to be the case in nations where authority flourishes.

Again, the reception of human authority is unfriendly to religious liberty. Those who bow to the opinions of another, must think him superior to themselves. This imagined superiority gives him power. The more dependant one man is upon another, the more that man is under his sway. Now power, as history abundantly testifies, is liable to be abused. Though at first, those who arrogate to themselves the right of authority may be una-



ble to abridge the liberty of men of other sentiments, yet let them but succeed in rallying around them the majority of the people, and obtain the power of persecuting, and what, were submission refused, would withhold them from enforcing, or aiming to enforce, what they claim as their rightful prerogative? Or, if the people, though denying the right of authority, are virtually swayed by it, is there not danger lest those whose opinions are implicitly received, should seize the reins of power, which they did not ask for, but which they find within their grasp? Where then would be the right of private judgment, and the rights of conscience? Let any religious body get power enough out of the world to rule the world, and, judging from the past, they will rule it with a rod of iron.

But though mere human authority ought in no case to be regarded as conclusive, we are far from meaning that it should go for nothing. It ought to incite us to a more careful examination, but not to determine our conclusion. What all are agreed upon, is more likely to be true than what none are agreed upon; yet even all may be wrong.

But it may be objected, that the bulk of the community, not having the ability nor the time properly to investigate, must assent to authority. To this we say, what greater folly than for men to espouse a cause, of the truth of which they know nothing? Besides, the community possess common sense, which must play an important part in all sober investigation; and it would often suffice, if they would only exercise as much diligence, patience, and ingenuity, in ascertaining the truth of some points in religion, as they do in some of their researches on secular subjects. Then, again, they have one day at least in every seven, which they might so improve as not to be biased by what this man believes, or that man believes, but that what they believe may be the result of their own independent examination.

It may also be urged, that were every one to think for himself, there would be no uniformity in religion, and as Luther says, there would be as many religions as there are heads. Such might be the case at first; but in the course of time some doctrines would be almost universally agreed upon; for the tendency of candid inquiry is towards truth, and truth is one. We admit that reason is

liable to mistake ; but we must still remember that it is such a ray as the Father of Lights has seen best to bestow. Nothing more ennobles reason than its exercise on its author. Yet it is said that speculation on religious matters is fruitless. We answer, reason sees truly, just so far as it sees distinctly ; and the distance at which objects cease to be well defined to all men, has not yet been determined. Absurder views have not been held in religion, than have been held in astronomy, metaphysics, and other sciences. The law of progress is written on all subjects of human inquiry. What a man in one age has advanced, another in a subsequent age has proved. All things in religion, we suppose, are regulated by fixed laws. These laws it is our province to discover, apply, and obey.

Let human authority prevail, and what would be the effect upon our country ? A paralysis of the moral and intellectual energies of the people. Truth would wander forlorn, with but here and there a votary to do her homage, and that perhaps in remote recesses to escape the ire of the arrogant and the deluded. The streams of science and literature would be checked in their flowing. Destroy free inquiry, and our prospects would be blighted. Better come war, for there is hope of victory. Better come famine and pestilence, for there is hope that the recuperative energies of the country may restore her. But forbid the people to think for themselves on religion, and her glory is departed.

## ARTICLE VIII.

CAN WAR, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, BE JUSTIFIED ON  
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION?

WAR has ever been the scourge of the human race. The history of the past is little else than a chronicle of deadly feuds, irreconcilable hate, and exterminating warfare. The extension of empire, the love of glory, and thirst for fame, have been more fatal to men than famine or pestilence, or the fiercest elements of nature. The trappings and tinsel of war, martial prowess, and military heroism, have, in all ages, been venerated and lauded to the skies.

And what is more sad and painful, many of the wars whose desolating surges have deluged the earth, have been carried on in the name and under the sanction of those who profess the name of Christ. Obedient to the mandate of the Catholic Church, the millions of Europe rise and arm themselves for the conquest of the Holy Land. Emboldened by the emblem of the cross, streaming from a thousand banners, that ferocious multitude, thirsting for revenge, waged against the Infidel a cruel, unrelenting, and exterminating warfare. "Friends, let us follow the cross," was the battle-cry of Cortez, to rouse the flagging courage of his desperate followers in the conquest of Mexico. It has not been till recently, that the disciples of Christ have been conscious of the enormous wickedness of war as it usually exists. And even now there are many who do not frown upon it with that disapprobation and abhorrence, which an evil of such magnitude as an unjust war deserves.

Regarded in this light, the inquiry at the head of this article demands our serious thought; it is a question of deep interest and vital importance. It demands an impartial, dispassionate, and candid investigation. What is the truth? we sincerely and devoutly ask. It is with the earnest desire of maintaining and establishing the truth,

on a great moral question, that we proceed to the inquiry before us: "Can war, under any circumstances, be justified on the principles of the Christian religion?"

Wars of every kind may be included under two classes—offensive and defensive. Concerning the former we shall say nothing. We need not delay a moment to discuss a question so directly at variance with the dictates of conscience, and the principles of revealed religion.

The inquiry is then reduced to this,—Can DEFENSIVE war, under any circumstances, be justified on the principles of the Christian religion? What are we to understand by war? It is a contest between two parties, wherein one or both attempt to disarm, overpower, or destroy the other. These parties may be two distinct nations, or they may be both of one nation, the one arrayed against the other. The former is an international war; the latter, a civil war. Can either of these or both, when strictly defensive, be justified on the principles of the revealed will of God?

And here we must define what is truly a defensive war. It is said by a biographer of Napoleon, that he frequently asserted that he never waged any other war than defensive. Such a declaration is an outrage on reason and common sense. It is very easy to point out the characteristics of a defensive war. For instance, a rupture with France, because she neglected or refused to pay the five millions which she justly owed us, would not have been a war of self-defence; nor could an appeal to arms for the purpose of establishing a claim to a disputed territory, be considered a defensive war. Such a question was at issue in the late treaty with Great Britain concerning Oregon. Had we taken up arms to settle that dispute, the God of heaven would have frowned upon us. The same principle is involved in our unhappy contest with our sister Republic of Mexico. Much is said about a nation's glory and honor; but an appeal to arms to vindicate these would not be a war of self-defence. These are won by other deeds than martial exploits on the field of battle. But under what circumstances is war truly defensive? We reply, when its object is to repel an invasion; when there is no alternative but to submit to bondage and death, or to resist. Were a hostile army landed on our shores, to burn our cities and desolate our homes, to overthrow



our institutions and doom us to bondage and death, a war to repel such an outrage would be defensive. And so also when society arms itself to suppress a domestic insurrection, or put down a lawless mob, it then contends in self-defence. The inquiry now is, can war under any circumstances, in defence of life, be justified on the principles of the Christian religion?

But it may be said that no such wars can ever happen. We reply, that in every age of the world there have been such, and we know of nothing to prevent such from occurring again. If like causes produce like effects, and human nature remains unchanged, then war in defence of life must happen. While the world is filled with men whose passions and rage no love or moral restraint can check; while there are multitudes, whose lusts and desire of gain are ever breaking forth in deeds of wrong and violence, occasions for taking arms in defence of life will arise. So long as there are military heroes, whose insatiable ambition aspires to universal conquest, tramples on all that is dear and sacred, and scorns every principle of justice and humanity, so long there is every reason to believe that wars in self-defence will occur.

Our views of truth and convictions of duty compel us to maintain that war, in the sense in which we have defined it, can, under some circumstances, be justified on the principles of the Christian religion. There may, however, be wars in self-defence, unjust and wrong. Such, for instance, when every means have not been tried to secure peace by negotiation or arbitration; or when one party violates the rights of another and refuses to make restitution. It will then be remembered, that in this discussion we maintain the right of self-defence with this limitation.

I. The right of self-defence, if man can claim that right, is first given by our Creator to the individual. Society has no rights which have not been delegated to it, directly or indirectly, by those who compose that compact. Let us first consider those facts which seem to show that the individual has the right of self-defence.

1. This seems to us an original suggestion of the mind. That is, constituted as we are, we cannot help believing that we have the right of self-defence. In the declaration of our national independence there is this memorable sen-

tence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident—that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This sentiment finds a response in the bosom of every man. It is not till every noble aspiration of the soul has long been crushed, and its high destiny forgotten, that this feeling is stifled and paralyzed. But is not the feeling that I have the right to preserve my life as deep, as strong and as universal, as the feeling that I have a right to live? No one denies the latter; why deny the former?

Besides, it is almost universally admitted by those who deny the right to take life, that we may, when attacked, inflict injury in self-defence. But whence comes this feeling that we may inflict any harm in self-preservation? Why, it is a law of our nature; we feel that this is a right given us by our Creator. But if we are so constituted as to feel that we may use any force to preserve our lives, is it not equally clear that we are so constituted as to feel that we may use all in our power, even to taking the life of the assailant? It seems impossible to make any distinction between the two; if one is a law of nature, so is the other. And hence, if we deny one, we must the other.

2. The right of self-defence is confirmed by a higher and more imperative law of my being. God has given me my life; it is the most sacred and by far the most precious gift which he has ever entrusted to my care. It is worth inconceivably more to me, than all the wealth of this globe. Still further, I am the father of a family; a bosom companion confides in my protection; innocent and helpless children are entrusted to my paternal care. Here is an individual who has been so long under the dominion of malignant passions, that his heart is steeled and conscience seared. To gratify his depraved desires and fiendish hate, he attempts to burn my dwelling, murder my family, and destroy my life. Now may I not justly resist that murderous attack; and, if there were no alternative, kill the assassin, to preserve my life and the lives of those innocent and helpless ones who look to me for protection? Does not that inward consciousness of right which the Creator has implanted in the bosom of every man, tell me that I not only may, but ought to repel this

aggression? Who would not be guilty of the violation of a trust most weighty and most sacred, if, in such an emergency, he did not use all the means in his power to disarm the villain, and shield his life and the lives of his family from his vindictive rage? If, in the use of that power, at a single blow I lay him senseless at my feet, and he dies from its effects, I am conscious that, in defending my life and my family, I have done just what I ought to have done. Let the consequences be to him injury even to death, I have done what my moral sense tells me was right. Now can it be denied that an impulse so deep, so imperative, and so universal, is not a law of our nature, implanted in the heart by the Creator? If we reject this, we know not that we can put confidence in any suggestion of the mind. If this principle be admitted, then self-defence is countenanced by our Creator, and consequently justified by the principles of the Christian religion. We need only remark that this argument has as much weight when applied to society, as to the individual. Whatever right the individual has, he may, if he please, vest in a civil compact. But still we are aware that the decisions of the natural conscience are not always a sure indication of the will of God; we may feel that an action is right, and that we may, and ought to do it, and still labor under great mistakes.

II. We proceed, therefore, to show that the right of self-defence is confirmed by a view of the consequences which would result, if the principle were or were not carried into practice. In this way we may often learn the will of God as plainly as if he had made a direct revelation. The moral philosopher directs us to ask, in order to determine whether an action is right or wrong, "what the consequences would be, if this or that action were universally practised among men?"

For the purpose of obtaining a concise, distinct and complete view of this subject, we will suppose a civil compact formed, composed of any number of individuals. The persons who have entered into this compact, have delegated to it certain specified rights, among which are those of self-defence and redress of grievances. That God wills the existence of society is evident from the fact that man could make no progress in civilization, or in moral and intellectual improvement, without its protection.

Not only this, but his very existence depends on this compact. Now let us inquire if the objects necessary to the happiness, progress and existence of society, can be accomplished, unless it has the right of self-defence.

1. To deny this right would be virtually denying the right to inflict capital punishment. The criminal who in cold blood has murdered his fellow-man, is doomed by society to suffer the penalty of death, for the purpose of preserving its own existence; that is, to maintain the peace and social order which are essential to its preservation. Society has the same object in view when it repels an invader, or suppresses a domestic insurrection. Besides, there is greater reason for society to take arms in self-defence, than to inflict capital punishment. It can imprison the criminal, and thus prevent him from doing further injury; but it has not this alternative, when assailed by a large body of armed men.

2. Again, society, if it had not the right to take life, could have no power to enforce obedience to its laws, and maintain social order. Its officers of justice would be insulted and despised; its mandates would be nothing but a mere name, an outward show, a powerless abstraction. This is confirmed by universal experience and observation. Our own country, which certainly has not been wanting in mild and lenient treatment towards offenders, has learned some sad and painful lessons on this subject. More than one of our beautiful cities have been scenes of riot, conflagration and murder, where all the evil passions of man's nature were fanned into a flame of ungovernable fury, and which could be checked only by the use of violent means. How could we preserve social order, where would be the peace and safety of society, if at such times it had no right to enforce obedience at the expense of life? Anarchy and discord would rage uncontrolled, and the whole social fabric tremble to its base.

3. It is also the universal testimony of history, that when one nation servilely submits to be plundered, invaded and enslaved by another, it dooms itself to the lowest degradation and misery. The influence of such a servile act of submission is most disastrous to the physical, intellectual and moral cultivation of those who thus tamely submit to bear the yoke. It inevitably entails on society a curse, whose blighting influence will crush every



hope, repress every noble aspiration, and paralyze every exertion. If any one doubts this, let him look at the influence of slavery on the individual; and let him remember that a nation cannot so easily withstand its debasing influence as the individual. And although the servitude of the former is not so absolute as of the latter; yet when a nation's freedom is taken away, and it is subjected to oppressive taxes and despotic laws, its spirit is crushed and broken. In accordance with these views the eloquent Hall remarks: "Retrace the annals of all times and nations, and you will find in the triumph of despotism, the triumph of wickedness." If such are the lamentable consequences which society inflicts on itself when it does not resist aggression and wrong, have we not a plain intimation of the will of God concerning the right of self-defence?

On the other hand, no prophetic voice can tell the magnitude of those blessings, which a nation secures for itself and for future ages, when it manfully and justly resists aggression and wrong. No one can tell how much the patriots of our own revolution owed to the spirit of disinterested, upright and inflexible resistance of wrong and oppression, exhibited by their fathers in the English revolution of 1688. And may we not say with truth, that the civil and religious liberty which we enjoy, and our national institutions,—the pride and glory of every American citizen, were planted in the storm of battle, nurtured and brought to maturity by the fearless spirit and paternal care of men, who in their defence periled their lives, and freely poured out their blood?

Such is the view of Lieber in his work on Political Ethics. "No human mind," says he, "is vast enough to comprehend in one glance, nor is human life long enough to follow out consecutively all the immeasurable blessings and unspeakable good, which have resulted to mankind from the ever-memorable victories of little Greece, over the rolling masses of servile Asia, which were high sweeping over Europe, like the high tides of a swollen sea, carrying its choking sands over all the germs of civilization, liberty and taste, and nearly all that is good and noble." Now these results, it seems to us, are plain indications that God has given to society the right to defend itself, and if necessary at the expense of life.

4. Again, we think that if society were denied the right to take arms in self-defence, it could not exist. We know the assertion is often made, that if nations would rely on their integrity and the justice of their measures, and firmly refuse to fight, they would never be attacked. It might with equal truth be said, that if society would rely on its just and equal laws, and resolve never to inflict punishment, no one would break the enactments of its civil code. Every one sees that this is preposterous. The assertion is made on the ground that all men are guided solely by moral principles; and until it can be shown that they are so, the assertion itself cannot be sustained.

But we say there are occasions when society has no alternative except either to defend itself by the force of arms, or fall a prey to the violence and passions of wicked men. This is a question of fact; can it be sustained by facts? The government of William Penn is always cited to prove that this is a false position. But one or two examples are not enough to establish a question of so much importance; especially when we have so many examples proving the contrary. Did not that little company of Grecian patriots sue for peace and make every concession in their power, when Xerxes led his myriads of mercenaries upon their soil? Where would have been the liberties, yea, the very existence of Greece, had not that little Spartan band in the pass of Thermopylæ nobly resolved to die, or repel the invader from their shores? And in a still later period, did not a certain Roman patrician, when he addressed the Senate, close with the brutal and ferocious expression, "*Delenda est Carthago*?" And while ill-fated Carthage was trusting with generous confidence to the magnanimity of her rival foe, while she was imploring that the exterminating sword might be sheathed, even then the storm of conquest burst upon her, and left her fair city a heap of ruins, and doomed her patriotic sons to servitude and death. Although they were not able to repel the aggressors, yet it is a confirmation of our position. History is full of examples on this subject. Would any pacific intentions, any love of justice, any renunciation of self-defence, have satiated Napoleon's ambition, when the invasion of Egypt dazzled his imagination with visions of glory? Was any outrage too great

for him to perpetrate, to consummate his scheme of universal conquest? We are informed by Allison, that he determined to overthrow the Ottoman empire, for no other purpose than to increase the brilliancy of his fame, and prepare the way for a more easy descent on the British dominions, and annihilate their power in the East. It was his determined purpose to subjugate and enslave every kingdom and empire of the globe; and it is well known that he would have done it, if the allied powers of Europe had not met and subdued him on the field of Waterloo. Now if we assert that they had no right to oppose by force of arms Napoleon's career of blood and conquest, we ask if a more dire calamity could have visited our globe, than he had the power and will to inflict? Empires would have been rent asunder, kingdoms annihilated, aye, and our own Republic, trodden under the heel of the oppressor, would have perished. To avert such frightful evils, and to save itself from utter extermination, we believe that God has given to society the power of life and death.

III. We now proceed to inquire what the doctrine of revelation is on this subject. If it is a violation of the law of God and the precepts of Christ, for society to protect itself by force of arms, we will and ought to abandon our position, let the consequences be as disastrous as they may.

It is often said that defensive war cannot be justified on the principles of the Christian religion, because it is always attended by all the evils which are connected with offensive war. We do not doubt that there are evils incidentally attending a war in self-defence. But this by no means proves a defensive war to be wrong. What good is there, what blessings have we in this life, what good has ever been accomplished on earth which have not been attended by evils? "It is no objection to a rule, that it is capable of abuse," is the language of the moral philosopher. "In the present imperfect condition of human nature, it is frequently sufficient that a rule prevents a greater evil than it inflicts."

In all cases where war has ever existed, the principles of the gospel have been violated by one or both parties. Such must always be the case in every war. Hence it must follow that if the gospel were fully obeyed, all war

must cease. But it does not follow from this that war to repel an invasion or suppress a domestic tumult is wrong. When the spirit of the religion of Christ universally prevails, the penalties of civil law will cease to be inflicted, because there will be no offenders. But no one supposes that the punishment of the criminal is wrong, because the tendency of the gospel is to infuse into society such a spirit that wicked men can no where be found.

War is no where forbidden by the express command of God; but he has revealed principles which forbid the spirit of war. These principles are explained and enforced in the precepts of the New Testament. They are, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." Again, "Resist not evil; love your enemies; do good to them that hate you." "Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good." These are sufficient to illustrate the doctrine of the Scriptures on this subject. The question now before us is, can defensive war, as we have defined it, under any circumstances exist, without violating the spirit of these commands?

Before we consider this inquiry, it may be necessary to make a remark concerning the spirit that should guide us in ascertaining the import of the Scriptures. And first, we ought always to give them such an interpretation as will harmonize with their general spirit and teaching. By selecting passages of Scripture here and there, the most absurd theories and pernicious doctrines have been taught and believed. It is a manifest violation of the first principles of interpretation, to quote that passage to prove the wickedness of all war, where Christ commanded Peter to "put up his sword," telling him "that all who took the sword should perish by it." With equal justice we might refer to that passage where he commands one of his disciples who had no sword, "to sell his garment and buy one," to prove that all war is right. Again, the precepts of the gospel are often of such a nature that it is impossible to obey them to the letter. For instance, "if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out." "No man can be my disciple unless he hate father and mother and his own life also." The truth which Christ wished to impress on his hearers in these passages was, that no one could be his disciple, unless he were willing for his sake to leave all earthly



friends, yea, and sacrifice his own life. That is, Christ required of his followers their supreme affection. By comparing these passages with others, and interpreting them according to the general spirit of the whole, we ascertain their true import.

1. Bearing these principles in mind, let us inquire into the meaning of the precepts already cited. The command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," contains the great law of reciprocity, universally binding on individuals, communities, and nations. Its meaning is that we should cherish as tender a respect towards all the means of happiness which God has given to our neighbor, as we would wish him to cherish towards the means of happiness which God has given to us. This is as true when applied to society, as when applied to individuals. Of the same import is the other command, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." Now the question arises, is the spirit of these precepts violated, when society takes arms in self-defence? For instance, if, for the purpose of gratifying revenge, or cupidity, or love of power, one nation should attempt to pillage and destroy another,—would the latter transgress the spirit of these precepts, if it should compel the former to desist? Certainly not. For God does not give to nations the right to seek their happiness in this way. Hence it must follow that the spirit of those precepts is not violated, when one nation compels another to desist in its career of conquest and bloodshed.

2. But it may be said that if, in this case, the law of reciprocity is not violated, the law of benevolence is. For this law enjoins on us to do good to those who injure us, not because they have a right to demand such treatment, but because it is the will of God. We fully admit this; but may we never adopt any other mode of treatment? While we are required to do good to the wicked, and by kindness endeavor to reclaim them, still there are occasions when, if we would not sanction their guilt, their wrong doing should be met with firm and inflexible opposition, and suppressed, if need be, by force. It is in pursuance of this principle that society inflicts the penalties of the civil law. All this may be done, and at the same time we may pity the unhappy condition of the wicked, and seek to reclaim them. To present this subject in the

plainest light possible, let us suppose an instance where we believe that it would be the will of God, that the wicked should be punished, and aggression repelled by force. It is well known that the sea has ever been infested with piratical vessels, freighted with fiends incarnate. The sole object of their trade is to shoot and stab as many men, and plunder and burn as many ships, as by violence they can get into their possession. One of these floating engines of death intercepts the peaceful course of a merchantman, and demands her surrender. Her crew and passengers know full well that the motto of these desperate men is, that "dead men tell no tales." If they resist, there is a prospect of saving the vessel and many innocent lives. If they quietly submit, the vessel is doomed to be plundered and burned, and its occupants to be plunged by remorseless hands into the sea. They know further that this unresisting conduct, carried out by themselves and all others who traverse the sea, would be giving direct assent to this nefarious business, and that soon every water would be filled with these desperate outlaws. Now it cannot be that benevolence requires the crew of this vessel to submit to that outrage. It undoubtedly requires that men so hardened and wicked should be pitied, and, if possible, reclaimed. But when this does not prevent them from persevering in their career of crime, then other measures must be adopted. And does not this example clearly define the duty of society, when menaced in like manner—it may not be by pirates, but by a foreign invader or a domestic insurrection? The law of kindness and love may require society to suffer many injuries, and quietly submit to many wrongs. But when by so doing it perils its own existence, and encourages individuals or nations in their guilt and wrong doing, then other treatment is required. The conclusion then is that society is bound to obey the law of benevolence, while at the same time it has a further duty—to meet, with determined opposition, aggression and violence, whether perpetrated by individuals or nations. Thus, if ten foreigners should come to our shores to pillage and murder, society ought to pity and show them kindness, so far as possible; but it would be under no less obligation to compel them to desist. So if ten thousand

should come hither for the same purpose, its duty would remain the same.

3. The object of those precepts of the gospel which enjoin upon us not to resist evil, but to overcome evil with good, is to prohibit in the most impressive manner the exercise of all feelings of hatred or retaliation. But in a war strictly defensive, there is no more necessity for the existence of these malevolent feelings, than in the execution of criminal law. Society may rise and repel an aggression, or suppress a lawless mob with the same feelings as those with which the judge pronounces the sentence of death on the murderer. The language of Mr. Webster on this subject is full of truth, and is worthy of serious attention. "The criminal law," he says, "is not founded on the principles of vengeance. It does not punish, that it may inflict suffering. The humanity of the law feels and regrets every pain it causes, every hour of restraint it imposes, and more deeply still, every life it forfeits. It punishes, not to satisfy any desire to inflict pain, but simply to prevent the repetition of crimes." With such feelings society may arm itself to repel a foreign invasion, or suppress a domestic tumult. There need be no more hatred and revenge in the one case than in the other.

4. These views, we think, harmonize with the spirit and instruction of the whole Scriptures. Let us first glance at the precepts and examples of the Old Testament. We need not refer to the command of God to Noah,—“Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed,” to prove the right of society to take life; for whatever may be the import of the passage, we have other proof, against which no reasonable objection can be urged. Nor shall we cite the example of the Hebrews, when, by the express command of Jehovah, they waged against the Canaanites a war of utter extermination. That fearful example would be no authority in the case before us; for they acted under the express injunction of the Almighty. But let us consider the example of Abraham. When his kinsman Lot, and his family were seized and carried away by a band of plunderers, he did not wait for an express command from God to attack them and rescue his relations; but he armed his servants and pursued these marauders, and compelled them to give up

their prey. Here is an act of self-defence; and we infer that it was right from the fact that, "Melchisedec, a priest of the Most-High," came out and pronounced a public benediction on Abraham when he returned. The example of David, when his possessions were invaded by his enemies, is another illustration of the same truth. In the fourth chapter of Nehemiah, we have still further confirmation of the right of self-defence. The Jews for their disobedience had been carried away captives into Assyria. Their native land was abandoned to the ravages of their enemies. Jerusalem was forsaken, plundered, and burnt, and its walls demolished. When the seventy years of exile were completed, according to the promise of God they returned again to the land of their fathers, and to their desolate and ruined city. But no sooner did they commence to rebuild its prostrate walls, than they were menaced on every side by hordes of jealous and blood-thirsty enemies. In this emergency, did they take no means of self-defence? Did they say, as some do at the present day, that God would protect them without any effort on their part? Did not Nehemiah rather command them, "to remember the Lord who is great and terrible, and fight for their brethren, their sons, and their daughters, their wives and their homes"? Now we think these examples establish the right of self-defence; for if we take this as a general principle and carry it into practice, we find that it has always produced the happiest results to our race.

Let us now inquire what the teachings of the New Testament are on this subject. We have already examined the precepts of Christ which refer indirectly to this point, and we think have shown that, when correctly interpreted, they do not conflict with the right of self-defence. There are several passages where the profession of arms and the use of the sword are incidentally spoken of by Christ and the apostles; but we do not think that they furnish any decisive proof of the right of society to take arms in self-defence. But still a subject of such importance is not left in doubt. The apostle, in his epistle to the Romans, has fully defined the nature, power, and object of government or society. He says that the magistrate "is the minister of God to thee for good; but if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he," that is,



the magistrate who is the agent of society, "beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger," that is, one who executes punishment, "on him that doeth evil." Here it seems that the sword, an instrument used for no other purpose than to take life, is given by him who has the right "to kill or make alive," into the hand of the civil magistrate; and consequently we suppose that he, or which is the same thing, society, has the power of life and death. The apostle acknowledges the right of society to take life, when, despairing of obtaining justice from his own kindred, and appealing to the tribunal of Cæsar, he says, "If I am an offender, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die." The right of society to take life is also taught in the second chapter of Peter's first epistle. Now it seems to us, when we take these passages in connection with each other, there can be no doubt concerning the import of the first. It is simply this. God has given to society the right to use the sword for two purposes. First, to deter men from doing wrong. "If thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he"—that is, the magistrate, "beareth not the sword in vain." And secondly, to punish evil doers; "For he is the minister of God, a revenger, to punish him that doeth evil." Here then is conferred upon the magistrate, who is the agent of society, the power to inflict death on those who have committed any thing "worthy of death." We suppose that it will be admitted by all, if any crime is worthy of death, it is that which endangers, and which if allowed would destroy, the social fabric. Hence society, when assailed by foreign invasion, or menaced by an infuriated and lawless mob, has the right, by the express permission of Jehovah, to gird on the sword, to overawe and suppress those who seek its destruction; or in other words, war, under some circumstances, can be justified on the principles of the Christian religion.

We cannot close this discussion without expressing our earnest conviction of the importance of taking a true position on a question which agitates so deeply the public mind, at the present day. The progress of peace must be retarded, and its universal triumph long delayed, if its friends contend for those principles which do not commend themselves to the reason and consciences of men;

and which have not for their support the eternal basis of truth. To assert that every possible case of war in self-defence is wrong, seems to us opposed to the plainest dictates of conscience, and contrary to God's revealed will; and every measure to promote the cause of peace on such a basis, is not only erroneous, but must in the end be futile. "Let not," says Channing, "the cause of peace be injured, by the assertion of extreme and indefensible principles. The doctrine of the absolute unlawfulness of all war is thought by its advocates to be necessary to a successful opposition to this barbarous custom. But were we employed to restore peace to a contentious neighborhood, we should not consider ourselves as obliged to teach that self-defence, in every possible case, is wrong; and equally useless is this principle in our labors for the pacification of the world. Without taking this uncertain and dangerous ground, we may and ought to assail war, by assailing the principles and passions which gave it birth."

VERITATIS AMANS.

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## ARTICLE IX.

### GLEANINGS FROM RECENT GERMAN PERIODICALS.

[Most of these Notices were prepared for the June number of the Review, but were unavoidably postponed.]

Of works relating to Biblical philology and exegesis, we have an account of the following:—

A new edition of Gesenius's *Lexicon Manuale Hebraicum et Chaldaicum in Vet. Testamenti Libros*, by A. Th. Hoffman, Professor at Jena. It is to be not a mere reprint, but an improved edition. One volume (pp. 432) left the press several months ago. The work cannot fail to receive important additions in passing through the hands of so able an orientalist. He is the author of the copious Syriac Grammar which is so well known.

*Novum Testamentum Coptice edidit* Dr. M. G. Schwartz. Pars 1. Evangelia Mathaei et Marci continens. The text is printed chiefly

according to MSS. in the library at Berlin, and is accompanied with a copious selection of various readings, and with critical and grammatical notes.

*Theoretisch-practisches Elementarbuch der Hebräischen Sprache*, by E. Bondi, teacher at the Beth-Hamidrasch in Kollin. *Handbuch der Arabischen Volkssprache*, Manual of the Arabic popular language, with explanations in German and Italian, and directions for the pronunciation of every Arabic word, by J. Hofstetter and Geo. Hudai. *Hebräisches Lesebuch*, etc., by M. A. Levy. The only peculiarity in the plan of the book seems to be its Appendix of unpointed text, with Rabbinic scholia and explanations.

A new commentary on the book of Jonah, *Das Buch Jonas historisch-kritisch untersucht*, etc., has been published by August W. Krahmer, Privatdocent in Marburg. We have seen only a very general notice of the book; but the terms of this seem to imply that the views of the author are such as afford reason for believing that he has done something for the advancement of a correct Biblical exegesis. At Zürich has appeared a *Commentar über den Brief Pauli an den Philemon*, by Dr. Aug. Koch. It professes to be a full, exhaustive exposition of this important epistle. Dr. Cäsar von Lengerke, Prof. at Königsberg, has published two new volumes on the Psalms, *Fünf Bücher der Psalmen*, containing both a commentary and translation. He is the same author who wrote upon Daniel, a decided rationalist, but eminent for his linguistic tact and attainments. It would not surprise us to find that the work had been put forth as a sort of rationalistic counterpoise to Dr. Hengstenberg's recent commentary on the Psalms. It will be recollected that this was the relation in which his work on Daniel stood to Hävernicks work on that book.—Since the above sentence was penned, we have seen a somewhat extended notice of Lengerke's work in the April No. of Tholuck's *Anzeiger*. The rationalistic tendency of the performance is described as sufficiently *intense*; but what is not a little astonishing, when we consider the theological antagonism of the men, it is represented at the same time as dependent on Hengstenberg's commentary for its philology to an extent almost incompatible with any just pretension to original authorship.—A fourth edition of Hug's *Einleitung in die Schriften des N. T.*, Introduction to the Writings of the New Testament, has been published since the author's death. The translation of Mr. Fosdick was made from the third edition. The progress which has been made in this field of biblical study since that publication, has left room for additions and alterations which the new edition now put forth claims to have supplied.

The indefatigable de Wette, after a brief respite, has again put his hand to his commentary on the New Testament. Part first of volume third, has just appeared, containing the epistles of Peter, James and Jude. He has issued also new editions of the portion of the work on Colossians, Philemon, Ephesians, Titus, Timothy and Hebrews.—The first volume of the third edition of Winer's *Biblisches Realwörterbuch* has been completed. The second and remaining one is promised within the present year.

Among the recent publications in classical philology, we notice the following ; which may not be without interest :—

G. Ch. Crusius, whose special lexicons of several of the Greek authors have been received so favorably, has appeared with a *Vollständiges Wörterbuch zu den Werken des P. Virgilius Maro*, with particular reference to the explanation of the mythological, historical and geographical proper names.—Henschel's new edition of Ducange's *Glossarium mediæ et infimæ Latinitatis* has been brought as far as Fasc. xxvii et xxviii. Tomi vi, pp. 393—768.—Klotz's very popular edition of *Cornelii Nepotis vitæ*, etc., has been re-printed for the seventh time. It is accompanied by Billerbeck's vocabulary of this author, revised and improved by G. Chr. Crusius, mentioned above.—*Phutarchi vitæ parallelæ* ed. C. Sintenis. Vol. iv. This volume completes the series. This edition presents the most perfect text of the Lives hitherto published, but is destitute of the apparatus in other respects which a student needs in reading an ancient author.—The well known and admired *Vita Davidis Ruhnkenii*, by Wyttenbach, has been edited anew by Car. Henr. Frotcher. He has added to it critical and grammatical remarks, together with a copious index of the things and words contained in it. Wyttenbach was considered in his day as a great master of the Latin language ; but it is here shown that his Latinity was still such as will not stand the test of rigid scrutiny, that notwithstanding his purism, many expressions escaped from him which are either absolutely unclassic, or without authority in the style of the model writers of antiquity.—A discussion of great interest has been going forward since 1844 between Professors Hermann, of Göttingen, and Zumpt, of Berlin, respecting the genuineness of the letters between Cicero and Brutus—the former in defence of them, the latter against them. The combatants are able ; and the dispute gives occasion for the exhibition of great acuteness and learning. A writer in the *Neue Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* for December last has a valuable article on the subject, in which he recounts the past fortunes of these letters, which so many critics have rejected, and subjoins a sketch of the arguments



employed in this renewed discussion of the question. It is clear, from his account, that one point at least has now been settled; and that is, that if the correspondence be not genuine, the evidence of this must be sought out of the letters themselves, not in them. Hermann appears to have shown conclusively that Cicero's essential characteristics as a writer appear here as decidedly as in any production ascribed to him; and that the assertions to the contrary by Tunstall, Markland, and others, have been made without due examination. The principal writings on his side of the dispute are *Zur Rechtfertigung der Echtheit des erhaltenen Briefwechsels zwischen Cicero u. M. Brutus, erste Abtheilung*, and subsequently under the same title, a second Part.—A second volume of Klotz's *Handbuch der lateinischen Literaturgeschichte*, Manual of the History of Latin literature, appears on the list of newly published works. The first volume (pp. 381) treats almost exclusively of the origin and cultivation of the Latin language, and is for that subject a work of unequalled value. The fulness with which it exhibits the *Quellen und Hilfsmittel*, the sources of information and the literary helps pertaining to the whole circle of inquiry, is a feature which must render it specially welcome to the classical scholar.—Prof. Bernhardt, of Halle, has published a work under the title *de Horatii Epistola ad Pisones*. Of its particular design and character we have seen no account.

Krüger, of Berlin, has published the first Heft of the second volume of his *Thucydides*. It has the highest reputation; for school-purposes it is without a superior. The same scholar has just issued a little book, which he entitles *Critical Letters on Buttman's Greek Grammar—Ein Philolog. Vade mecum für Viele*.—Kühner has put forth a third edition of his *Ciceronis Tusculanæ Questiones*. It contains, as compared with the preceding edition, an enlargement of more than one hundred pages.—The new edition of the works of Tacitus, by J. G. Orelli, meets with a somewhat singular reception at the hands of the critics. The first volume containing the *Annals*, was published last year; and a second, containing the *History* and smaller treatises of Tacitus, will soon follow. Prof. Zumpt, of Berlin, in a review of it in a late number of the *Berlin Jahrbücher*, accords to it uncommon merit, particularly as regards the text, which he pronounces the most perfect which the extant means for revising it admit of being attained. Prof. Baiter, who is associated with Orelli in this labor, has visited Italy repeatedly for the examination of manuscripts, and the authorities thus consulted are represented as having been used by the editors with fidelity and judgment. The January number of the *Zeitschrift für die*

*Alterthumswissenschaft* contains a review of this work by Prof. Halm, the general strain of which is also decidedly favorable. On the other hand, a somewhat extended critique of the same work in the *Halle Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, Jan. 1847, closes thus: "The only thing to be commended in the book is the new collation of the Florentine manuscripts. The labor of the editors fails entirely in every thing which would give it peculiar value; it is shallow, superficial and in the highest degree negligent." This severe judgment the reviewer pronounces after exhibiting what he considers as sufficient evidence to justify it.—*Epistola Critica ad Virum Doctissimum*, C. F. S. Alschevski, Part I, by J. Ingerslev, a Danish scholar. Its object is to consider the points in which Alschevski's edition differs from others which have preceded it. The great progress in general which the criticism of Livy has made in this edition is acknowledged, the principal qualification of this praise being that the preference is sometimes given to readings which the writer regards as of inferior authority.—Stallbaum is putting forth his edition of the works of Plato for the third time. The first volume is out, containing the Apology of Socrates and Crito.

Among the works of a miscellaneous character which we find advertised as already published or about to be published, we mention the following:—

*Geschichte Rom's im Zeitalter der punischen Krüge*, by Dr. K. Haltaus, commencing with the period where Niebuhr's history closes, and designed apparently as a continuation of it.—*Johannes Arndt, Ein Zeitbild, etc., in den ersten Jahren des Siebzehnten Jahrhunderts*, by Dr. August Wildenhahn, author of a Life of Spener and other biographies which have been very popular with the religious public of Germany.—*Geschichte der Welt vor und nach Christus,—für das allgemeine Bildungsbedürfniss dargestellt*, by Dr. Heinr. Dittmar. This work is to be completed in four volumes, the first of which has appeared, containing 603 pages. Dr. Tholuck bestows on this first volume the highest praise. He describes it as recognizing the Bible, in its plain and obvious meaning, as an unimpeachable source of historical knowledge, and as written at the same time with a learning and ability equal fully to the demands of the understanding. He takes exceptions in his critique to a few points; but they do not affect the substantial character of the performance.—*Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, by Dr. K. R. Hagenbach, a second improved edition.—The fourth volume of the second edition of Neander's *Allgemeine Geschichte, etc.*, General History of the Christian Religion and Church, is advertised as published.—

*De Epistola ad Diognetum S. Justini Philosophi et Martyris nomen præ se ferente.* Scripsit Dr. Jo. Car. Th. Otto, private teacher in the University at Jena. The student who wishes to see the strongest things that can be said in favor of the genuineness of this celebrated letter, will find them in this edition. Of the high antiquity of the letter there can be no dispute; and of its interest, as one of the most remarkable relics of the earliest Christian literature, there is but one opinion. For a translation of it into English, the reader is referred to this Review, No. 34, p. 280.—Krüger has published a second edition of his *Griech. Sprachlehre für Schulen*. In some qualities this Grammar is superior to any other in the German language.—Gräfenhan has finished the third volume of his History of Classical Philology, *Geschichte der class. Philologie*.

The first part of a work which promises to be one of interest, has recently appeared from Prof. F. H. Fleck, of the University at Leipsic, entitled *Philosophische und christliche Theologie nach ihrem Widerspruche und höherem Einklange*. This work is designed to exhibit the different philosophical schools, at present existing or which have existed in modern times, in their relations to Christianity. An attempt is here made to define the precise attitude which these schools have held in reference to the religion of the Bible, from the time of Des Cartes to that of the new Hegelians, who are now contending for the ascendancy. The various systems of speculation which fall within the limits of the period surveyed, are brought into comparison with the teachings of Christianity, and have judgment pronounced upon them according to the author's view of their agreement with them or opposition to them. Sketches are given of the founders or principal representatives of the different systems, intended to illustrate their character more fully, and supplying at the same time a species of very important incidental information. The second volume is to follow soon, containing the portions of the work which are more strictly theological.

A new philological Journal has been founded at Berlin, under the editorship of A. Hofer, entitled *Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft der Sprache*. Judging from the contents of the first, second and third numbers, it is to adhere much more closely to the province which it professes to occupy, than is true in the case of many of the German periodicals. In the first number, every article is strictly linguistic in its character. We notice that our countryman, Rev. Eli Smith, missionary of the American Board in the east, has honorable mention made of his zeal in oriental studies. Prof. Pott, of Halle, communicates an interesting paper on the language of the Gipsies in Syria, consisting

chiefly of materials for which he is indebted to Mr. Smith, who forwarded them to him through the hands of Dr. Schultz in Jerusalem. Prof. Pott, it may be mentioned in this connection, has completed his learned work on the origin, history and language of the Gipsies. The second volume treats more particularly of the last topic, describes and illustrates the language in question, giving an outline of a Grammar, exercises for reading, and a vocabulary. Mr. Borrow may run now some hazard of losing his reputation of being almost the only man in the world, not a Gipse, who understands the "seven jargons."

The library of the University at Göttingen maintains still its rank among the first libraries of Germany. At the death of Heyne in 1812, it contained only 200,000 volumes; but according to a catalogue recently published, it numbers now 350,000. The average increase for the last thirty years has been about 5000 a year. In addition to a standing appropriation which the government makes for this object, special grants have been made from time to time, which have added very considerably to the revenues of the Library. It should be said to the praise of the present king of Hanover, in whose behalf so little that is praiseworthy can otherwise be said, that he has shown a noble liberality in giving money to build up the Göttingen library.

The University at Erlangen has conferred on Alexander von Humboldt the title of Doctor of Philosophy. This is the nineteenth doctor's diploma which he has received. The numbers of his orders or knighthoods is still greater. The king of Prussia has lately bestowed one of those dignities upon him which brings him as near to the royal family in rank as it is possible for a subject to come. All this is the reward of his eminent learning, his literary and scientific accomplishments. Baron von Humboldt is now in advanced life; but, as his latest productions show, retains still the unimpaired vigor of his powerful intellect.

It is rumored that Dr. Nitzsch, of Bonn, is to be transferred to the University at Berlin, as the successor of the late Prof. Marheineke. Dr. Dorner, of Königsberg, so favorably known as the author of the *History of the Doctrine concerning the Person of Christ*, has followed a call as ordinary Professor of Theology in the University at Bonn. Prof. Fleck, of Leipsic, whose labors as an editor of the sacred text are well known, has been transferred to a similar post at Giessen. Dr. Harless, of Erlangen, author of an excellent commentary on Ephesians and other works, and eminent for his oratorical powers, has been appointed preacher in one of the churches at Leipsic.



An important publication has recently appeared in Paris—*Description Géographique, Historique et Archéologique de la Palestine*, by M. Munk. The work consists of five books, of which the first is devoted to the physical and topographical condition of Palestine; the second, to an account of the different heathen nations that inhabited the land before the conquest of it by Joshua; the third, to the history of the Hebrews from Abraham to the time of the Babylonian captivity; the fourth describes the moral, social and literary state of the Hebrews down to the present time; and the fifth, the history of Palestine from the Babylonian captivity till the destruction of the temple by Titus. An appendix presents to us a general outline of the events which have taken place in that country from the destruction of Jerusalem down to our own time. The author is represented as possessing uncommon qualifications for his task. With a knowledge of the Hebrew and other oriental languages, he unites a knowledge of the principal modern languages, and has also visited Palestine in person.

The great Dictionary of the German language, on which the Grimms, have been engaged for a series of years, has at length been put to press. The first part is out probably before this. When completed, the entire work will make, it is supposed, seven quarto volumes. Scholars in all parts of Germany have been employed for years in collecting materials for this stupendous undertaking.

We are sorry to have occasion to report the recent death of several men among the most distinguished in Germany in the several walks of literary and professional service to which they were devoted. One of them is the well known Dr. Hug, Professor of Theology in the University at Freiberg. His Introduction to the New Testament is the work which has given him most celebrity abroad, having been translated both in this country and England. He was born at Constance in 1765.—Another who has closed lately a distinguished career is Dr. Ludw. Fr. Franz *Theremin*, one of the Prussian court-preachers, and Prof. *Honorarius* in the University at Berlin. He was held in the highest estimation for worth of character, and in the view of no inconsiderable part of the German public had no superior as an eloquent, efficient preacher. His published writings are considered among the most classical in the German language. He was born in 1780. He was descended from one of the Protestant French families which took refuge in Prussia after the revocation of the edict of Nantz.

The University of Berlin has sustained a serious loss in the death of Prof. Puchta. He succeeded three years ago to the professorship

of Roman law, vacated by the appointment of Savigny as one of the king's ministers. He was not quite forty-three years old.

On the 2d of November last died Chr. Fr. *Siegel*, Prof. of Theology at Leipzig, and one of the University preachers. He was born in 1781. He is well known in this country as the author of a valuable *Manual on Church Antiquities*—a somewhat extensive work in four volumes, 1835—38.—On the 6th of December last died at Giessen Dr. K. Fr. Aug. *Fritzsche*, in whose death Germany has occasion to deplore the loss of one of the ablest philological critics of this or any other age. In New Testament philology, Winer is the only man who would bear comparison with him. His principal exegetical productions were Commentaries on Matthew, on Luke, and the Epistle to the Romans, all written as well as most of his other works in Latin. In the first of these, he carried his love of refinement, of rigid linguistic deduction much too far, as he himself afterwards admitted, but in his later writings he has kept nearer to the true medium. His works constitute a rich fund of learning, which will be resorted to as long as the critical study of the New Testament shall continue to be pursued. He was born in 1801, and has closed his life just at the period when his greatest efforts as a scholar were still to be made. Some further particulars in his history were stated on a previous occasion; see this Review, No. 35, p. 469.

Among the men of science who have lately died, are Dr. *Ideler*, of Berlin, distinguished as a mathematician and chronologist, and F. W. *Bessel*, director of the Observatory at Königsberg, who was ranked among the first astronomers of the age.

## ARTICLE X.

## LITERARY NOTICES.

## I. BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

1. *Exercises in Hebrew Grammar and Selections from the Greek Scriptures to be translated into Hebrew, with Notes, Hebrew Phrases, and References to Approved Works in Greek and Hebrew Philology.* By H. B. HACKETT, Professor of Biblical Literature in Newton Theological Institution. Andover. Allen, Morrill & Wardwell. 1847. pp. 116, 12mo.

The title of this work gives but an inadequate view of its character and value. It is a great addition to our materials for securing to the student a minute, thorough and independent acquaintance with the principles of the Hebrew tongue. It is divided into three parts. Part I. is entitled "Exercises in Punctuation." Under the indeclinable parts of speech, the verbs, regular and irregular, and the nouns, collections of unpointed Hebrew words are set down, with their significations, the former to be combined and pointed by the student, and the latter to be pointed according to their various forms and meanings. "In the course of the conjugation and inflection of the Hebrew verb, numerous forms occur which are precisely the same as regards the consonants of which they consist, but are distinguished by a different vocalization. The examples are to be pointed with the vowel-signs which they assume, in order to produce different forms of the verb." To the several combinations of consonants, figures are appended, indicating the number of different forms which those consonants will assume, when furnished with their proper vowels, in the different parts of the verb. These numbers often extend to eleven or twelve. To point readily and correctly these triliteral roots, so as to produce so many different forms of the verb, must secure to the student very great familiarity with grammatical elements. These exercises cover twenty-eight pages. Part II, containing sixty pages, is a series of extracts, first from the Greek New Testament, and then from the Greek version of the Old Testament, with copious Notes, calling the attention of the student perpetually to the forms, aiding him in his efforts, and directing him to grammatical principles. The utility of this exercise is well set forth by Dr. G. B. Winer, in a brief Appendix added by Prof. Hackett, and containing the views of Gesenius and Winer on the method of Hebrew study. He says, "That the practice of translating into a foreign language is an excellent help to a radical acquaintance with it, has been in recent times universally admitted in reference to the Greek; and I am constrained by my experience to believe that the neglect of such practice is the principal reason why so many theological students

find their knowledge of the Hebrew so imperfect, and, in many instances, after a short time so easily escaping from them. Hence, along with the analytical study of the language, the student should keep up the constant habit of translating more or less into Hebrew." Part III, extending only to twelve pages, consists of selections from unpointed Hebrew passages, which the student is to furnish with their vowels. In these exercises he is chiefly placed beyond the reach of aid from his Hebrew Bible, even if he were disposed to consult it, most of the passages being taken from other sources. Both the plan and the execution of the work are worthy of all praise, and have received already the commendation of distinguished teachers. We take leave earnestly to recommend the work to clergymen, whose knowledge of the Hebrew is gradually escaping them. The diligent study of the language for half an hour every day, under the guidance of this manual, would restore all they have lost, and give them a new interest in the pursuits of Biblical learning. We also recommend the work to all teachers of Hebrew, as a volume calculated to secure to their pupils the great end of their earlier toils—real and rapid advancement in the elements of a language, a thorough acquaintance with which is so important to the interpreter of the word of God. We cannot but think that a manual on the same principle with this might be constructed, which would be of essential use in promoting thoroughness and accuracy of knowledge in the study of other languages besides the Hebrew; we speak, of course, not of exercises in punctuation, but in the production, identification and signification of the forms of similar words, and in translation.

## II. CLASSICAL LITERATURE.

2. *The Germania and Agricola of Caius Cornelius Tacitus, with Notes for Colleges.* By W. S. TYLER, Professor of the Greek and Latin Languages in Amherst College. New York. Wiley & Putnam. 1847. pp. 181, 12mo.

At the commencement of our College terms, we take pleasure in calling attention to this fine edition of the *Germania* and *Agricola* of Tacitus. It seems to have been edited with ability, by the aid of the best helps, and by a scholar both accurate and enthusiastic in his work, and taking very correct views of the requisites to the completeness of such a volume. The Notes, which fill more than half the book, are brief, but judicious, and suited to give the student an accurate and thorough knowledge of his author, and pleasure in his perusal.

## III. GENERAL LITERATURE.

3. *The Genius of Scotland, or Sketches of Scottish Scenery, Literature and Religion.* By ROBERT TURNBULL. Second Edition. New York. Robert Carter. 1847. pp. 379, 12mo.

We cannot well conceive of a work of this kind more judicious or interesting. Instead of pursuing the usual course of books of Travels, the author selects scenes, objects and persons of interest, and exhibits them in an attractive and spirited manner. In this way the reader is



furnished with a view of every thing which he desires to know, without having also forced upon him those incidents of a personal and temporary character which are of no value except in the estimation of the author. In the course of the volume, we are made familiar with the most remarkable places of Scotland, and besides, we become acquainted with most of the distinguished personages of the country, living and dead. It will furnish an innocent and delightful employment for a student's hours of relaxation. It was our design to have enriched our pages by extended extracts from the work, with a review; but we must be contented to delay our purpose to a future opportunity.

4. *Boston Editions of the Standard English Poets, including Milton, Young, Cowper, Burns, and also Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress with Scott's Notes.* Phillips & Sampson. 1847. 12mo.

We look with pleasure upon efforts to call public attention to our standard English authors. In a period when the older writers are neglected, and literature is valued by many in proportion only as it is recent, we are the more gratified with efforts like the present to provide for the public taste volumes whose neat and beautiful forms, attractive appearance and sterling contents, while they profit and please, may be instrumental in displacing the flashy publications of the day. Of the character of these volumes we need not speak. They have long since taken their high places in the temple of fame. The collection named at the head of this notice is in four volumes, Milton and Young being embraced in one volume of nearly 600 pages; they are perfectly distinct from one another, each volume forming a complete work, and sold by itself. For intrinsic excellence, and pleasing exterior, we commend the volumes to those who esteem them for personal use, and to those who may seek them as valuable gift-books for their friends.

5. *The Church Member's Manual of Ecclesiastical Principles, Doctrine, and Discipline; presenting a Systematic View of the Structure, Polity, Doctrines and Practices of Christian Churches, as taught in the Scriptures.* By WILLIAM CROWELL. With an Introductory Essay, by HENRY J. RIPLEY, Professor in the Newton Theological Institution. Boston. Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1847. pp. 276, 12mo.

This very complete Manual of Church Polity is all that could be desired in this department. Every important point, within a wide range, is brought forward, and every point touched, is settled. The volume has been a work of time and perseverance, of thorough deliberation and zealous research. We believe it will not be found defective in any essential point; and in all it may be deemed good authority.

6. *Neander's History of the Christian Religion and Church.* Translated by Prof. TORREY. Boston. 1847. Crocker & Brewster. pp. 740, 8vo.

We have delayed a notice of the first volume of this translation of Neander, in the expectation of an early receipt of the remainder of the work, and with the purpose, on such receipt, to offer a more extended criticism. Many of the public journals have already expressed their

opinion of the merits of the volume already issued. As to Neander, there is no question. He is the greatest living Church-historian, and his words, in this department, come with authority. The translator has in most respects discharged his office faithfully; perhaps his chief fault is, that it has been too faithfully. He has conformed so strictly to his German original, as to leave some of his terms and sentences unintelligible to the unlearned reader. A servile imitation is not necessary to a good translation. But if the volume have defects, (as what human production has not?) it is a valuable addition to the cause of theological science, and will be an important help to the scholar. An examination of those portions which relate to the Christian ordinance of baptism, convinces us that Neander places the practice of the early churches where we suppose that Christ and the apostles placed it. At another time, we hope to group together the testimonies of this great author on this point, as of essential value, not in forming but in establishing our argument; not in enlightening, but confirming us.

7. *Miscellaneous Essays and Discourses.* By MARK HOPKINS, D. D., President of Williams College. Boston. T. R. Marvin. 1847. pp. 514, 8vo.

This elegant volume—marked with the beauty and taste of all Mr. Marvin's publications,—contains four articles originally contributed to periodical works, nine addresses of a literary character, and nine occasional sermons. They extend over a wide range in literature and religion, and are among the choice gems of the American press. The volume is in all respects an honor to American talent, and worthy of an extensive circulation.

8. *The Bible not of Man, or the Argument for the Divine Origin of the Sacred Scriptures, drawn from the Scriptures themselves.* By GARDINER SPRING, D. D. New York. American Tract Society. 1847. pp. 319, 12mo.

We regard with pleasure all books whose object it is to illustrate the Bible, or to magnify its importance, its utility and its excellence. In the tide of publications which every week sends forth over the world, few are devoted to this great work. Most authors write upon time; few upon eternity. Human words and works are abundantly discussed, illustrated, praised; the divine, more seldom. It is, however, matter of gratulation, when a volume appear slike this, appealing to reason and common sense, to the understanding and the consciousness of men, and of intellectual men. The Bible is ready to be judged on its own merits. It does not shrink from the strictest scrutiny. On whatever grounds men are pleased to try it, it is prepared to submit to the examination, and fears not the severity of any ordeal. The plan of the work of Dr. Spring is eminently adapted to an age of skepticism. It invites the infidel to examine the claims of the Scriptures, and to convict them, if they are unworthy of public confidence. It is suited to confirm the faith of the Christian, by setting before him, in a clear light, the reason of the faith that is in him. The work contains a preliminary dissertation on "the fitness of the time selected by divine Providence for the introduction of the Christian dispensation,"—and

ten chapters on the main topic of the volume. Chapter I is entitled, "The Bible above the invention of the human intellect." II. The spirit of the Bible a superhuman spirit. III. Its moral rectitude. IV. The divine origin of the Bible argued from its peculiar doctrines. V. From its religion. VI. The unity of the Scriptures. VII. Their adaptation to the wants and character of man. VIII. The testimony of Christian experience. IX. Accordance of the Bible with human reason. X. Concluding remarks.—We will only add that the plan, so well conceived, is well carried out, in a manner exhibiting the learning, research and skill of the author. We regard it as another bulwark erected to check the advance of infidelity.

9. *The Laboring Classes of England, especially those engaged in Agriculture and Manufactures; in a Series of Letters.* By an Englishman. Also, *A Voice from the Factories, a Poem in Serious Verse.* Boston. John Putnam. 1847. pp. 168, 12mo.

This little volume contains a large amount of historical and statistical information respecting the laboring classes and the industrial occupations of England. Chapters of personal history are interspersed, having all the interest of romance. No one can read the book without receiving valuable information, and at the same time awakening his sympathies for the sufferings of his fellow-men.

10. *The Works of Henry Ware, Jr., D. D.* Vol. III. and IV. Boston. James Munroe & Co. 1847. pp. 444, 445, 12mo.

These additional volumes of the works of the late Dr. Ware, Jr., are composed partly of new matter, as sermons, and partly of matter already published. In Vol. III, containing thirty-two sermons, nine have appeared previously; the rest are from MS. In the fourth volume, containing the Essay on the Formation of Christian Character, Sermons on the Character and Offices of Christ, Historical and Ordination Sermons, very little is new. The selection and compilation, however, have been made with taste and judgment. The works are entitled to and will enjoy a place with our standard literature. Most of the articles are marked not only by purity, simplicity and neatness of style, but by a truly serious spirit. Notwithstanding the defectiveness of the author's creed, no one could have been acquainted with him, or can read his works, without feeling an admiration of his character, and a true love of his religious fervor and conscientiousness. Those parts of the volumes which maintain erroneous views of faith, of course we cannot commend;—especially the sermon on Atonement; this, we believe, is not only defective, in that it does not go far enough, but unscriptural in so far as it does go. Any person of a truly enlightened and well-balanced mind, however, may read the volumes with pleasure and profit; a critical judgment will detect and condemn the erroneous, the defective and the bad, and admire and adopt the good; and to any person of such qualifications we run no risk in commending the works.

11. *Good for Evil, or Love to Enemies. Illustrated by Numerous Interesting Facts.* Boston. N. E. S. S. Union. 1847. pp. 236, 18mo.

The perusal of this little book has given us sincere pleasure. Its attractive style and its numerous interesting illustrations will win for it a place among "books which are books;" and wherever it is read, it will do good. Its principles are scriptural, and its facts, to the point.

12. *Chambers' Miscellany of Useful and Entertaining Knowledge.* Edited by ROBERT CHAMBERS, Author of *Cyclopædia of English Literature.* Boston. Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1847.

This little work is No. 1 of a series of thirty numbers, of which three are to constitute a volume. The numbers are to be issued at regular intervals, in paper covers, of about 160 pages each. The tables of contents give promise of a simple, pure and interesting series of pieces, adapted to yield instruction, entertainment and recreation. The work, we doubt not, will enjoy an extensive popularity.

13. *The History of Sunday Schools and of Religious Education, from the Earliest Times.* By LEWIS G. PRAY. Boston. Crosby & Nichols. 1847. pp. 262, 12mo.

This volume is written by a gentleman who has been for twenty years the superintendent of a Sabbath School connected with one of the Unitarian Societies in the city of Boston. Though not in any respect a controversial work, nor professedly sectarian, the superior fulness of the information relating to some of the Sabbath Schools and Sabbath-school efforts belonging to his own denomination, sufficiently indicate the direction from which it has come. The notes on the religious education of children, by parental or associated effort, extend back to the patriarchal age, bringing the history through the several periods and regions of the world, and the centuries of the Christian era. The accounts are necessarily very brief, though some portions are deeply interesting. A valuable amount of statistics on the subject of Sabbath Schools is brought together. As the author approaches our own times, his notes become more full, and exhibit much industry and research. We are interested in his manner of tracing the origin and progress of Sabbath Schools in England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland and on the Continent. By consulting missionary journals, he might have gone further; embracing in his survey, after America, Asia and Africa, and the islands of the sea. He shows that the elementary idea of Sabbath Schools had existed in many minds before the time of Robert Raikes; like many inventions, of which the ground-thought had often flitted before the minds of men, like lightning at midnight, while the conception has not been fixed and made useful to the world till after the lapse of years. The author speaks of individual schools and of several societies, as the American Sunday School Union; but he has omitted all mention of the New England Sabbath School Union, notwithstanding its operations are so well established in this city, and have been so long and so well known. As a history, and the only work of its kind, we regard it as a valuable contribution to our means



of knowledge on this subject. We could wish only for as great fullness in the description of some of the schools of our own and of other Christian denominations, as is here given to those of the Unitarians. As the author, however, knew best that with which he was himself connected, perhaps we have no occasion to find fault. What he has done, he has apparently done well. It only remains for another to fill up that in which he has been deficient. The work is beautifully printed on fine paper, and adorned with a likeness of Robert Raikes.

14. *Cheap Publications of the London Religious Tract Society.* Philadelphia. Am. S. S. Union. Boston. W. B. Tappan.

We ask leave to invite attention to this series of useful little publications, which urge their claims among the cheap literature of the day. By a mutual arrangement, the American Society reprint, we suppose from the English plates. They have a fair appearance, but are bound only in paper covers. Each volume contains nearly 200 pages 18mo.; they are often illustrated with wood-cuts, and sold at 12½ cents. The numbers we have seen are, *The Life of Luther*, *The Solar System*, *The Sidereal Heavens*, *Learning to Think*, *Learning to Feel*, and the *Complete Poems of Cowper*. They may not, perhaps, be suited to the wants of the learned; but for popular reading, they deserve high commendation.

15. *The Scriptural Law of Baptism, or the Design of Baptism presented and applied, leading to an Examination of its Form, its Subjects, its Authority, and its Relative Position.* By EDMUND TURNEY, Granville, O. Hartford. Robins & Smith. 1847. pp. 201, 12mo.

This excellent treatise on Baptism is distinguished by strong, clear and philosophical views, and shows abundant proof that it originated from a thinking mind. It is one of the best and most satisfactory works on the subject which we have seen. It treads in a new and higher path than most books on the same topic, relying less upon the more obvious arguments, and appealing chiefly to those which result from a process of ratiocination grounded on scriptural premises. It is, however, calm, clear and convincing, and may be set down as a decided advancement in the literature of the baptismal controversy.

16. *Juvenile Anecdotes; or Authentic and Interesting Facts, designed for the Moral and Religious Instruction of Children and Youth. Compiled and Arranged with Appropriate Remarks.* Boston. New England Sabbath School Union. 1847. pp. 153, 18mo.

This little book contains a series of useful and practical remarks and striking anecdotes, arranged under the heads of Advantages of Parental Instruction, Anger, Meekness, Humility, Contentment, Honesty, Fortitude, Filial, Fraternal and Parental Affection, Prayer, Conversion, Remarkable Sayings, Usefulness. The connecting and explanatory remarks, interspersed with the Anecdotes, exhibit much taste and judgment in the Editor. The little volume is much above the ordinary collections of anecdotes, and a pleasing addition to our practical religious literature.

17. *Two Discourses on the Character of Rev. Thomas Chalmers, D. D.* By DANIEL SHARP. Worcester. S. Chism. 1847. pp. 20, 8vo.  
*Sons of Thunder. A Tribute to the Memory of Alexander Vinet and Thomas Chalmers.* By ROBERT TURNBULL. Hartford. Brockett & Fuller. 1847. pp. 22, 8vo.

These sermons were called forth by the recent demise of the distinguished men whose names appear in the titles. Dr. Sharp has selected the appropriate and striking text, Is. 3 : 1—4. "For behold, the Lord doth take away—the eloquent orator." His first discourse is entitled, "Eloquence an Instrument of Good;" the second, "Elements of Useful Eloquence." They are both excellent discourses, well worthy of the mature age and attainments of the author.

The sermon of Mr. Turnbull is founded on Mark 3 : 7. "And he surnamed them Boanerges, which is, The Sons of Thunder." It is strong and brilliant, attracting the attention and richly repaying it.

We embrace this opportunity to give a very brief chronological sketch of the two eminent men commemorated in the discourses. Dr. Chalmers was born at Anstruthers, near St. Andrews, in the year 1780. He showed in early life signs of great powers. He was sent to the University of St. Andrews by his parents, and distinguished himself in literature and the physical sciences. He was ordained A. D. 1803, at the age of 23. His first settlement was at Cavers, from which place he removed to Kilmany. In this place, in addition to his parochial duties, he gave instruction in mathematics in the University of St. Andrews. At his ordination, it is well known, he had had no experience of the transforming power of vital godliness. Having been appointed to write for Brewster's Edinburgh Encyclopædia the article on the Evidences of Christianity, his preparatory investigations showed him how defective was his religion, and led him to seek with Christian humility and zeal the pearl of great price. Thenceforth he was a new man.

In 1815, Dr. Chalmers was translated to Glasgow. In 1823, he became professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews, [Dr. Sharp says, Aberdeen] and three or four years afterwards, he obtained the chair of theology at Edinburgh University. He was among the founders of the Free Church of Scotland, for conscience' sake. With some three hundred other ministers, on the 23d of May, 1843, he withdrew from his place, that he might establish in Scotland "the crown-rights of Jesus Christ." With an energy undimmed by age or trial, he labored valiantly in the cause of his Master. On Sabbath, the 30th of May last, after having attended public worship through the day, he retired to rest at an early hour in the evening, having his writing materials by his bed that he might resume his studies at once on awaking. In the morning he had gone to his rest and his reward. He died, it is supposed, of a disease of the heart.

Alexander Vinet was born June 17, 1797, in Lausanne, and educated at the Academy in his native town. At the early age of 20, he was made professor of the French language in the University of Basel, and not long after he was ordained at Lausanne. In 1837, he was appointed Professor of Theology in his native town, at the Academy or College where he had been educated. In this office he remained

till his death, which took place on the 4th of May last. He was a champion of evangelical orthodoxy, a brilliant preacher, and an ardent Christian. His discourses, translated by Mr. Turnbull, in which we scarcely know whether to praise most the brilliancy of the author or of the translator, were published in Boston a few months since, under the title of "Vital Christianity." We are happy to learn that the volume has been received with favor not only in America, but also in England and Scotland, and that in the latter countries it has gone through "no less than four separate editions."

18. *The Eloquence of the Colonial and Revolutionary Times. With Sketches of Early American Statesmen and Patriots.* Delivered before the New England Society of Cincinnati. By E. L. MAGOON. Cincinnati. Derby & Co. 1847. pp. 91, 12mo.

Mr. Magoon holds a pen of rare and varied powers. Sometimes he writes with great force; his descriptive and dramatic passages are extremely vivid and impressive; in his terse and nervous style, he conveys much meaning in few words. The present little volume is a good specimen of his occasional addresses. It contains rapid and generally truthful sketches of several prominent personages who appeared as public speakers in the times of our revolution, with brief extracts, in some instances, from their works, in confirmation of his views. It is an excellent little book, containing much information, attractive in its appearance, and worthy of perusal.

#### QUARTERLY LIST.

##### DEATHS.

E. B. BULLARD, Missionary to the Karens, Burmah, April 5, aged 34.  
 ABNER FLANDERS, Buxton, Me., June, aged 70.  
 JESSE JONES, Steuben, N. Y., Aug. 6, aged 68.  
 J. H. LEFTWICH, Rocky Mount, Ten., June 13, aged 61.  
 HORATIO N. LORING, Utica, N. Y., Aug. 14, aged 41.  
 DAVID B. MCGEEHEE, Clover, Va., June 3, 1846.  
 BENJAMIN OGLE, Marion Co., Ill., April 6, aged 78.  
 HARRISON C. PAGE, (licentiate), Newton Theological Institution, Mass., Aug. 9, aged 27.  
 HENRY PALMER, Chatham, Col. Co., N. Y., July 16, aged 81.  
 PETER ROBINSON, Iowa.  
 ALLEN B. ROUNTREE, Mexico.

C. C. SHIRES, (licentiate), Greene, Chen. Co., N. Y., April 16, aged 29.  
 JAMES H. STEBBINS, Vienna, Ont. Co., N. Y., May 24, aged 30.  
 ASA TODD, Chesterfield, Mass., July 16, aged 92.  
 L. L. WASHBURN, Texas, aged 27.  
 ASA WILBUR, Belgrade, Me., Aug. 8, aged 87.  
 RICHARD WOLSEY, Farmersville, Seneca Co., N. Y., May 21, aged 75.

##### ORDINATIONS.

AARON D. ABBOTT, Auburn, O., April 22.  
 LANSING BAILEY, Warren, Herk. Co., N. Y., June 23.  
 A. BARKER, Fountain Creek, Ill., May 8.  
 AMOS N. BENEDICT, New Marlboro', Mass., July 15.

JONATHAN BERRY, Franklin, Ind.,  
July 31.

JOHN BRANTLY, Fayetteville, N. C.,  
July 11.

— CARMICHAEL, Newmarket,  
Madison Co., Ala., April 8.

LYMAN CARPENTER, Blue Grass,  
Scott Co., Iowa, Feb. 12.

JAMES CHRISTIAN, Charles city Co.,  
Va., May 24.

JAMES M. COCHRAN, Machias Port,  
Me., Aug. 11.

G. F. DANFORTH, Medford, Mass.,  
Aug. 12.

JUDSON DAVIS, Maryland, Otsego Co.,  
N. Y., June 16.

HORACE G. DAY, Schenectady, N. Y.,  
May 25.

THOMAS S. DEW, Little Buck Head,  
Burke Co., N. C., May 9.

BOSTON JENKINS DRAYTON, (colored),  
Richmond, Va., June 6.

JAMES DRUEY, Mt. Gilead, Mercer  
Co., O., July 4.

WILLIAM P. FARISH, Albermarle Co.,  
Va., May 30.

WILLIAM FREEMAN, New York, N. Y.,  
July 1.

CHARLES H. GATES, Chesterfield,  
(Montville,) Con., June 23.

ASA HOWARD GOULD, Baring, Me.,  
Aug. 11.

HARVEY GRAY, Rush, Susq. Co., Pa.,  
July 14.

SAMUEL HASKELL, Suffield, Con.,  
Aug. 4.

MARTIN W. HOLMES, Middlesex,  
Yates Co., N. Y., July 7.

JAMES M. HOPE, Middletown, Orange  
Co., N. Y., Aug. 12.

ELI B. HUMPHREY, Chandaken, Ulster  
Co., N. Y.

G. W. HUNTLEY, Farmersville, Col.  
Co., N. Y., June 30.

C. A. JENNISON, Brooklyn, Mich.

JOHN JOHNSON, Calais, Me., June 3.

LEVI MANN, Woodstock, Ulster Co.,  
N. Y., May 12.

GEORGE P. MATTHEWS, Liberty, Me.,  
June 3.

J. McMILTON, Crooked Creek, Carrol  
Co., Ark., May 16.

J. G. MOORE, South Butler, N. Y.,  
July 13.

SAMUEL W. NICHOLSON, Chester-  
ville, S. C., June 27.

S. STILES PARKER, Burlington, N. J.,  
April 30.

WILLIAM PIKE, Haverstraw, N. Y.,  
June 22.

J. B. PORTER, Hopewell, Henry Co.,  
Ky., April.

OAKMAN S. STEARNS, Southbridge,  
Mass., May 19.

APOLLOS PHELPS VIETS, Canton,  
Con., June 30.

#### CHURCHES CONSTITUTED.

Wakesha, Wis. Ter., Aug. 1846.

Lebanon, Ky., Feb. 5.

Keokuk Co., Iowa.

Newmarket, Madison Co., Ala., April 8.

Hopewell, Jasper Co., Geo., April 15.

Pickensville, Ala., April 17.

Savannah, Geo., 2d chh., April 18.

Springfield, Ky., April 20.

Middleburg, Loudoun Co., Va., April  
27.

South Porter, Mich., April.

Wing, Lucas Co., O., April.

Friendship chh., Stokes Co., N. C.

Judson chh., Stokes Co., N. C.

Evansville, Ia.

Russell Co., Ala.

Whitehaven, Somerset Co., Md.,  
May 3.

Bethesda chh., Caroline Co., Va.,  
May 6.

Romine Settlement, Va., May 8.

Logansport, N. Y., 2d chh., May 26.

Green Point, L. I., N. Y., May 27.

Penn, Ind., May 28.

New Zion, Miss., May 29.

Albemarle Co., Va., May 30.

East Pittston, Me., June 2.

Rocky Point, Southold, L. I., June 2.

Lewiston Falls, Me., June 3.

Bridgeville, Pickens Co., Ala., June 12.

New York, N. Y., Union Baptist chh.,  
June 17.

Golconda, Pope Co., Ky., June.

Hebron, Va.

Lancaster (Clintonville), Mass., July 8.

Kirkersville, O., July 10.

New Marlborough, Mass., July 14.

Smith Co., Miss., July 17.

Plank Road, Onon. Co., N. Y., July 22.

Goodwill, Stokes Co., N. C.

Ithaca, Tompkins Co., N. Y., Aug. 4.

#### DEDICATIONS.

Whitehaven, Somerset Co., Md., Nov.  
Ypsilanti, Mich.

Allendale, R. I., May 27.

East Troy, Wisconsin, June 3.

Hannibal, Mo., June 6.

Salem, Ms., (chapel), June 7.

Milford, Con., June 10.

Wiota, Iowa.

Houghton, Talbot Co., Iowa.

Hoboken, N. J., July 1.

Cape Island, N. J., July 18.

Baltimore, Md., Seventh chh., Aug. 1.

Sanford, Me., Aug. 3.